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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the role of human rights in contemporary liberal democracy 
and considers this role specifically in the context of the 'war on terror'. The thesis 
examines the relationship between human rights and security developed in this context 
and considers the processes through which this relationship has been formulated as well 
as the various players involved in development and maintenance of what needs to be 
understood as a liberty-security regime.
The analysis begins from a critical understanding of contemporary liberalism still 
very much grounded in its classical tradition and seeks to interrogate the liberal character 
of the current regime. The necessary unraveling of this regime is done in part through a 
comparative analysis of the relationship between liberty and security as formulated in 
state strategy in the UK, Australia and the US. However, rather than understanding this 
regime as developed and sustained solely at the level of state or government action, the 
crucial role of civil society actors, particularly of certain intellectual strata and of human 
rights advocacy organisations, in constructing and legitimating such a regime, as well as 
the interplay between these perspectives, is also at the core of this study. The thesis 
demonstrates the pivotal role that liberal intellectuals and human rights organisations play 
in not only legitimating the current regime but also influencing its current form. 
Fundamentally, the research suggests that this legitimating function exists not in spite of 
their apparently critical position but because of it.
The analysis in turn aims to establish whether the role of human rights in this 
context is indicative of an inherent political functionality or whether there is the 
possibility that human rights can be part of an alternative and above all emancipatory 
politics. To develop this consideration, a critical review is provided of certain thinkers on 
the left who utilise human rights principles as central to a critique of the current regime 
and as part of their vision of an alternative, leftist politics. By demonstrating that the 
effect of a human rights framework on critical interventions is not restricted to those 
working within the liberal tradition, this thesis suggests that a commitment to human 
rights principles in this context cannot be part of the development of a substantive 
critique of both the current regime and the wider liberal-capitalist status quo.
IV
Introduction
The politics of liberty and security in the era of the 'war on terror'
This research seeks to provide a critical analysis of the human rights approach developed 
in the era of the 'war on terror' and the function human rights fulfil in the context of that 
'war'. It aims to investigate how the development of such a human rights regime is 
shaped by the security concerns underpinning the current security strategies put in place 
by governments who claim scrupulous respect for human rights. Since the events of 9-11, 
the notion of security has been infused almost completely with the notion of a 'war' 
against terrorism and we are told that national security relies entirely on its success. This 
apparently novel interpretation of security has been accompanied, in the UK at least, by 
an official commitment to human rights principles, whilst paradoxically courting critique 
for its impact on human rights. In the UK, the state's management of the concern for 
human rights and the concern with national security has therefore given rise to a liberty- 
security regime whereby the state's commitment to human rights is initially juxtaposed 
and soon subordinated to security strategies which have been criticised for impacting 
negatively on the human rights of certain populations.
Liberty and security have in this era been intertwined in a rhetoric of 'war' that 
continues to reveal new frontiers and necessitate new strategies. More pressingly, the 
relationship between human rights and security has moved beyond a simple juxtaposition 
to the point that the two concepts have been conflated and security itself has powerfully 
emerged and been constructed as a right - or rather, as a peculiar variant of the right to 
security. The formulation of and the emphasis on security as a right is indicative of the 
dominance of rights discourse which leads both to formulate diverse concerns or interests 
as a matter of rights and to present them as compatible with other rights, above all with 
those which seem threatened. The emphasis on security as a right, and a fundamental one, 
illustrates that human rights are not simply in close proximity to security policy but that 
they have infused the very language of security. The dominance of the rights language is 
further highlighted by the fact that not only supporters of the 'war on terror', but
overwhelmingly the majority of its critics have articulated their positions primarily in the 
language of rights. Despite the undoubted conflict between the various views and 
opinions on the liberty-security relationship there appears to be an underlying, if perhaps 
unacknowledged, agreement that this relationship has to be negotiated in the 
contemporary era within the parameters set by human rights.
This research seeks therefore to unravel this liberty-security regime. We will try 
to decipher the way in which the current formulation of the relationship between liberty 
and security has enabled the state to manage the apparent conflict between its concerns 
for human rights and the security strategies it deems essential. However, rather than 
understanding this liberty-security regime as developed and sustained solely at the level 
of state or government action, the crucial role of civil society actors ('civil society' 
understood in the Gramscian sense, see below), particularly of certain intellectual strata 
and of human rights advocacy organisations, in constructing and legitimating such a 
regime, as well as the interplay between these perspectives, will also be at the core of our 
study. The research will therefore seek to determine the extent to which the current 
regime in its present, hegemonic form is a result of this interplay between the state, an 
intellectual 'class' and human rights organisations - three kinds of players which will 
constitute the central strands of empirical investigation (see below). Crucial here will be 
to enquire whether this interplay is based on a convergence of views and, beyond that, the 
extent to which a common approach or framework underlies not only convergences but 
divergences.
For if this is so, if in reality a common approach underlies the very interplay 
between these different players, beyond their divergences, then the question arises - a 
question absolutely crucial for this research - as to the nature of the political terrain in 
which these agents operate, that is, about the politics they pursue and the parameters it 
sets for political action. Do the current critiques of the liberty-security regime (and so of 
state security and war politics) involve a different politics, that is do such critiques 
involve and pursue true political alternatives? The possibility that the conflicting views 
between so prominent players be mere differences in the context of a basically shared 
understanding about the fundamentals, strongly points, as daily observation in principle 
confirms, towards a politics essentially concerned with the maintenance of the status quo
and ready to, almost as a matter of course, de-legitimise and, in certain cases, criminalise, 
any alternative politics, above all emancipatory politics. The denial of the possibilities for 
any transformative action seems indeed a major and decisive aspect, as some thinkers 
have emphasised (cf, Badiou, Douzinas, Zizek and Ranciere among others), of such 
politics.
Now it seems beyond doubt that such politics is liberal politics. In other words 
the existence of a common approach to liberty and security hinges arguably on the 
essentially liberal doctrine on which the liberty-security regime has been established and 
continues to operate. To understand the regime as it currently operates, a theoretical 
framework needs to be developed that enables one to take into account what is at stake in 
liberalism and, from here, enables a substantive critical analysis of liberalism as 
manifested in the current liberty-security regime and human rights approach. To this 
purpose the analysis must be grounded in a critical understanding of what liberalism is. 
The apparent flexibility of the term in contemporary popular political discourse on both 
sides of the Atlantic suggests an empty notion that can be applied by, and in reference to, 
ideas and thinkers on both the left and the right. However, there exists a popular 
understanding that can be summarised as follows: 'liberalism is the tradition of thought 
whose central concern is the liberty of the individual' 1 . In light of the apparent conflict 
between security and liberty in the policies introduced by liberal states in the context of 
the 'war on terror' this understanding requires interrogation. The preservation and 
prioritisation of the liberty of the individual in itself requires consideration to ascertain 
what precisely this means in a liberal politics and how this is translated into the current 
politics of security.
To bring out the fundamental principles of liberalism as a specific politics a return 
to the foundational ideas of liberal thought is required. A critical understanding of 
contemporary liberalism demands in the first instance a return to the 'classical' liberal 
tradition to ascertain the underlying assumptions behind the apparent prioritisation of the 
liberty of the individual. In the following pages we will therefore turn to the foundations 
of liberal thought focussing on classical thinkers within the liberal tradition and drawing 
upon a series of key interventions in the critique of liberalism enabling this analysis to set
'Domenico Losurdo, Liberalism: A Counter History, (London: Verso, 2011), 1.
out a clear understanding of what liberalism is. This analysis is also crucial because of the 
status assigned to several key classical liberal thinkers in current debates about the liberal 
nature of the 'war on terror'. It is vital that a critical understanding of classical liberalism 
is established to determine the role these thinkers play (or are assigned) in the 
development of its contemporary form.
From this point it will be possible to firstly to determine the way in which the 
liberal understanding of the relationship between liberty and security was formulated and 
the extent to which this formulation continues to define the current liberal position. 
Secondly, this will enable us to highlight the main consequences of such liberal politics 
and to consider the extent to which they have intensified in the era of the 'war on terror'. 
Finally, we shall set out the empirical strands of this research and the main methods 
through which they will be addressed.
From Hobbes to Locke: the reordering of liberalism's priorities?
^As Mark Neocleous has noted , the commonly held understanding of liberalism defined 
by a concern with liberty is founded on an apparent reversal of Hobbes' emphasis on 
security by Locke. In this story Hobbes and Locke are positioned either side of a security- 
liberty 'balance' and it is only with Locke's reversal of Hobbes' prioritisation of security 
that the popular notion of liberalism defined by a concern for liberty emerges. In this 
sense Locke is (rightly) understood as providing the foundation of contemporary liberal 
political thought but the notion of a split from Hobbes and a reversal of priorities require 
consideration.
Hobbes's understanding of human nature demands the absolute power of a 
sovereign to ensure security. The perpetual war of all against all that characterises the 
state of nature can only be averted by a central authority whose priority can only be 
security. The power of the sovereign must be sufficient to ensure the security of all, 
without which man is reduced to relying 'on his own strength and art, for caution against
2 Mark Neocleous, "Security, Liberty and the Myth of Balance: Towards a Critique of Security Politics", 
Contemporary Political Theory, 6 (2007); Mark Neocleous, Critique of Security, (Montreal: McGill- 
Queens University Press, 2008)
all other men' 3 . The pursuit of security requires the entrance into a political covenant 
through which the individual enjoys the security provided by the sovereign. But, escaping 
the insecurity of the state of nature also requires an individual to relinquish a certain 
degree of the absolute liberty that characterises this pre-social state. As Quentin Skinner 
has noted, in the bargain Hobbes foresees 'we lose only those aspects of our natural 
liberty that if retained, would undermine our own safety and the more general value of 
peace' 4 . For Skinner there are two elements of natural liberty in this formulation; 
everyone must retain the rights to free movement and the 'right not to be incommoded' 5 
but in reality these aspects of natural liberty are simply what could be called, 
paraphrasing Alain Badiou, the liberties of the human animal, as they are exclusively 
concerned with self-preservation. Therefore, in Hobbes' vision the degree of liberty given 
up by free men who enter such a political covenant is determined by the return they 
receive: 'How far therefore in the making of a commonwealth, a man subjecteth his will 
to the power of others, must appear from the end, namely security' 6 . Security is achieved 
at the expense of liberty but this is ultimately inescapable.
We have therefore in Hobbes a very clear relationship between security and 
liberty and it is this relationship that is said to be radically altered by Locke; as noted 
above such a reconfiguration of central concerns is said to provide the foundation of 
contemporary liberal thought. However, as Neocleous has demonstrated through a 
consideration of Locke's account of prerogative power, we find in Locke not a reversal of 
Hobbes to a tradition of liberty, but instead 'much more a liberal discourse on the priority 
of security'1. This non-reversal has also been noted by other scholars such as Leo Strauss 
who suggested that 'in spite of the limitations which Locke demands, the commonwealth 
remains for him, as it was for Hobbes, "the mighty leviathan": in entering civil society, 
"men give up all their natural power to the society which they enter into'" 8 . Liberties in
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968 [1651]), 224.
Quentin Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 53.
Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty, 53 
6Hobbes in Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty, 53. 
7Neocleous, Critique of Security, 14 (original emphasis) 
8Leo Straus, Natural Right and History, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1965 [1953]), 231.
this sense remain understood as powers conceded on entry into civil society and in 
continuity of Hobbes's central contribution 'Locke essentially identifies the function of 
the sovereign as the production of security' 9
This rejection of the standard definition of liberalism is of crucial importance to a 
critical understanding of the liberty-security relationship in liberal political thought and 
exposes a disconnection between the presentation of liberalism and the reality of its 
founding ideas. Maintaining the fundamental status of this apparent reversal has a crucial 
ideological function for the presentation of liberalism and this will be a central concern of 
this thesis. In the first instance this requires a more sustained consideration of Hobbes' 
true influence over the liberal tradition.
Hobbes' influence over the development of liberal thought and Locke's relation 
to Hobbes cannot be reduced to this overly simplistic and ultimately misleading notion of 
a reversal of central concerns. Instead it is crucial to understand Hobbes' influence over 
the foundation of the liberal tradition as a product of his understanding of the individual. 
It is from this perspective that we can understand that instead of a departure or reversal 
'Locke completed an edifice that rested on Hobbes's sure foundation' 10 .
The liberal tradition founded in Hobbes enacted a reversal of the seventeenth 
century way of understanding the individual. They enforced a downward move in 
considering the human from below and this had the novel effect of presenting self- 
preservation as the defining feature of the human being, and as a result, of society. The 
liberal doctrine developed what has been appropriately called possessive individualism 11 . 
This possessive individualism is founded in the model of society that Hobbes infers, 
identified by MacPherson as a 'possessive market society' 12 . Within this possessive 
market model there must be a 'compulsive framework of law' which protects life, and
^eocleous, "Security, Liberty and the Myth of Balance", 139
10Crawford Brough MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 270
1 ' MacPherson, Possessive Individualism 
12 MacPherson, Possessive Individualism, 46
crucially, property 13 . Hobbes removed man from society and made him the centre as the 
'subject of modernity and the source of law' 14 .
Hobbes' concept of equality was twofold, consisting of equal insecurity of men 
and their equal subordination to the market. The equal submission to the market was 
derived from the inevitability of the market system. The only concept of justice that could 
therefore be conceived was that of the market and this was because 'a rational individual 
realised his true position as a mere unit in a market society' 15 . Thus Hobbes cemented not 
simply the validity of the market system but more importantly its inevitability. The 
market system was naturalised and from this the only possible concept of justice was 
enforced. While the influence of Hobbes still resonates in the contemporary period his 
argument is confused by his concept of equality. The market system necessitates unequal 
insecurity to maintain the dominance of the propertied classes. Hobbes neglected the 
reality of the class based system in the pre-revolutionary capitalism that he so fervently 
supported. For this to be rectified one would have to wait for Locke.
However, prior to Locke's adaptation and refinement of Hobbes, the Levellers' 
'Agreement of the People' reinforced the centrality of property. MacPherson illustrates 
that the individualism implicit in the Leveller's demands credits their contribution to the 
liberal tradition and not to democracy as they are often associated. They developed the 
naturalisation of property evident in Hobbes and the securing of the right to property 
formed the basis of their demands for extended franchise. The Levellers asserted that the 
primary role of government was the preservation of property. The right to property was 
central to their demands and the extension of franchise they are so known for was simply 
a tactic to preserve this right. Franchise was in fact only 'required' by those propertied 
classes and thus the exclusions from their demands of a large majority of the population 
could be justified. The Levellers' formulations of the individual right to property as a 
natural right and their insistence that its preservation was the pivotal goal of government 
paved the way for the doctrine of Locke.
13 MacPherson, Possessive Individualism, 57-58
14 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), 71.
15 MacPherson, Possessive Individualism, 86
The individual natural right to property is central to Locke's theory on civil 
society and government. In development of the established tradition, Locke asserted that 
the preservation of property was the main aim of government. MacPherson saw that 
Locke's 'astonishing achievement' was to 'base the property right on natural right and 
natural law and then to remove all the natural law limits from the property right' 16 . As a 
result 'private property appears, not as a social institution, but as a logical entailment of 
the individual's self-sufficiency' 17 . He in turn crucially justified the rejection of limits on 
appropriation. He explained that the introduction of money removed the practical 
restrictions to appropriation and that the value of money was derived precisely from its 
unequal value. Locke fundamentally justified the specifically capitalist appropriation of 
land and money.
He utilised partial quotations and manipulations of traditional, and thus 
legitimacy-giving, sources such as the Bible and what he call 'the judicious Hooker' to 
justify the morality of his doctrine. Whilst explaining that the abandonment of the idea of 
common land was granted by God, Locke set up two classes of people: the 'industrious 
and rational' and the 'quarrelsome and contentious' 18 (also referred to as the 'lazy and 
inconsiderate' 19). Locke's view of free society is better understood as consisting of 'two 
races: the property owners and labourers' 20 exposing the fact that for Locke humans are 
equal only in their desire for self-preservation, not in the rational means to it. The 
labouring 'race' is incapable of raising their thoughts beyond the basic requirements of 
subsistence and their subordinate position is maintained in the most part by their own 
lack of reason.
16 MacPherson, Possessive Individualism, 197
17 Louis Dumont, Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986), 81.
18 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett, 1690 (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 291
19 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Abridged and Edited by Kenneth P. Winkler, 
1689 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1996), 28.
20 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1944), 119 emphasis added.
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However, Locke is careful to demonstrate the additional components of his 'free' 
society that maintain this inequality. The role of religion is crucial to the instruction of 
the people:
The greatest part cannot know, and therefore they must believe ... the instruction 
of the people [is] best left to the precepts and principles of the gospel ... Hearing
0 1plain commands, is the sure and only course to bring them to obedience .
Beyond this it is the role of the government to maintain the pacification of the labouring 
masses. He remains aware that the labourer's reward is set at the bare minimum and there 
remains a risk of the poor struggling directly with the rich for their share. This however 
only happens in 'male-administration of neglected, or mismanaged government' 22 . The 
state thus has a pivotal role to play in defending inequality and in protecting the property 
of the 'industrious and rational' minority. As Neocleous explains, 'in positing the key 
function of the state as the protection of property rights, Locke's recodification of the 
relationship between politics and economics could hardly fail to point to security rather
f\ -j _
than liberty as the main liberal thematic' . The notion of Locke reversing Hobbes's 
emphasis on security is here exposed as an ideological construction that serves only to 
mystify the fact that liberty and security in liberal thought cannot be separated in the way 
inferred by the notion of a reversal of concerns. Liberalism has as its central concerns the 
liberty of the minority to exercise their right to private property but more so the security 
of such property and its owners24 .
21 John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. lan Thomas Ramsey, 1695, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press 1958), 66.
22 Locke in MacPherson, Possessive Individualism, 223 
23Neocleous, Critique of Security, 22
24 The critical reading of Locke found in MacPherson is not without its own critics. James Tully's A 
Discourse on Property provides a reinterpretation (or rehabilitation) of Locke and rejects MacPherson's 
vision of his work defined by the justification of unlimited individual appropriation and the self-interested 
exploitation of the labouring classes. Crucial to Tully is the notion of chanty set out in the First Treatise as 
a fundamental duty that for him undermines MacPherson's reading. For Tully, Locke's theory is 
'constructed in opposition to an unlimited rights theory' and cannot be read in the way that attributes him a 
pivotal role in the justification of private property. See, James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke 
and his adversaries, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 131-132. Tully's 'rehabilitation' of 
Locke has itself been criticized for its attempt to deny or conceal the exclusionary logic running through 
Locke's understanding of'the people'. Neal Wood, who is not without his own contentions with 
MacPherson's text, concurs with the notion that Locke acknowledges and sees as desirable the social
An exclusionary logic
Locke stated that unlimited appropriation had divine sanction as the land given in 
common was really intended for the 'industrious and rational'. By this he offered a 
justification of the already established inequality between the propertied and the non- 
propertied classes, and the perseverance of this inequality. Locke further justified the 
'morality' of this inequality through his manipulation of the work of Hooker who is well 
quoted (and misquoted) in the Second Treatise. Locke twisted Hooker's duty of mutual 
love and used it to establish the natural inequality of men. This duty was subsequently
S\ £ _____
reduced to the much less onerous duty of not harming others . This manipulation of 
Hooker is necessary to transcend the duty of mutual love which capitalist appropriation 
would oppose. Reducing duty to 'not harming each other' thus withdrew restraints to 
unlimited capitalist appropriation and its exacerbation of inequality.
The resulting inequality was made natural by Locke in his novel formulation of 
the state of nature and its necessary laws. In Locke's state of nature every man has the 
right to be the 'Executioner of the Law of Nature' 26 . Right in this sense is to be 
understood as a power. This was combined with Locke's notion that 'the first and 
strongest desire God planted in man and wrought into the very principles of nature is self 
preservation27 . This acceptance of self-preservation as a natural right reinforced the right 
to unlimited appropriation.
Locke's doctrine of the laws of nature naturalised not only capitalist appropriation 
but the central capitalist principles of 'labour as a commodity' and the wage relation. 
Locke professed that the right to the appropriation of the produce of another's labour was
divisions of labor that defined the unequal society he confronted. See, Neal Wood, The Politics ofLocke's 
Philosophy: A Social Study of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983); Neal Wood, John Locke and Agrarian Capitalism, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984). However, the validity of MacPherson's analysis is reinforced more clearly by the 
fact that such an opposing theorist as Leo Strauss can admit "considerable agreement" between 
MacPherson analysis (specifically here in reference to a 1951 paper that preceded and informed Possessive 
Individualism) and his own interpretation of Locke. See, Strauss, Natural Right and History, 234m; 
Crawford Brough MacPherson, "Locke on capitalist appropriation" Western political quarterly 4 (1951).
25 Locke, Two Treatises, Second Treatise 5
26 Locke, Two Treatises, Second Treatise 8
27 Locke, Two Treatises, First Treatise 88
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'part of the natural order' 28 . The final acceptance in the justification of capitalist relations 
was in the affirmation of class differentiation as part of the natural order. The 
establishment of class differentiation in rights and rationality enables Locke to provide a 
'positive moral basis for capitalist society' 29 . The assumption that individual rights are 
based in the most honourable traditions of western philosophy arguably overlooks, or 
fails to realise, how Locke's development contravenes arguments for justice and 
encourages inequality. Locke's constitutionalism was thus a defence of the rights of 
expanding property rather than the rights of the individual over the state. Locke's real 
effect on the liberal tradition is evident in the formalisation of his ideas on unequal 
property which were bound as a role of government in the Federalist Papers:
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, 
is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of 
these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different 
and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees 
and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the 
sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the 
society into different interests and parties30 .
Ensuring the security of the authentic human
Marx outlined several of the central tenants of possessive individualism which were later 
illustrated by MacPherson. In On the Jewish Question, Marx noted that liberty as a right 
of man, as constructed in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man the Citizen, stood 
as a right based on the separation, and not association, of men31 . Indeed Marx was well 
aware that the liberty spoken of in the Declaration amounted to a right to private property 
in its practical application. He also noted that the right to property amounted to a right of
28 MacPherson, Possessive Individualism, 220
29 MacPherson, Possessive Individualism, 22 1
30 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist: with Letters of 'Brutus ', ed. by 
Terence Ball, 1787-88, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 41, Federalist No. 10, attributed to 
Madison.
31 Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question", in Writings of the young Marx on Philosophy and Society, ed. 
Easton, LD &Guddat, KH, 1843, (New York: Anchor Books, 1967)
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self-interest. Equality as composed in the Declaration of 1795 is restricted to the equal 
right to liberty as explained above.
Fundamentally, with regard to the relation of the individual to society, Marx 
dissects the construction of society in the Constitution of 1793 to be focussed solely on 
security. Specifically, he states that:
Security is the supreme social concept of civil society, the concept of the police, 
the concept that the whole society exists to guarantee each of its members the
^0preservation of his person, his rights, and his property .
In fact, security stands as the guarantee of the egoism found in, and necessary for, 
capitalist society. Marx offered a scathing critique of the apparent goal of equality in the 
Declaration. He found it 'curious' that a nation just beginning to free itself and 
supposedly 'tear down the barriers between different sections of the people' should 
proclaim the justification of the egoistic man. This is less curious when one accepts that, 
as did Marx, 'man as bourgeois rather than man as citizen is considered to be the proper 
and authentic man' 33 . This 'man' stood as the basis of the political state which was 
unsurprising for Marx as the goal of the French revolution was restricted to political 
emancipation. Political emancipation for Marx was 'a reduction of man to a member of 
civil society, to an egoistic independent individual on the one hand and to a citizen, a 
moral person, on the other' 34 . Political revolution is bourgeois revolution and it serves to 
give the right to private property. The resulting state form thus legitimates the inequality 
inherent in private property.
Locke's fundamental role is to set out a logic which allowed liberals to 
simultaneously advocate 'freedom' and 'non-interference from the state' and put in place 
what has to be qualified as a ferocious regime of regular violence and coercion against 
the people. The primary recipients of this violence are of course the people, among whom 
there are many who Locke qualified as the 'lazy and inconsiderate' who must be pacified 
to maintain a system of inequality. This is clearly a logic of total segregation and
32 Marx, "On the Jewish Question", 236
33 Marx, "On the Jewish Question", 237 original emphases
34 Marx, "On the Jewish Question", 241
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exclusion upon which the liberal tradition has been able to justify what appear 
fundamentally illiberal practices. This is most explicit in the fact that many liberals 
(including Locke) have found no problem in aligning the vindication of slavery in the 
colonies with their condemnation of political 'slavery' 35 that they saw as the want of 
monarchy. The separation of society into two distinct races demanded a process of 
dehumanisation that legitimated the violence directed at the labouring masses at home in 
the same way that it legitimated the slavery of black populations overseas. The separation 
into two races sets the 'authentic' man apart from the inauthentic or more specifically sets 
the human apart from the subhuman. This distinction is made clear by Locke:
There is a difference of degrees in men's understandings, apprehensions, and 
reasonings, to so great a latitude, that one may, without doing injury to mankind, 
affirm that there is a greater distance between some men and others in this respect 
than between some men and some beasts36
The subhuman race does not require liberty or security; these issues within liberalism 
have to be understood in reference to the minority for whom they are a concern. Security 
then must be understood not only as the supreme concept of bourgeois society but the
'j fj _ _
'supreme concept of liberal ideology' . For Neocleous, who certainly echoes Foucault's
 j o
thesis here but only follows it in part, liberalism must be read 'less as a philosophy of 
liberty and more as a technique of security' 39 . Indeed as Neocleous has suggested, the 
development of Hobbes' ideas in liberal thought needs to be understood not in terms of a 
reversal of the understanding of security vis-a-vis liberty but a move to treat them as 
synonymous40 . This move required a particular vision of security and equated to the 
'liberty of private property' and in this sense became the 'ideological guarantee of the
35Losurdo, Liberalism, Chapter 1.
36 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 331
37Neocleous, Critique of Security, 31
38 See, Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977 1978, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Michel Foucault, The Birth ofBiopolitics: Lectures at the 
Collegede France, 1978-1979, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
39Neocleous, Critique of Security, 31
40 Mark Neocleous, The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power, (London: Pluto 
Press, 2000), 43
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egoism of the independent and self-interested pursuit of property within bourgeois
41 
society .
Domenico Losurdo's counter-history of liberalism makes clear that the image of 
liberalism defined by freedom or moreover by a free market needs to be revised. He 
illustrates that the market was not a site of free exchange by equals but for centuries was 
'a site of exclusion, dehumanisation and terror' 42 . This alternative image is revealed 
through a critical analysis of the foundations of liberal thought and this makes clear that 
the liberal state is not restrained by its central concerns but is instead willing and able to 
employ all the means necessary to ensure the maintenance of the status quo. But the 
standard definition of liberalism's central concern lying with liberty serves a crucial 
ideological function and the selective history of liberal ideas mystifies the reality of 
liberal politics.
Liberalism, a 'consistent, comprehensive metaphysical system'
It remains crucial then to set out how contemporary liberalism as the heir of this political 
philosophy is to be understood. The work of Carl Schmitt is understood by many on both 
the left and the right to provide an useful critique of contemporary liberalism. This 
critique, set out predominantly in his work of the Weimar period, is recognised as 
providing an insight into the reality of a liberal politics and has become increasingly 
influential since the translations of his work into English in the latter part of the twentieth 
century. The status of Schmitt's work demands here a consideration of his understanding 
of liberalism and its relevance to an analysis of the current liberty-security regime. More 
specifically, Schmitt's focus on the principles of human rights within his critique of 
liberalism suggests an important theoretical contribution to assist in the consideration of 
the role of human rights in relation to, or as part of, the current politics of security.
More recently the work of Alain Badiou has provided arguably the most incisive 
critique of contemporary liberalism and has, like Schmitt, placed an emphasis on human 
rights and humanitarian ethics at the core of such a critique. Although Schmitt and
41Neocleous, The Fabrication of Social Order, 43 
42Losurdo, Liberalism, 344
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Badiou are diametrically opposed thinkers, they provide crucial contributions to a critical 
analyses of liberalism and human rights- critiques whose fundamental common points 
are seemingly all the more significant in that they stem from utterly opposed premises 
and understandings43 . Therefore, the following section will consider the utility of an 
engagement with Schmitt and Badiou focussing in the first instance on Schmitt's 
contribution to an understanding of liberalism and its potential relevance to a critique of 
the current liberty-security regime. From this point it will consider the critical analysis of 
human rights developed by both thinkers to ascertain the effect the current humanitarian 
ethics has on the form and function of a contemporary liberal politics.
It is through Schmitt's critique of liberalism that the disparity between the 
presentation of liberalism and the reality of its operation is made most clear and in 
negotiating us through this void Schmitt for many provides unrivalled assistance in 
acquiring an understanding of what contemporary liberalism is. In the first instance 
Schmitt understood liberalism as a 'consistent, comprehensive metaphysical system' 44 . 
This comprehensive system is based on the following general principle which constitutes 
the kernel of liberalism: 'That the truth can be found through an unrestrained clash of 
opinion and that competition will produce harmony' 45 . The notions of unrestrained 
clashes of opinion and the utility of competition obviously equate with the liberal 
enthusiasm for free trade and unrestrained economic competition but Schmitt reveals that 
this principle, and liberalism's resulting engagement, extends beyond the economic 
sphere - indeed it is at the core of the liberal understanding of politics.
The emphasis on this 'clash of opinion' reveals the central importance of debate 
within the liberal system. Understanding this central position is for Schmitt crucial to
43 An engagement with Schmitt's ideas has influenced a number of figures on the left who reject the politics 
of human rights (here one could point toward Hardt and Negri's Empire and Zizek's work) and the 
convergence between Schmitt and Badiou's political thinking is a point of consideration here. However, it 
is important to note from the outset as Nina Power has made clear that the convergence around a 
conceptualisation of the political and a critique of the liberal attempt to deny the political that is evident 
between Schmitt and Badiou (and will be discussed below) do not infer a convergence of their politics or 
political aims. See, Nina Power, "Towards An Anthropology of Infinitude: Badiou and the Political 
Subject", Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 2, no. 1-2, 2006.
44 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy, (London: The MIT Press 
1988 [1923]), 35
45 Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 35
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explain the significance of the two political demands made by liberal rationalism. These 
two demands are the 'postulate of openness in political life and the demand for the 
division of powers A6 . The second demand is more specifically understood as 'the theory 
of balance of opposing forces from which truth will emerge automatically as an 
equilibrium 41 . The notion of balance is given central importance in the liberal system as 
the method through which truth can be achieved.
Both points are structured around the notion of competition, whether of interests 
or of opinions, and the elevated status it receives as the means through which truth, 
whether profit or a balanced view, will emerge. The concept of balance, which in its 
different uses involves an astonishing conflation of reason (or reasoning) and interests (or 
the calculation of interests) whereby the former is subordinated to the latter, is all 
pervasive extending way beyond the balance of powers; we will find it at the very centre 
of the debate on the liberty-security regime as the pivotal concept around which 
'opposing forces' are reconciled.
Unsurprisingly, liberalism constructs the state as a mediator 'balancing' opposing 
forces. The concept of balance reduces the workings of the state to this mediating role 
and ultimately legitimises the existing order, for the state is supposed to work with what 
there is, thus without affecting the existing distribution of forces. Balance is a major 
object of Schmitt's critique of liberalism as it obscures the reality of political decision 
making and exposes a glaring distinction between liberalism's presentation of the 
workings of the state and the reality the operation of the state, including fundamentally 
the liberal state. Liberalism's emphatic commitment to parliamentarianism is 
symptomatic of the fear of the reality of political decision making - parliamentarianism 
provides liberalism with its response to naked power and force, justified by the claims to 
achieve truth and justice. The total liberal commitment to parliamentarianism is justified 
through the commitment to the processes of discussion, openness and the balancing of 
interests.
46 Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 36 emphasis added
47 Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 36 emphasis added
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Discussion, or 'negotiation', is not simply one central idea in liberalism, it 
replaces the political process. These concepts are for Schmitt a 'cautious half measure' 
that is utilised by liberalism to delay or avoid the exacting political decision that is at the 
core of any politics. Parliamentary debate serves to replace the 'definitive debate' or the 
'decisive bloody battle' with deliberation and in turn permit 'the decision to be suspended 
forever' 49 . Liberalism in this sense fears the 'bloody battle' that must be waged by the 
state. It constructs the state as a benign institution concerned only with balancing 
opposing forces instead of making the vital decisions necessitated by the reality of the 
political process. Schmitt exposes most clearly the void between the liberal explanation 
of the workings of the state and the actual reality of state operation including under 
liberal governments.
The liberal state and the rule of law
This liberal construction of the role of the state for Schmitt raises the issue of exception. 
The concept of exception occupies a central position within Schmitt's critique and 
ultimately provides the test that Schmitt subjects liberalism to. It is crucial here to expand 
Schmitt's notion of the exception to consider its central place in his critique of liberalism 
and fundamentally to consider its relevance to an analysis of the contemporary liberal 
politics.
Exception understood in a Schmittian sense is irretrievably bound with the 
concept of sovereign power through the famous statement that 'sovereign is he who 
decides on the exception' 50 . Key to understanding the sovereign through the exception is 
the notion that exception does not relate solely to emergency decrees or exceptional 
circumstances but refers to 'a general concept in the theory of the state' 51 . Indeed, 
Schmitt explains that 'it is precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of
48 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab, 
1922, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 63
49 Schmitt, Political Theology, 63
50 Schmitt, Political Theology, 5
51 Schmitt, Political Theology, 5
17
sovereignty' 52 . The relation between norm and exception is decided by the sovereign and 
the decision made is a decision 'in the true sense of the word' 53 . The exception can never 
be wholly prescribed in law and thus cannot in effect be derived entirely from the norm. 
If the exception involves transcending the norm, then deciding if an exception exists is an 
extra-legal decision.
This basic formulation makes an alignment between Schmitt and Locke's account 
of prerogative power that is obscured in the dominant but highly selective appreciation of 
Locke's influence over contemporary liberal thought. If we understand that in Locke we 
find 'a space for the exercise of prompt and flexible action outside the legal limits placed 
on the state' 54 then there exists more shared ground between these thinkers than many 
would be willing to acknowledge (including Schmitt himself55). However, the importance 
of Schmitt's conceptualisation is that he makes clear that the liberal obsession with 
regulation and checks and balances obscures the sovereign. Who the sovereign is, is clear 
simply when the action is not subject to control in this sense. The relation between 
sovereign and legal system is one of interest when opposed to the liberal misconception 
that regulation is appropriate or even possible. Schmitt is clear in his explanation that 
while the sovereign stands 'outside the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless 
belongs to it, for it is he who must decide if the constitution must be suspended in its 
entirety' 56 .
What Schmitt's analysis reveals most fundamentally is that the liberal formulation 
of exception is therefore characterised by an impossible attempt at regulation and at least 
a formal containment of the exception (and by extension, a containment of the 
sovereign). Essentially what characterises an exception is unlimited power and thus 
Schmitt is careful to point out throughout his discussion that not every emergency decree 
is necessarily an exception. The attempt to regulate the exception and thus repress the
52 Schmitt, Political Theology, 6
53 Schmitt, Political Theology, 6
54Neocleous, "Security, Liberty and the Myth of Balance", 136
55 See, Schmitt Political Theology; Leonard Feldman, "Schmitt, Locke, and the Limits of Liberalism", 
Konturen: Interdisciplinary Journal for German Cultural Analysis, 1 (2008) 
<http://konturen.uoregon.edu/vol l_Feldman.html >
56 Schmitt, Political Theology, 1
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question of the sovereign is however to misunderstand, or misrepresent, the nature of the 
exceptional situation in which 'the state remains, whereas law recedes' 57 . The recession 
of the law in this situation is implicit and contradicts the attempt to regulate the exception 
through law. Indeed, Schmitt illustrates that the tendency of liberal constitutionalism to 
regulate the exception as precisely as possible gives rise to the peculiar instance in which 
the law spells out in detail the case in which it suspends itself. For Schmitt the liberal 
drive to legally regulate the exception is an oxymoron born out of liberalism's 
unwillingness or even inability to acknowledge political reality. The norm cannot define 
and regulate the exception; instead the exception 'confirms not only the rule but also its 
existence, which derives only from the exception' 58 . In suggesting that the exception is 
crucial to the operation of the state, Schmitt takes to task the liberal denial of sovereign 
power that while crucial to a liberal presentation of politics, is dismissed entirely by the 
facts of the liberal state. Balance and exception are entwined in this contradiction; indeed, 
the very idea of a sovereign power denies the idea of 'truth' arising out of a competition 
between interests.
Violence and the law
Schmitt's concept of the exception has been highly attractive to a range of scholars 
seeking to understand liberal politics and more specifically the current politics of 
security. Schmitt's concept of the exception has been adopted as the framework by which 
the recourse to, and development of, emergency powers in the context of the 'war on 
terror' can be critically understood. However, there appears a tendency among certain 
versions of this scholarship - versions of what could be referred to as a 'Left- 
Schmittianism59 - to define state violence exclusively as the result of the suspension of 
the law. According to Neocleous the problem with this turn to Schmitt in the current
57 Schmitt, Political Theology, 12
58 Schmitt, Political Theology, 15 
59Neocleous, Critique of Security, 73
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context60 is a tendency to produce a critique based on the idea that the emergency powers 
introduced in the name of security are exceptional both in terms of them marking a 
departure from the norm and involving a transcendence of the law. This assumption leads 
many leftist critiques of the 'war on terror' to conclude that the violence of the state only 
occurs when the law is absent and the necessary response is thus reduced to a 'less-than- 
radical' 61 demand for a return to the rule of law.
While this is a valid critique of certain leftist analyses produced in recent years, as 
a blanket conclusion it is a product of a misreading of Schmitt who makes clear that 
emergency powers and the exception are not equivalent phenomena. We can accept, as 
Neocleous suggests, that many emergency powers conducted in the name of security both 
pre and post 9/11 are unexceptional both in terms of being a central feature of normal 
political management and crucially, emerging from within the law62 but this does not 
preclude the relevance or importance of Schmitt's critique to an analysis of contemporary 
liberalism. A reading of Schmitt as utilised here accepts, as many others on the left have 
made clear, that 'law is inextricably linked with violence' 63 and avoids a formulation of 
law and violence in opposition that is essentially at the core of the liberal commitment to 
legal regulation. In accepting that there is a far more complex relationship between law 
and violence this analysis remains aware that the concept of exception needs to be 
understood not simply as a reference to emergency decrees but, as already noted, a 
general concept in the theory of the state. An acceptance of the state's capacity to 
transcend the law and an exposure of the liberal rule of law as simply representing one 
side of liberalism, are not new to left or Marxist theory64 and the analysis here heeds 
Joachim Hirsch's warning that we must remain aware of the two sides of bourgeois
60 For a critique of any attempt to utilise Schmitt as part of the development of a left politics see: Mark 
Neocleous, "Friend or enemy?: Reading Schmitt politically". Radical Philosophy 79 (1996); Richard 
Wolin, The Frankfurt School Revisited, (New York: Routledge, 2006), chapter 13.
61 Neocleous, Critique of Security, 73 
62Neocleous, Critique of Security, 72 
63Douzinas, The End of Human Rights, 330
64 See, Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in their Place, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 
57-8; See also, Andreas Kalyvas, "The Stateless Theory: Poulantzas's Challenge to Postmodernism" in 
Paradigm Lost: State Theory Reconsidered, ed. Stanley Aronowitz and Peter Bratsis, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2002) 109.
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rule65 . It is from this perspective that an understanding of the liberal state as Janus-faced 
- and thus capable of managing the apparent contradiction between its commitment to the 
rule of law and its reliance on open violence - is crucial. It is precisely here, in exposing 
this Janus-faced nature of liberalism, that Schmitt is most useful. This analysis seeks 
therefore to use Schmitt analytically as a source of conceptual tools through which a 
substantive critical analysis of contemporary liberalism and liberal politics can be 
conducted. Fundamentally, to establish an understanding of human rights and their 
central place in liberal politics such a use of Schmitt is an essential starting point.
Depoliticisation: a premise and a major consequence of liberal politics
For Schmitt the denial of sovereign power underpins a politics that is ultimately 
depoliticised, denying the reality of decision making that is at the core of any effective 
politics, substituting it for discussion and negotiation. In his analysis the concepts of 
balance and exception must be understood as central to this depoliticisation; their status 
in liberal politics exemplifies the underlying premise of depoliticisation, and 
depoliticisation is a major consequence of their employment as detailed above. An 
analysis of the liberty-security regime that is concerned with the liberal employment of 
these concepts in the context of war must consider how such a depoliticisation obscures 
both the reality of conflict and the regime's capacity for violence (both the violence of 
the law and the violence that results from its suspension).
The depoliticisation of liberal politics is more substantively rooted in two major 
ideas that will be expanded below: first, the concept of humanity; and second, the 
submission of a single, overarching universal 'ethics' that denies the singularity of 
situations. Liberal politics puts human rights at its very centre and by doing so, constructs 
politics in a moral and moralising fashion by means of two major divisions inherently 
tied to the concept of humanity and the dehumanisation it invokes in its current usage.
65 '[The state] is also prepared to use coercion outside of the framework of law to secure bourgeois rule 
whenever the proletariat threatens the foundations of the capitalist order. Freedom, equality, and the rule of 
law are only one side of bourgeois rule: its other is raison d'etat, class bias, and open violence. Both facets 
are essential to the reproduction of bourgeois society and neither should be neglected'. Joachim Hirsch in 
The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods, by Bob Jessop (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982), 123
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Badiou makes clear the perseverance of a liberal politics that is based as it has been from 
its outset on the division of the people into the human and the non-human. The first 
division involves a distinction between human beings and the 'in-human' criminal or 
terrorist while the second division emerges from the 'split subject' of human rights 
whereby the 'active' subject (the human) is confronted by a 'sub-human' 'passive' 
victim. Both these divisions are based on essentially depoliticised terrain established by 
the concept of humanity and will be explained in turn below.
Schmitt made clear that the central principle of human rights - absolute human 
equality - was essentially a liberal formulation that presents 'equality without the 
necessary correlate of inequality, and as a result (is) conceptually and practically 
meaningless, an indifferent equality' 66 . This formulation of equality is in reality 
impossible in the political realm as it is not possible to 'abstract out what is political 
leaving only universal human equality' 67 and indeed in different realms of socio-political 
life it is not possible to deny the essential inequality that gives equality its meaning and 
substance. Inside a democratic state a level of real equality does exist based not on 
humanity but on citizenship and the homogeneity within necessitates the inequality of 
those outside the nation68 . To suggest that all people are equal solely on the basis of their 
humanity devalues political equality based on citizenship and moreover as a result 'the 
sphere of political and therefore politics itself would be devalued at least in the same 
degree, and would become something insignificant' 69 . Placing human rights at the centre 
of politics illustrates the devaluation of political equality and the necessary devaluation of 
politics more generally that characterises liberal politics.
The use of the apolitical concept of humanity in political situations has more 
specific consequences especially relevant in the context of a war against terrorism. It 
denies the concept of enemy and thus negates the friend/enemy distinction that is at the
66 Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 12
67 Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 11
68 Beyond the global situation the affect of this 'abstracting' out the political within states raises a crucial 




crux of the political in the Schmittian sense70 . It denies, to express it more aptly with 
Badiou, avoiding the Schmittian essentialisation and objectification of the political 
category as something given in advance, the possible political emergence or production 
of'the Two' of politics.71 . The concept of humanity does not however, in its denial of the 
political, involve a redundancy of violence and indeed war. The concept of a war fought 
in the name of humanity, a humanitarian war (or 'intervention' to give it its contemporary 
resonance), paradoxically provides the very basis and crucially, the legitimation, of the 
most extreme forms of war. Since such wars are fought against dehumanized beings, not 
against human enemies, they are not political wars aimed to simply defeat the enemy, but 
- as the current 'war on terror' plainly shows72 - moral wars of annihilation aimed to 
eradicate evil:
When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for 
the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a 
universal concept against its military opponent. At the expense of its opponent, it 
tried to justify itself with humanity in the same way as one can misuse peace, 
justice, progress, and civilisation in order to claim these as one's own and to deny 
the same to the enemy73
In monopolising claims to this concept of humanity the enemy is denied the 
quality of being human and declared a criminal or even 'terrorist' who must be 
annihilated with all the violence available to the state. The 'war on terror' has in its 
official rhetoric usurped the concept of humanity to frame a war in which human beings 
fight against the 'inhuman' terrorist who is located outside humanity and indeed an
70 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition, trans. George Schwab, 1932 (London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2007)
71 Alain Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, ed& trans. Norman Madarasz (New York: SUNY Press, 1999) 
90-91.
72 As, at this very moment, it shows how a very slow and apparently difficult change of perspective, after 
years of failure, is taking hold. This change is most telling, for it involves, as can be seen in Afghanistan 
today, abandoning the war of annihilation and fighting instead a much more selective war and ostensibly 
focusing the main efforts on the reconstruction of the invaded territories and the protection of the civilian 
populations.
73 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 54
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enemy of it74 . The depoliticisation of the terrorist is compounded by the current 
hegemonic, depoliticised understanding of terrorism:
It must be said that today, at the end of its semantic evolution, the word 'terrorist' 
is an intrinsically propagandist term. It has no neutral readability. It dispenses 
with all reasoned examination of political situations, of their causes and 
consequences75 .
A war in this sense does not confront a legitimate enemy but an 'outlaw of humanity' and 
war can thereby be 'driven to extreme inhumanity' 76 . The moralising function 
exemplified by the assignment of good (those on the side of humanity) and evil (the 
enemy of humanity) provides the legitimation for the most amazing violence that 
accompanies the humanitarian 'effort'. Thus used the concept of humanity is ultimately 
inseparable from violence potentially in its most extreme forms.
The concept of humanity as it is currently applied involves a dehumanisation that 
operates concurrently on two levels. The second level that occurs adjacent to the 
dehumanisation of the enemy, involves the dehumanisation of the subject of human rights 
in the form of the sub-human figure of the victim. The subject of human rights is for 
Badiou, split into active and passive beings and this split establishes a relationship within 
which the active subject takes on an intervening role to save or protect the passive victim 
that is utterly powerless ultimately as a result of its subhumanity11 . The extreme 
powerlessness of this victim is a result of its dehumanisation and the division establishes 
a politics of 'humanitarian intervention' within which the active subject is compelled to 
intervene with whatever means required.
74 George W Bush framed the war on terror as a response to the terrorists' 'war against humanity' defining




75 Alain Badiou, Infinite Thought: Truth and the Return to Philosophy, ed. & trans. Oliver Feltham and 
Justin Clemens (London: Continuum, 2005), 109.
76 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 54
77 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hallward (London: Verso, 
2001) 9-13 original emphasis
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Ethics in the contemporary era is underpinned by this split subject and conceived 
of primarily as an 'a priori ability to discern Evil' because, fundamentally 'Evil is 
primary' 78 . This ethics in its humanitarian formulation is dominated by the prevalence of 
evil and crucially stands as the 'ultimate principle of judgement' 79 . Political judgement is 
in this sense reduced to a process whereby 'good is what intervenes visibly against an 
Evil that is identifiable a priori' 80 . The major consequence of this formulation of ethics is 
of course an amazing depoliticisation in which judgement is no longer political but based 
on the confrontation of good and evil. Moreover, reducing the understanding of 'good' to 
purely that which intervenes against an Evil denies any possibility of 'uniting people 
around a positive idea of the Good' 81 . Collective action is in this sense dismissed as an 
evil reaffirming the dominance of the contemporary ethics and confirming the 'politics of 
humanitarian intervention' as the only legitimate framework for action. The 'necessity' of 
intervention is ultimately the result of both levels of dehumanising; the in-human terrorist 
necessitates a war of annihilation and the subhuman victim demands a civilising 
intervention. Both of these interventions are considered in an apolitical framework that 
denies the reality of conflict and legitimates the use of extreme violence.
As a result of this split subject, the situation in which intervention is deemed 
essential is depoliticised, considered only in terms of human rights and the civilising 
mission directed at the active subject:
Since the barbarity of the situation is considered only in terms of 'human rights' - 
whereas in fact we are dealing with a political situation, one that calls for a 
political thought-practice, one that is peopled by its own authentic actors - it is 
perceived, from the heights of our apparent civil peace, as the uncivilised that 
demands of the civilised a civilising intervention82 .
Denying the existence of a political situation is more substantively based in stripping 
situations of their singularity that is a result of the a priori determination of Evil. For
78Badiou, Ethics, 8 
79Badiou, Ethics, 8 
80Badiou, Ethics, 8 
81 Badiou, Ethics, 13 
82Badiou, Ethics, 13
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Badiou the particular situation is the starting point for all properly human action and the 
ethics of human rights denies this 'properly human action' by remaining concerned at the 
level of the abstract denying the specificity of singular situations. There is no need for an 
overarching ethics but instead a clear view of what is demanded in a certain situation. 
The depoliticisation of liberal politics is enforced by this inability to consider particular 
situations that is ultimately a result of the 'ethics' of human rights that prioritises evil 
over good. The good becomes only the avoidance of evil and maintaining or improving 
the status quo. The 'good' is what there is; it is the current status quo, and thus it must not 
be disturbed by any alternative political thought-processes that would be demanded if the 
specificity of particular situations was acknowledged.
The preservation of the status quo is ensured by the depoliticised framework for 
action imposed by the current 'ethics'. The maintenance and legitimisation of the status 
quo is a pivotal effect of this depoliticisation and ultimately, a grounding premise of 
liberal politics. The 'ethics' of human rights as formulated through a split subject
Q'J
legitimises the global-political conditions that characterise the contemporary era . The 
active intervener and passive victim positions are not floating, they have a fixed identities 
designated along global-political lines obviously denied in the universalist rhetoric of 
humanitarianism. Contemporary ethics is a civilising mission in which the role of the 
West as intervener is inevitable. Global political situations are reduced to the West's 
active intervention to the benefit of the third world victim who has apparently created the 
mire in which he finds himself As Douzinas has clearly illustrated84 , human rights 
therefore play a central legitimising role securing the hegemony of the current global- 
political hierarchy.
In the post 1989 era the apparently irreplaceable position of human rights has 
gained increasing confidence and their status is seemingly reaffirmed at the 'end of 
history'. The dismissal of all attempts at unifying and connecting people serves to 
reinforce the hegemonic status that liberal individualism, in its continuing possessive
83 Schmitt is probably the first thinker who made clear that 'the concept of humanity in its ethical- 
humanitarian form is a specific vehicle of economic imperialism'. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 54
84 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, (London: 
Routledge Cavendish, 2007).
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guise,85 holds. Any real attempt to bring equality out of the abstract is dismissed as an 
evil and collective action is denied, rendering real political alternatives to the 
individualism that underpins both human rights principles and liberal capitalism, 
impossible. The legitimising function of this 'ethics' is not only exerted at the global 
political level but fundamentally reinforces local political and economic conditions 
through its wholesale demands for the preservation the status quo.
In reality most of the issues involved in depoliticisation are also at the core of the 
attempt to gain legitimacy for the liberal system86 as depoliticisation has the central effect 
of rendering any truly alternative politics impossible. Political and economic conditions 
are inherently bound together in liberalism and their current manifestation on the local 
and global stage provides the conditions of a status quo that is sustained through the 
denial of any legitimate alternative.
Understanding liberalism as a comprehensive metaphysical system, within which 
the idea of balance as truth struck out of competition and an inherent problem with the 
concept of exception are dominant themes, will provide a framework for an analysis of 
the liberty-security regime. The questions of depoliticisation and legitimisation must 
accompany the understanding of liberalism laid out above and if indeed these are major 
principles and consequences of liberalism one can expect to find them in prominent 
positions throughout the operation of the liberty-security regime.
The empirical analysis of the most prominent 'voices' in the current liberty-security 
regime
In conformity with the perspective on liberalism outlined in the previous pages, and with 
a view to investigating the extent to which a common approach underlines the debates 
and divergences about the current liberty-security regime, the research will be structured 
around three main empirical sections.
85 Macpherson, Possessive Individualism
86 The denial of collective action; the construction of politics in a moralising fashion; and the politics of 
humanitarian intervention are all key examples of the process of depoliticisation that enforces the 
legitimacy of the liberal system.
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Part 1: The liberal intellectual and the politics of liberty and security
The first section considers the role of the liberal intellectual in the debate on the 
relationship between liberty and security. This focal point is essential given the extent 
and potential impact of the intervention of a range of liberal intellectuals in this debate in 
the post-9/11 era. The relationship between liberty and security - or more precisely 
between human rights and security - and its liberal character in the current context has 
been a preoccupation of intellectuals tied to the liberal tradition and the analysis seeks to 
consider the content of this intellectual work and its effect on the current regime.
In relation to the potential hegemonic status of the current liberty-security regime 
the literature under review must be considered from the perspective of the role of the 
intellectual in the work of Antonio Gramsci (1971)87 . Essentially one must consider to 
what extent the scholars and practitioners have the function of intellectuals as Gramsci 
understood it88 . This section of the research considers the intellectual broadly in terms of 
their function as intellectuals both in relation to individuals formally recognised as 
scholars and academics but also other individuals and organisations that can be 
understood to share this function. This understanding is based not in the intrinsic nature 
of intellectual activities but in the 'ensemble of the system of relations in which these 
activities (and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them) have their place in 
the general complex of social relations' 89 .
This first empirical section concerned with the role of the intellectual is divided 
into three strands that each focus on a different 'level' of intellectual intervention in the 
debate on the relationship between liberty and security in the context of the 'war on 
terror'. These three strands are comprised of firstly, the work of liberal public 
intellectuals; secondly, that of scholars and academics; and thirdly, interventions made by 
human rights advocacy organisations. The first strand is concerned with renowned public
87 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971) 8
88 'Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of 
economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give 
it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and 
political fields'. Gramsci Prison Notebooks, 5
89 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 8
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liberal intellectuals who have the status of reference points for a liberal understanding of 
a range of issues that in turn provides them a readership far beyond scholarly circles and 
the academy. The concern here lies with their ability to reach a wide public audience but 
also with the use of their work as a foundation for 'lower' levels of intellectual work. The 
apparently novel post-9/11 situation demands liberal democracies rethink their 
management of the liberty-security relationship and for many scholars and academics as 
well as a wider international public there have been certain public intellectuals whose 
work has been accredited with a degree of authority as a liberal compass helping the state 
and the intellectual community find its way in this 'new' era.
The second strand turns to the scholarly and academic debate on the liberty- 
security relationship and concerns itself with the content of this debate and more 
specifically with the parameters in which it takes place. There will be particular attention 
paid to the potential influence of the public intellectual stratum over this 'lower' level of 
intellectual work but there remains a focus on the potential impact of this international 
debate that has drawn in such a number and range of scholars - in terms of their 
status/rank, their location and their critical starting point (or lack thereof). The constant 
concern lies with the possibility of a convergent position underlying the debate that has 
occupied so many scholars and academics working in a number of disciplines around the 
world.
The focus on human rights organisations in the third strand begins from an 
understanding of them as having the function of intellectuals in the Gramscian sense. It is 
concerned with their understanding of the relations between liberty and security as 
expressed through programmatic and mission documents, their participation in debates 
and in lobbying and campaigning activities, and more broadly at where and how they 
position themselves in their mission of championing of human rights. The importance of 
looking at human rights organizations takes full account of the popular sentiment that 
these organisations stand as the most legitimate guardians of liberty in the contemporary 
period. Such status is born of the fact that it is human rights principles that are supposed 
to provide the framework within which all concerns for liberty must be articulated. 
Crucially, there will be a special emphasis on the language used by such organisations as 
a pivotal signifier of the convergence (or divergence) in the logic that underpins their
29
position with that of public intellectuals, scholars and academic as well as with that found 
at state level. The possibility of a convergent approach among apparently diversely 
situated intellectuals raises a core concern around the parameters set to the debate on the 
liberty-security relationship. Furthermore, the possibility of a convergence in approach 
between human rights organisations and the state raises significant concerns about the 
potential for true political challenges to the current liberal regime.
These three levels of 'intellectuality' are of central importance due to the ways in
on
which these intellectuals, scholars and practitioners inform public opinion . The 
empirical data will be drawn from an in depth content analysis of the academic and 
public literature produced by this intellectual 'class'. The substantive issue within this 
strand must be the extent of debate in the literature - the extent of convergence or 
substantive disagreement - between public intellectuals, scholars and practitioners, a 
debate usually underpinned or guided by the interventions of prominent intellectuals and 
usually heavily relying on the liberal tradition, in their quest to define the most 
appropriate relationship. A critical analysis of such literature will seek to define the 
substance of such a debate and more importantly identify the parameters within which 
such a debate takes place. The content of the literature and the extent of both the conflict 
within this literature, and the conflict in relation to the state must be carefully analysed in 
order to see the extent to which a shared understanding and common approach arises or 
exists that potentially revolves around an adherence to the central themes explained 
above. Therefore, this strand will establish the position held by intellectuals, scholars and 
practitioners working on the liberty-security relationship and identify the extent to which 
the margins of dispute are curtailed by relying on a shared language and principles.
These three strands do not form an exhaustive list of participants in current 
debates on the liberty-security regime but they arguably stand as three of the most 
important and seemingly influential 'voices' on the liberal liberty-security relationship in 
the contemporary era. The research seeks to attend to each strand in turn, as well as to the 
interplay, and critically evaluate their interventions, understandings and formulations of 
the liberty-security relationship. In accordance with the theoretical underpinnings
90 The research does not suggest that this literature is authored by a homogenous group. The public 
intellectuals, scholars and practitioners work on different levels so to speak but as an identifiable area of 
literature it plays a pivotal role in shaping public opinion a process that will be considered in this analysis.
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explained above, the analyses will be particularly attentive to the role of the idea of 
balance in the debates and policy documents, the way in which the exceptional measures 
are presented, interpreted and justified, and the issues of depoliticisation and 
legitimisation. The relation these three groups of intellectuals have, as articulated in the 
literature, to both the state and civil society actors must be a key concern.
There is more to this theoretical approach and to the particular selection of the 
empirical strands for analysis. In particular, the concept of hegemony as articulated by 
Gramsci (1971) provides substantive coherence to the major research question about the 
possible existence or emergence of a common approach to the relations between liberty 
and security which would underline the differences between the state, civil society and 
the intellectual 'community'. If so, the question arises as to the extent to which such 
major actors, different as they are, constitute a kind of hegemonic formation, however 
heterogeneous. In the 'struggle for hegemony' Gramsci made clear that governments are 
reliant on rallying social support for specific policies. The dominance of the leading 
group is not secured solely at the state level but is dependent on securing popular consent 
that is mobilised within the various institutions and relations in civil society. 
Fundamentally, Gramsci's theory of hegemony exposes the central importance of the 
relations between state and civil society91 . Gramsci also made clear that intellectuals play 
a pivotal role in the struggle for hegemony. The role of the intellectual is decisive in 
informing, organising and persuading the population and thus the intellectual is crucial to 
both conservative and revolutionary movements92 . In a conservative sense the intellectual 
has a vital function in organising the consent of the population to the rule of the dominant 
group, but in the revolutionary sense the intellectual is at the core of the formulation of a 
counter hegemony93 . The intellectual is located within civil society and must be seen as 
playing an essential role in determining the relations between state and civil society by 
way of their ability to mobilise or dismantle the consent of the population. The relation
91 Civil society does not of course constitute a unified whole.
92 For Gramsci the very function of intellectual activity provides the intellectual with the ability to 
contribute 'to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it'. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 9
93 For Gramsci the new intellectual in the revolutionary movement must be at the forefront of the struggle: 
'The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, which is an exterior and 
momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in active participation in practical life, as a constructor, 
organiser, "permanent persuader" and not just a simple orator'. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 10
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these intellectuals have, as articulated in the literature, to both the state and civil society 
actors must be a key concern. If indeed this literature is symptomatic of the work of 
intellectuals the empirical component of this research will consider where the allegiances 
of these intellectuals lie, how they shape the substance of the regime and to what extent 
their intervention is decisive in the 'struggle for hegemony'.
Part 2: The state and the official presentation of the liberty-security regime
The second major section of empirical analysis is concerned with state security strategy 
and more pressingly the politics of security that will be drawn from these documents . 
This will in the first instance involve a documentary analysis of both national security 
and counter-terrorism strategy documents. The emphasis on strategy documents lies in 
the status of these publications and their role distinct from policy documents or pieces of 
legislation in setting out the official understanding of an area of policy and the context 
(political, economic, historical) in which it has been or needs to be developed. These 
documents have a 'marketing' function attempting to 'sell' official policy to the public. 
They provide an account of strategic thinking in a given area of policy (or at least an 
official presentation of the logic that underpins the development of such policy) and for 
this reason they offer a unique and unparalleled source of information on the official state
94 The analysis here does not propose to offer a substantive theorisation of the state but begins from a 
conceptualisation of the state grounded in the first instance in the works of Nicos Poulantzas. Poulantzas' 
understanding of the state as a social relation provides an essential foundation to such an analysis as 
proposed here that demands a critique of the contemporary liberal state. Avoiding the misconception of the 
state as subject or object as well as that of presenting the state as a single intrinsic entity, this analysis 
follows Poulantzas' definition of the state as 'rather a relationship of forces, or more precisely the material 
condensation of such a relationship among class fractions, such as this is expressed \vithin the state in a 
necessarily specific form'. Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: 
New Left Books, 1978) 128-9 original emphasis. The analysis begins from an acceptance of the continued 
relevance of Poulantzas ideas but also of the utility of the development of his work not least by Bob Jessop. 
Jessop's assertion that the state can be analyzed as the site, generator and product of strategies arguably 
offers a great deal to a consideration of the state politics of security. Bob Jessop, State Theory, 260-271; 
See also, Peter Bratsis, Everyday Life and the State, (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2006). There is no 
attempt here to equate Jessop's notion of'strategic selectivity' with the specific security strategies in 
consideration here, but this understanding of the state potentially offers an additional set of conceptual and 
theoretical tools through which this analysis can get to grips with the importance of security politics to the 
liberal state.
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position95 . For the purposes of this analysis security strategy documents provide an 
account of the official understanding of the relationship between security and human 
rights, the ways in which the current post-9/11 context has affected this relationship and 
the ways in which the state has had to respond.
Security strategy in the era of a war on terror is undoubtedly rooted in counter- 
terrorism initiatives and there will be a proportional emphasis on these strategies. 
However, the analysis seeks to ascertain the current politics of security more broadly and 
will thus be concerned with the potential for 'securitisation' to extend beyond the threat 
of terrorism and frame state strategy in areas seemingly distant from traditional 
understandings of security. The contemporary conception of security must be unravelled 
and in doing so the analysis will attempt to locate the politics of security within the 
broader politics of the state in the current era. Such an analysis is crucial to determine the 
official understanding of the relationship between liberty and security as defined in 
strategy documents and to assess to what extent this influences the emergence of a 
common approach between the state and civil society.
As we have insisted on the possibility of a common approach underlying the 
differences between the main actors, it is necessary to highlight also that the tension- 
ridden interplay between state and civil society will also be of central importance to this 
analysis. The research must ascertain to what extent the regime is shaped by and thus 
partly a result of, such interplay, particularly in the long term, rather than being the direct, 
unmediated consequence of state or government action. This reinforces the relevance and 
importance of the Gramscian concept of hegemony in understanding the process by 
which the regime is developed and more critically the impact it has on the state's ability 
to maintain the current status quo. The subjects of empirical analysis considered here are 
taken therefore to constitute, each at its own level, fundamental pillars in the construction 
of hegemonic dominance.
To provide wider scope and depth to this analysis, an international comparison 
between the UK and Australia will also be carried out throughout the first two empirical
95 The assertion is not made here that these documents contain the true nature of the state's understanding 
of an issue but that they provide an overview of how these issues are presented. The liberal state's official 
presentation of the issue of security and its relationship to human rights is the core concern of this section 
of empirical analysis.
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sections in relation to both the intervention of liberal intellectuals and state security 
strategy. This comparative element seeks to extend the analysis of the emergence of a 
common approach to liberty and security beyond the UK and to consider to what extent 
there are antipodean similarities in the approach at the intellectual level and the resulting 
regime in place in Australia. The comparison with Australia is justified by the fact that 
the Australian Federal government has in the past considered adopting a human rights 
regime based on the existing UK model96 . This proposal followed an apparent official 
confidence on behalf of the new administration in the UK (or Westminster) system that 
appeared to show their alignment with scholars, practitioners and civil society actors who 
had for some time suggested that the UK human rights regime had 'proved effective in 
balancing issues such as the need to fight terrorism with the democratic and other 
principles required for a free society' 97 .
The UK-Australia comparison will provide a more clear indication of the liberty- 
security regime and the political context in which it has been developed and is currently 
sustained than just focusing on the UK in isolation. More specifically, the apparent 
convergence in approach to the liberty-security relationship between the UK and 
Australia points to the emergence of a common Anglo-Saxon liberty-security regime. The 
potential of a specifically Anglo-Saxon liberty-security regime is in itself therefore a 
focus of concern and this must be interrogated through an unravelling of the empirical 
strands in both the UK and Australian context. However, whilst the UK-Australia 
comparison is itself a central concern the UK and Australia have stood firm as the two 
closest US allies in the so called 'Coalition of the Willing'. The relationship of both
96 This proposal was put forward by the Rudd government following their defeat of the Liberal government 
of John Howard in 2007. The Rudd government established a National Human Rights Consultation 
Committee that was to consider the possibility of the adoption of a statutory bill of rights. The 
recommendations of the Committee were implemented in part in the establishment of a new Human Rights 
Framework in 2010 that established a number of features of the UK human rights regime without 
committing to a statutory bill of rights. The failure to implement any substantive statutory instruments has 
been for some a sign of failure of the current government but the consultation process and its initiation 
following the UK (and New Zealand - as another 'Westminster' system) example is sufficient basis for a 
comparative component to this analysis. See, David Erdos, "The Rudd Government's Rejection of an 
Australian Bill of Rights: a Stunted Case of Aversive Constitutionalism?", Parliamentary Affairs, 65, 2, 
(2012)
97 George Williams "Victoria's Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: Lessons for the National 
Debate", Papers on Parliament No. 46,
<http://www.aph.gov.au/SEnate/pubs/occaJect/transcripts/070706/070706.pdf,> (December 2006)
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countries to the US in the context of the 'war on terror' is also of importance in 
understanding the possible development of an Anglo-Saxon liberty-security regime 
identifiable in the UK and Australia in the era of the 'war on terror'. While the analysis 
will remain concerned with the specificity of the UK-Australian context, the relationship 
to the US and its influence on both domestic and foreign policy in both countries in the 
'war on terror' will provide a backdrop to the consideration of UK-Australia relations.
The potential for an Anglo-Saxon liberty-security regime exposes the importance 
of understanding how a liberty-security regime is shaped by a specific 'political culture' 
- an idea understood here as the configuration of prevailing societal self-images, 
aspirations, dispositions, attitudes and, as Tocqueville famously put it, 'habits of the
QO
heart' which broadly but effectively orientate political understanding and practice on the 
part of states, civil society actors and individual citizens. Fundamental aspects of the 
current political culture of liberal democracies, that is, aspects which arouse strong self- 
images and passionate commitments, are above all to do with democracy, equality, 
human rights and humanitarian ethics. Therefore, the comparative element seeks to 
further unravel the influence of the specific political culture in which the liberty-security 
regime is installed and maintained, deciphering any interrelations between this culture 
and the liberal framework outlined above.
Following the analysis of the state politics of security there will be a return to the 
role of the intellectual. This will consider more specifically the direct role of the liberal 
intellectual in the service of the liberal state in the era of the 'war on terror'. The 
relationship between the liberal intellectual and the liberal state will be interrogated and 
the analysis will seek to chart the potential influence of liberal intellectuals over the 
development of state security strategy.
Part 3: Human rights, the politics of security and the possibilities for critique
98 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. And trans, Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop, 
1835 and 1840, (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2000); See also, Robert N. Bellah, et al, Habits of 
the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life, updated edition 1985, (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1996)
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Through the interrogation of the current liberty-security regime this research aims to 
make an important addition to the critical literature on human rights. It seeks to provide a 
critical analysis of the human rights approach in the current political context of the war 
on terror. The critical literature is almost as old as human rights themselves (Burke on the 
conservative side and, later on, Marx on the progressive one) and has continued to grow 
at a pace, particularly after the fall of the Berlin wall, within the works of Alain Badiou, 
Slavoj Zizek, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, and Costas Douzinas among others. At 
the core of this critical literature is a focus on the liberal character of human rights that 
ultimately denies them any truly transformative potential. This research will add to this 
literature and illustrate that in the current political context human rights are implicitly and 
exclusively tied to the liberal system.
As set out above the point of interjection in this literature comes through a focus 
on the ways in which the human rights approach is potentially constituted in the 
contemporary period through the dialogue between seemingly disparate groups both 
within the state and civil society. In a development of the critique of liberalism that is at 
the core of the critical literature on human rights, this research will seek to consider 
whether the dialogue on the liberty-security relationship is defined and ultimately 
restrained by the liberal parameters in which it takes place. There is a novel utility in the 
application of this material in the specific context of the war on terror and this research 
will thus consider the (in)ability for human rights to operate independently of the liberal 
system. The research will remain in dialogue with the critical literature on human rights 
and the work of a number of these authors, most notably Schmitt and Badiou, will be 
utilised as tools, on the basis of which I will try to develop a critical perspective to 
analyse the current human rights approach.
The liberal intellectual intervention is characterised by an attempt to reinforce the 
position of human rights at the core of liberalism and thus the debate around the human 
rights approach in this context is reduced to an affirmation of the liberal system. At the 
forefront of this literature is the attempt to define the liberal approach to the war on terror 
and to 'save' liberalism from the descent into exceptional measures that the war on terror 
demands. This research does not obviously seek to contribute to this literature but instead 
posits it as a central object of critical analysis, since it is assumed that it plays a
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potentially pivotal role not only in the development of the current human rights approach 
but also in the definition of the terrain in which politics and the possibilities for true 
alternatives to the current situation may take place. The two distinct areas of literature 
identified above are therefore both of central importance but have antithetical statuses: 
the first as the basis for developing a theoretical framework for the research; and the 
second as primary source of information and evidence for understanding the liberal 
approach, including human rights, which will be subjected to critical scrutiny.
The research will however confront a third area of literature as part of the critique 
of the liberal underpinnings of human rights and as a fundamental component of the 
analysis of the current politics of liberty and security. This third area is identified with 
intellectuals and scholars commonly considered to be on the political left who employ 
human rights principles as part of and even as central to a critical left wing perspective. 
As part of the critique of the contemporary human rights approach, and more in particular 
in connection with the question of the nature of the political terrain in which debate and 
conflict take place and the possibilities for true political alternatives, there is a real need 
for this research to engage with the more complex issue of the utilisation of human rights 
principles on the left that complicates the seemingly simplistic dismissal of human rights 
on the basis of their appropriation by liberalism, or their inherent submission to it. In this 
connection, the question we pose is: are human rights inherently tied to liberal principles, 
or do they embody principles of their own which can provide the basis for, or otherwise 
be put to use in the context of, alternative, emancipatory politics?
While the critique of human rights in the work of the liberal authors named above 
is done as part of a wider critique of liberalism, there are a number of prominent 
intellectuals and scholars who place themselves on the left and retain a commitment to 
human rights principles. The works of Noam Chomsky, Judith Butler, and Jurgen 
Habermas are all symptomatic of a left-wing perspective, or so considered, that utilises 
human rights as a major foundation, if not the basis of, a critique of liberal policies, and 
more generally of the liberal status quo. These three authors have also turned their 
attention (or focussed their existing concerns) to the 'war on terror' and, to varying 
degrees, the wider politics of security. They have each articulated critiques of the current 
regime that utilise human rights as a foundation for their political opposition.
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The research seeks therefore to engage with and confront the fundamental tension 
on the left around the question of human rights and their ability to transcend liberalism. 
The undoubtedly critical stand of those left thinkers in the third category of literature 
suggests that human rights are central to freedoms in the broadest sense. Indeed the 
employment of human rights in work of such eminent critical theorists reaffirms the 
dominance of human rights discourse in the current context and exposes the tension on 
the left that has its roots in the claimed assimilation of a critique of human rights with a 
defence of Stalinism.
Without claiming that human rights are always and at all times conservative and 
devoid of any utility in emancipatory struggles, this research will try to show that in the 
current political context of the war on terror human rights are wholly tied to the liberal 
project; beyond that, it will also try to enquire, as we mentioned before, whether or not 
this connection is a contingent one (e.g. dependent on the peculiarities of the so-called 
'war on terror'). An exposition of the liberal character of human rights informed by a 
critique of liberal politics seems essential to assess the affect the current human rights 
approach has on the current dominance of the politics of security. Beyond that, its central 
concern is to do with the potential for true political alternatives in the contemporary era.
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Chapter 1
Defining the liberal response to terrorism 
The liberal intellectual approach to the liberty-security relationship
This section focuses on the work of Michael Ignatieff, Michael Walzer, Ronald 
Dworkin and Richard Rorty. Each of these thinkers has defined themselves as liberal 
and has long positioned their work as a defence of the liberal tradition. This project 
has provided the overarching framework for their diverse intellectual output for many 
decades and has been reiterated most vehemently in their responses to the 'war on 
terror'. While they have each consciously assumed the role of defenders or guardians 
of liberalism this role has also been reinforced by the frequent use of their work as a 
reference point to ground a liberal understanding of a range of issues not least, in the 
post 9/11 era, the relationship between liberty and security.
The interventions in the liberty-security debate made by these four 
intellectuals are presented in the first instance as critiques (or critical analyses) of the 
current regime. They seek to outline the points of divergence from the liberal tradition 
that have been introduced in the name of the 'war on terror' in those liberal 
democracies tied to this 'war'. These intellectuals seek in response to dictate an 
alternate, liberal approach to security in relation to human rights that reinstates the 
vision of liberalism defined by the prioritisation of liberty over security. The 
development of a liberty-security regime that has characterised the post 9/11 era has 
led Ignatieff, Walzer, Dworkin and Rorty to turn their attention to the function the 
liberal framework can - and must - play in structuring the response to international 
terrorism. While there is no assertion made here that these intellectuals constitute a 
homogenous group, the four can be seen to have converged in this period around the 
apparent need for a revisiting and subsequent rethinking of the relationship between 
liberal principles and the requirement for states to provide security.
However, since this intellectual intervention, broadly conceived, remains 
committed to and defined by liberalism it is, in Peter Hallward's conceptualisation, 
tied ultimately to an intellectual stance of alignment with the world as it is 1 . In this 
sense these liberal intellectuals are aligned with the dominant ideology and their
Peter Hallward, "The Politics of Prescription", South Atlantic Quarterly 104, 4 (Fall 2005)
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position is characterised by an acceptance of all that really matters. The idea of 
alignment with or acceptance of the world, that is to say, of the status quo, appears - 
by seemingly confirming the insubstantial nature of a liberal critique of the liberal 
state - to render the liberal intellectual an easy target for critique. However, this 
critique may be 'easy1 , except when, which is not often the case, it grasps the actual, 
invaluable service the liberal intelligentsia renders to the current liberty-security 
regime and, more generally, to the status quo. That the liberal intellectual fulfils a 
decisive function in relation to the politics of security is quite obvious. Much less 
obvious is the precise nature of this function, the way in which it is performed and the 
far-reaching consequences of it. For such liberal 'critique* may actually be a critique 
only in appearance and may fulfil legitimising functions which can only be fulfilled in 
the form of a critique or the semblance of it.
This analysis therefore seeks firstly to ascertain the extent to which the liberal 
intellectual intervention in the security arena has not simply been a reaction to the 
current politics of security, but is instead bound up in the formulation and subsequent 
legitimisation of the current security regime. There has arguably been an 
intensification of the relationship between intellectuals and security politics in the last 
decade influenced most explicitly by the unrivalled expansion of 'security studies'. 
While this essentially conservative discipline has by virtue of its own fetishization of
f\
security served only to reinforce the concerns of the state (a practice that pre-dates 
2001), there is a need to look beyond this specialism to consider whether the ability to 
influence and legitimate the current regime is exclusively the recourse of those 
intellectuals who formally locate themselves within it.
Secondly, the analysis seeks to consider the potential legitimating function 
played by the liberal critique of security politics and more specifically to consider the 
extent to which this is a function unique to the liberal intellectual by virtue of their 
ostensibly external position from the current politics of security. Thirdly, the attempt 
is made here to point toward the convergence between the liberal intelligentsia's 
views on security and the position of the state that will be considered more fully in the 
fourth chapter. Finally, this analysis seeks to provide an initial analysis of the 
consequences of the liberal intervention. Taking into account that a significant process 
of depoliticisation has been shown to be a major consequence of human rights
2Neocleous, Critique of Security
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promotion and activism, the analysis is above all concerned with the potential 
depoliticising effects that may be born out of the liberal contribution to a debate that 
is at once premised on human rights advocacy and conducted on a political terrain 
defined by liberalism. At the core of the thesis there is a concern with what it actually 
means to be a liberal intellectual in concrete terms and what this suggests for any 
alternative intellectual project able to politicise security and radically question the 
logic of current security politics.
I wish to illustrate, by way of a focus on these four public intellectuals, that 
they both embody the central tenets of the liberal intellectual position on the current 
politics of security and precisely because of that, play a pivotal role in (re)defming 
them in the current, allegedly new, situation of the 'war against terror'. There are of 
course many other academics, scholars, journalists, analysts and commentators who 
potentially perform the same function as intellectuals in the Gramscian sense3 but the 
role of this public intellectual 'strata' needs to be set out to illustrate the specific 
effect it has had on defining the parameters for debate on the liberty-security 
relationship, and by extension, the parameters for any critical discussion of the 
politics of security.
A 'new' approach to a 'new' problem
The need for an intellectual 'rethinking' of the liberal framework in an age of 
international terrorism is founded on two major assumptions that these intellectuals 
appear to share with those western governments leading the 'war on terrorism': that 
there is such a thing as a 'war against terrorism'; and that furthermore, the character 
of terrorism and the extent of the threat are unprecedented and thus necessitate a 
carefully (re)thought response. It is of the utmost importance to note as a starting 
point for this analysis that the very incentive for the revision of liberalism in the post 
9/11 period is for each intellectual seemingly founded on an uncritical acceptance of 
the basic principles of the current status quo.
The approach to the current liberty-security relationship is based (for the four 
intellectuals in focus here and numerous others) in an agreement that the 'war on 
terror' has distorted the equilibrium that is the central characteristic of liberalism. The
See the two following chapters
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first marker of the essentially shared position between these intellectuals is agreement 
that the defining feature of the current era is an unavoidable confrontation with a set 
of opposing concerns. There is disagreement on which concerns are the most relevant 
and pressing but all four are united in their agreement that the concept of balance 
provides the appropriate framework for the necessary reestablishment of the central 
equilibrium.
Ignatieff and Walzer predictably confront largely the same set of requirements 
- ultimately liberty and security - and seek to articulate the appropriate liberal 
balance between these two. Ignatieff assures us that his The Lesser Evil4 approach is 
not a simple application of the balance metaphor as this metaphor isn't 'honest 
enough about the difficulties' 5 . The 'Lesser Evil' perspective is Ignatieff s response to 
the events of September 11 th 2001 that have apparently forced him to rethink how the 
human rights principles he holds so dear and have been central to his work in all its 
guises6, fit into a new era defined by an 'unprecedented' threat from terrorism. This 
era, defined in The Lesser Evil as 'an age of terror', is one seemingly characterised by 
the clash of concerns with liberty and security. Ignatieff seeks to mediate this conflict 
and accommodate both human rights concerns and a 'realistic' approach to the new 
security threat. In his role as a contemporary champion of liberalism he seeks to 
propose a truly liberal approach to liberty and security that recognises that the fight 
against terrorism 'requires violence' and may also require 'coercion, deception, 
secrecy and violation of rights' 7 . The Lesser Evil perspective is in Ignatieff s terms an 
attempt to reconcile the contradiction that the 'age of terror' imposes on a liberal 
democracy between concerns for liberty and 'necessary' security strategies.
However, despite his initial claims of a distinction of the Lesser Evil from 
balance, it is clear that the concept of balance ultimately guides Ignatieff s position. 
The concept is dominant in the wording of his argument and in the very framework
o
for action that he provides, even explicitly . Ultimately the liberal commitment to 
balance shines through what is essentially a minimal reworking of the liberal
4 Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terr or, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2005)
5 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, xiv
6 See, Derrick O'Keefe, Michael Ignatieff: The Lesser Evil?, (London: Verso, 2011)
7Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, vii
8Ignatieff explains that the 'ethics' he proposes is an 'ethics of balance'. Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, 9
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approach to any opposing forces as explained by Schmitt. Ignatieff is, as Schmitt's 
analysis would suggest, emphatic about the potential for a reconciliation of liberty and 
security in the contemporary era based in a balancing act that is possible, realistic and 
dependable when orchestrated within a 'democracy' 9 .
As Ignatieff pitched his Lesser Evil approach between moral perfectionism 
and 'false necessity', Walzer's Just War Theory (JWT) is located between essentially 
the same two perspectives that are both in their own way unsuitable as a responsible 
liberal approach to war. Walzer is clear that JWT is 'opposed to "realism" but not 
unrealistic' 10 . Defining a realistic as opposed to a realist approach has been at the core 
of Walzer's approach to JWT since its inception11 . Walzer has long devoted his 
attention to arguments around the morality of war, attempting to define the instances 
in which war is necessary and legitimate and this work stands as a central component 
of his intellectual work. Arguing about War involves the application of JWT to the 
current era and his subsequent articulation of a liberal approach to the 'war on terror' 
defined by this balancing process that is, despite his assurances (and those from the 
liberal press 12), not restricted to overseas military tactics in its legitimisation of the 
approach to terrorism post 9/11.
Dworkin and Rorty 13 are not so explicit in their approach to the liberty- 
security dynamic but are both in agreement that balance is the framework that 
liberalism dictates. Dworkin denounces the idea of a balance between liberty and 
security on the basis that it obscures the agency within the implied calculation. The 
idea of a simple calculation of increased security through placing restrictions on 
liberty that underpins the balance metaphor in its current application is for Dworkin 
'deeply misleading' 14 . In reality the balance involves a targeted reduction in the
9 As the true liberal he purports to be, Ignatieff uses the term democracy in place of liberalism as 
though the two were interchangeable and without distinction
10 Michael Walzer, Arguing about War, (London: Yale University Press, 2004), xv
1 ' Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977)
12 See, James Mann, "Rules of Engagement", The American Prospect, 13 August 2004, accessed 23 
January 2011. <http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=rules_of_engagement>.
13 It must be made clear at this point that the concern in this analysis is not with the broader scope of 
Rorty's work. There is no attempt to align the work of these individuals as a whole and this is certainly 
not the case for Rorty's wider philosophy. The emphasis on Rorty (as with the others) is with the 
intervention in the debate around the liberty-security relationship and the potential convergence of 
these thinkers on this specific issue.
14 Ronald Dworkin, "The Threat to Patriotism", The New York Review of Books, February 28, 2002, 8.
43
liberty of a specific group to the supposed advantage of the security of the majority: 
'Most of us pay nothing in personal freedom when such measures are used against 
those the President suspects of terrorism' 15 . The balance between liberty and security 
obscures the real issues that arise from its application and has therefore to be rejected.
There exists therefore an apparent conflict between Dworkin's commitment to 
a liberal politics of compromise 16 and his rejection of the idea of balance. However, 
on further inspection it becomes clear that Dworkin does not in fact reject the concept 
of balance - the very idea remains at the core of his understanding of politics - but 
instead rejects the specific balance between rights and security. He offers instead an 
alternative set of concerns whose mutual accommodation should guide our response 
to the contemporary security environment. Instead of balancing liberty and security 
we should balance 'our security against our honor' 17 .
For Rorty the response to the current security agenda is based on his concern 
with the potential marginalisation of the courts, the restriction of judicial 
independence and most pressingly with the potential the 'war on terror' has to disturb 
the balance of powers. The threat to these essentially liberal markers is symptomatic 
of the grave danger that the response to terrorism - and furthermore the response to a 
potential nuclear terrorism - poses to liberal democracy and the march toward Rorty's 
Utopian vision of the globalisation of this framework. The use of the balance metaphor 
is here less explicit than it is for Ignatieff for example, but Rorty's overarching 
concern with the balance of powers confirms that ultimately each of these intellectuals 
is incapable of operating outside the balance metaphor.
The idea of striking a balance is further entrenched in the proposals made by 
all four intellectuals through their agreement that the response to terrorism must 
follow a 'third model' or 'middle way' between alternatives - that is clearly a variant
10
of the balance metaphor . Ignatieff s Lesser Evil perspective and Walzer's return to
15Dworkin, "The Threat to Patriotism", 8
16 The problem at the crux of US political life for Dworkin is the series of oppositions that makes 
compromise impossible. While there is room to contest the idea that on substantive issues there is real 
distance between 'red' and 'blue' - and more will be made of this below - Dworkin sees the central 
problem of contemporary politics being the lack of shared principles. See, Ronald Dworkin, Is 
Democracy Possible Here?: Principles for a new political debate, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006)
17Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here, 51
18 The depoliticising effect of the construction of political projects (or politics as a whole) in the sense 
of a 'third' or 'middle' way has been illustrated in critiques of the New Labour project and its 
subscription to the 'Third Way' approach set out in this context by Anthony Giddens. See, Peter
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Just War Theory both frame this 'middle way' essentially between left and right, 
crudely defined for them by pacifism and realism respectively. The simplistic binary 
distinctions on which this 'middle way' is based is reinforced by Ignatieff s attempt to 
mediate between what he determines as the human rights concerns of civil society and 
the legitimate concern for security of liberal governments. His solution is essentially 
for the various perspectives to converge on a common approach and render any 
conflict redundant. The politics of Ignatieff s theory is essentially a liberal politics of 
compromise, assuming a shared understanding of the political terrain, which he 
opposes directly to terrorism understood to be a 'form of politics that aims at the 
death of politics itself 19 . Terrorism is ultimately apolitical as it refuses to conform to 
the politics of deliberation and compromise, which, in a true liberal fashion, he posits
fyr\
as the only basis for a sound politics .
Dworkin and Rorty seek to define a 'third model' but focus rather on the 
unsuitability of both the 'war' and 'crime' models of response to terrorism. Dworkin 
concedes that the 'war' and 'crime' models of response to terrorism are both unsuited 
to the current threat and acknowledges that he agrees to some extent with the Bush 
administration that this necessitates a 'third model' for action21 . However, the pivotal 
and almost immediate point of departure from the US government's position comes in 
his emphasis on the restraints that must be imposed on this third model. He notes that 
the Bush administration have emphasised the unsuitability of the war and crime 
models - and thus of their corresponding restraint mechanisms - to justify an absence 
of restraint over the state in the 'war on terror'. However, his response is to combine 
(as opposed to abandon) the two models of restraint in the current era to guide the 
response to international terrorism. Rorty is in agreement that the posed 'third way' 
model of response - conveniently for its proponents and worrying for the liberal - is
Burnham, "New Labour and the politics of depoliticisation", British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations 3, 2 (June 2001); Jim Buller, and Mathew Flinders, "The Domestic Origins of 
Depoliticisation in the Area of British Economic Policy", British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations 7, 4 (October 2005). While in this analysis the emphasis is initially on the effects of the 
particular construction of a 'third' or 'middle' way approach to liberty and security it also remains 
concerned with the potential correlation this has with the broader 'third way' approach to politics.
19Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, 111.
20 The events of 9/11 were for Ignatieff carried out by 'apocalyptic nihilists' whose intentions were 'not 
political'. Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, 99)
21 lgnatieff, The Lesser Evil, 91-2. In this case the rejection of the 'war' model is based on the 
suggestion that the notion of a political war against a legitimate enemy is insufficient or inappropriate 
as a response to international terrorism. Dworkin offers limited but arguably crucial legitimacy to the 
idea that the 'war on terror' is not a war in the conventional sense.
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devoid of regulation. The third model must instead be defined by increased openness 
and transparency.
It is important to note that a concern with the seemingly novel policing 
function of the 'war on terror' is indeed a point of convergence for all four 
intellectuals. In Rorty's words the threat in this period to 'civilisation' comes from
00people who 'were not exactly enemy combatants and not exactly criminals' and thus 
necessitates an alternative model of response. The construction of the liberal response 
as in some way a departure from both war and policing serves only to mystify the 
nature of security.
Avoiding the question of the exception
This demand for openness and regulation highlights the second major point of 
convergence between the four intellectuals around an avoidance of the question of the 
exception. It is in relation to this issue that the division into two strands - Ignatieff 
and Walzer; Dworkin and Rorty - is most pronounced. Dworkin and Rorty's positions 
do not explicitly allow for any concessions in regulation. Rorty's overall response to 
the political developments in the era of the 'war on terror' is simply to return to the 
two demands made by political rationalism as defined by Schmitt: 'the 'postulate of 
openness in political life and the demand for the division of powers'. His concern 
with regulation continues in this traditional liberal framework demanding the legal 
regulation of the exception. He suggests that Western governments should be made to 
'disclose and discuss what they plan to do in various sorts of emergency' 23 . As 
Schmitt predicted, the paradox of a regulated exception is lost on Rorty and his only 
response is to continue to clamour for increased openness and regulation. According 
to Rorty, the problem in this contemporary period, seemingly reinforced by the events 
of 9/11, is that the belief among the elite in the US and the EU that national security 
can only be effective if carried out in secret. In contrast, the only possible response for 
liberty to be protected is to ensure that the liberal frameworks of regulation and 
restraint symbolised by both the judiciary and the free press are not repressed. The 
seemingly illiberal paradigm evident post 9/11 has to be resisted by increased
22 Richard Rorty, "Fighting Terrorism with Democracy", The Nation, October 21 2002, 3
23 Richard Rorty, " Post-Democracy", London Review of Books 26, 7, April 1, 2004, 5
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openness in political life starting in the field of security if the march toward the liberal 
democratic Utopia is to remain on track.
The emphatic commitment to a framework of regulation leads both Dworkin 
and Rorty to formulate the response to terrorism in the form of a regulated exceptional 
situation24 . The contradiction in such a formulation - or indeed the fact that it is 
essentially an oxymoron - is lost on both authors or at least denied. The promotion of 
regulation through a commitment to liberal principles allows them to present the 
'revised' liberal position on counter-terrorism as an enhancement of the framework of 
restraint.
Dworkin's emphasis on human rights in this context is based in their 
regulatory function that must be at the centre of a third model for action in response to 
international terrorism. For a response to be legitimate it must conform to human 
rights standards and this cannot be watered down or traded away. A war - including a 
'third-way' 'war on terror' - must be regulated by the concept of absolute human 
equality. The regulation imposed by an acceptance of 'shared humanity' is notably 
absent in calls for decreased regulation that came from the Bush administration and 
continue to come explicitly or implicitly from other proponents of a balance between 
liberty and security. It is this understanding of shared humanity that for Dworkin 
prevents the prioritisation of 'our' (American) security over 'their' liberty that the 
balance metaphor in this context allows.
This framework of regulation set out by Dworkin appears to establish space 
between his position and that of Ignatieff and Walzer. The 'Lesser Evil' and 'Just 
War' theories are in essence calls for limited decreases in regulation over the response 
to terrorism framed through an essentially liberal moralising approach to politics. 
Dworkin's 'reformulation' of liberal politics for the post-9/11 era is distinguishable to 
a limited degree on the basis that he refuses to except that a liberal response to 
terrorism can be formulated through anything but an absolute commitment to the 
regulation of sovereign power. For Ignatieff and Walzer, Dworkin and Rorty's 
approach would arguably fall into the 'unrealistic' category as it refuses to
24Rorty has suggested that Western governments should be made to 'disclose and discuss what they 
plan to do in an emergency' to allow for the required openness and regulation of exceptional situations. 
Rorty, " Post-Democracy", 5. Dworkin has conceded that within his proposed framework of regulation 
the 'new regime of principle may be open to exceptions in truly extraordinary situations'. Ronald 
Dworkin, "Terror & the Attack on Civil Liberties", New York Review of Books, November 6, 2003, 95.
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acknowledge that the new threat necessitates a loosening of the ties that bind the 
state's hands in its response to international terrorism. Their shared position amounts 
an outright denial of the necessity of a state of exception and their response consists in 
reiterating the two demands made by liberal rationalism. They are unwilling to accept 
that the state's past and current response is conceivably within the remit of what is 
expected of a liberal state.
In contrast, Ignatieff and Walzer's respective positions have opened them up 
to a critique that mirrors much of the criticism aimed at the state on the grounds of 
their apparent concession that the response to terrorism cannot be effective if 
constrained by regulation25 . The novel model required to confront the unprecedented 
threat to security must for Ignatieff and Walzer be underpinned by a process of 
rethinking the framework of regulation imposed on the state. In the presentation of the 
lesser evil perspective Ignatieff is predominantly concerned with the concept of 
emergency and its impact on the relationship between liberty and security. The 
preoccupation with the concept of emergency and the resulting exceptional measures 
is symptomatic of the liberal concern with dispelling as much as possible the idea that 
exceptional measures against liberty are anything to do with the 'exception', and 
Ignatieff s project is based on defining the liberal approach by establishing an
0 f\
appropriate regulatory framework . The 'realism' of Ignatieff s position is essentially 
an acknowledgement of the relevance of the exception in the context of the 'war on 
terror'. From a liberal perspective he is exhibiting the conviction this era supposedly 
demands, confronting this 'reality' and moreover, attempting to shield himself from 
the critiques aimed at a so called naive moral perfectionism. However, the liberal 
within shines through and his account of the emergency is overrun with examples of 
its legitimacy based on the regulation that a 'democracy' provides and his perspective 
aims to enhance.
25 For critiques of Ignatieff s position see: Laurie Taylor, "No more Mr Nice Guy: Laurie Taylor on 
Michael Ignatieff, New Humanist [internet] 120, 5, (September/October 2005), accessed August 9, 
2010 <http://newhumanist.org.uk/!299/no-more-mr-nice-guy-laurie-taylor-on-michael-ignatieff>.
26Ignatieff has concerned himself with the ways in which 'terrorist emergencies put these universalist 
commitments under strain' but has remained committed to the principles of openness and regulation in 
confronting the necessary derogations or exceptions: 'where derogations or exceptions are required, 
they must be publically justified and approved by court order', i.e. not politically. Michael Ignatieff, 
"Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Terrorism" Social Research 69, 4 (Winter 2002). So, the courts 
are the 'sovereign', which, whilst confirming Schmitt's view, accords with Pierre Manent's analyses of 
the empire of the judges. See, Pierre Manent, A World Beyond Politics? A Defense of the Nation-State, 
trans. Marc LePain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) particularly chapter 16.
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As with Ignatieff, and in line with Schmitt's analysis, Walzer's suggested 
confrontation of emergency is not substantive and the emphasis at the core of JWT is 
as expected on the processes of constraint and regulation. His framing of the concept 
of emergency in the post 9/11 period is continued from his previous work through 
what he terms a 'polemical and paradoxical' approach to the theory of "supreme 
emergency"27 . In this approach revisited for the 21 st century 'constraints do have a
•^o
hold' but 'political leaders could do whatever was required to meet the danger' . In 
this formulation of emergency Walzer presents JWT and his subsequent idea of 
'supreme emergency' as applicable to the 'new politics of the global age' 29 in which 
the reality of the 'war against terrorism' has to be confronted head on. However, the 
acknowledgement of the reality of the exception that is suggested in his build-up of 
the concept of 'supreme emergency' is notably absent. He remains committed to the 
regulation of emergency and while he is aware that rules have to be overridden he is 
unwilling and ultimately incapable to accept the need for 'the rules' to be 
suspended30 .
The doctrine of 'supreme emergency' is essentially part of the formulation of a 
'middle way' - a balance - between opposing forces. The doctrine is for Walzer a 
'way of manoeuvring between rights absolutism and the radical flexibility of 
utilitarianism' 31 . This opposition in the true liberal sense cannot ever be fully 
abolished and whilst avoiding the use of the concept, Walzer sets up his approach as a 
balancing act that must accept the importance of regulation whilst also conceding the 
reality of the danger facing the US in the current era. The doctrine of 'supreme 
emergency' involves repealing restraint on military action to avoid disaster. 
Ultimately, to make the link with Ignatieff explicit, it is a doctrine that legitimates the 
'lesser evil' (in Walzer's terms the 'dirty hands' 32) of warfare to avoid the greater evil 
of attacks from terrorism.
27Walzer, Arguing about War, 33 
28Walzer, Arguing about War, 33-34 
29Walzer, Arguing about War, 15
30 'There are moments when the rules can be and perhaps have to be overridden. They have to be 
overridden precisely because they have not been suspended'. Walzer, Arguing about War, 34
31 Walzer, Arguing about War, 34
32 The 'problem of dirty hands' is a idea that Walzer has discussed in previous work and a fuller 
exposition of the concept of dirty hands in politics more broadly is discussed in a 1973 paper: Michael 
Walzer, "Political Action: The problem of Dirty Hands" Philosophy ana1 Public Affairs 2, 2 (1973). In 
this paper Walzer's concept seeks to confront the reality that it is 'easy to get one's hands dirty in
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Both authors in turn wrestle with the concept of exception but are ultimately 
unable or unwilling to suggest that exceptional measures leave spaces unregulated or 
outside the law (e.g. the detention, interrogation and treatment of suspects of 
terrorism). They do to some extent set themselves apart from Dworkin and Rorty by a 
rhetorical commitment to revise the regulatory framework but ultimately they remain 
committed to the fact that a liberal response must be defined by regulation. The 
preoccupation with the concept of emergency and the resulting exceptional measures 
is symptomatic of the liberal concern with dispelling as much as possible the idea that 
exceptional measures against liberty are anything to do with the 'exception'.
The gap between formal presentation and actual operation: the fallacy of 
regulation
While in the formal presentation of their interventions Ignatieff and Walzer continue 
in reality to avoid the question of exception this does not mean that their respective 
projects constitute in any form a revision of, or extension to, a framework of restraint. 
The idea that their perspectives seek to depart fundamentally from the current 'war on 
terror' project and provide a substantive critique of the politics of security is 
nonsensical. The essentially liberal distinction between the formal presentation of the 
state and its actual operation is exemplified in the work of Ignatieff and Walzer and as 
a result their work plays a decisive legitimating function sanctioning extreme violence 
from behind a facade of regulation.
The construction of the 'war on terror' as a legitimate project builds on the 
justifications for humanitarian intervention found in Ignatieff s earlier work. Much of 
his work has been devoted to opening up a space to justify such action as well as the 
inevitable 'collateral damage' from within the liberal framework. Actually, in The 
Lesser Evil he develops this 'ethics of intervention' justifying the 'war on terror' on
politics and often right to do so'. Walzer, "Political Action", 174. As part of the seemingly overarching 
goal of formulating a 'middle way', the theory of 'dirty hands' derives from an effort to 'refuse 
"absolutism" without denying the reality of the moral dilemma'. Walzer, "Political Action", 162. While 
this additional component of Walzer's theory appears to again confront the idea of exception, his 
inability to consider political action outside of the law is exposed. The concept of dirty hands 
formulated in the 1970s and transported into the post 9/11 era in the doctrine of 'supreme emergency' 
remains shackled by the liberal obsession with legal regulation. Walzer's ability to consider rules being 
overridden is distinct from the necessary acceptance of the suspension of the law: 'when rules are 
overridden, we do not talk or act as if they have been set aside, cancelled or annulled'. Walzer, 
"Political Action", 171. As a liberal in the Schmittian sense, Walzer is, despite his claims to be 
realistic, incapable of confronting the exception and the suspension of the law that it requires.
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the basis of the same moralising approach. Justifying the resort to the most extreme 
action (as humanitarian interventions always involve) as a 'lesser evil' is ultimately 
possible because Ignatieff s position embodies the active subject of human rights. 
This places him on the 'right side' in the battle between good and evil that frames the 
politics of humanitarian intervention and in the same sense, frames the 'war on 
terror'.
This binary opposition between 'good' and 'evil' is at the core of the 
depoliticised, moralising framework of human rights that defines the 'Lesser Evil' 
perspective. Wendy Brown has suggested that human rights in Ignatieff s work 'take 
their shape as a moral discourse centred on pain and suffering rather than political 
discourse of comprehensive justice' 33 . The emphasis is on the suffering of the 
individual and as opposed to suggesting an alternative formulation of justice all 
collective justice projects are seemingly dismissed as Utopian - the protection of 
human rights is in Ignatieff s words 'the most we can hope for' 34 . This reinforces 
Badiou's warning that in the contemporary 'ethics' of human rights 'every collective 
will to the Good' is seen to 'create Evil' 35 .
Furthermore, Ignatieff s approach to human rights involves a reduction of 
their remit to simply 'a decidedly "thin" theory of what is right, a definition of the
^ f\
minimum conditions for any kind of life at all' . This reduction of human rights 
activism to the preservation only of what resembles Agamben's 'bare life' illustrates 
that for Ignatieff the passive subject of human rights - the focus of his humanitarian 
'concern' - is, as Badiou has noted, defined by its 'subhumanity', by bare biological 
or animal life. Both Ignatieff and Walzer's interventions are rooted in the moralising 
approach that characterises liberal politics and defines the liberal state's approach to 
security. The promotion of their proposals as being defined by regulation is in reality 
yet another mobilisation of the liberal pretence of restraint that attempts to deny not 
only the reality of war but the fact that a 'just war' is a war unrestrained in its 
violence.
33 Wendy Brown, ""The Most We Can Hope For......": Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism,"
The South Atlantic Quarterly 103, 2/3, (Spring/Summer 2004) 453
34 Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, (Princeton: Princeton University Press 
2001)173
35Badiou, Ethics, 13
36 Ignatieff in Brown, "The Most We Can Hope For", 454
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Denying the terrorist's human status and locating him outside of humanity, 
confirms Ignatieff s subscription to the liberal moralising approach to the 'war on 
terror'. This contrasts with his construction of human rights playing a regulatory 
function in a war of this type, but this is again symptomatic of his liberal politics that 
obscures both the dehumanisation inherent in the concept of humanity and the 
legitimating role of human rights in a war of potentially extreme inhumanity. Ignatieff 
has thrown his support behind the 'war on terror' that is, as Schmitt predicted, based 
on the opposition of the defenders of humanity and their enemies. As the terrorist 
confronted in the contemporary era justifies its actions outside of the language of 
rights it cannot for Ignatieff be a political movement to be met by politics, but instead 
it must be met 'only by war' 37 .
In development of this idea Walzer suggests that the terrorism faced by the 
west in the current era is distinct from the terrorism fought in the past premised as it is 
not on ideas of fighting for freedom but on jihad that for Walzer is characterised
TQ
comprehensively by a 'fundamentalist religious response to modernity' . The 
required response should not therefore be avowedly political but instead needs to be a 
'combined cultural-religious-political explanation' that has to focus explicitly on the 
'creation of an Enemy' 39 . For Walzer the creation of an Enemy that can be justifiably 
annihilated has been central to terrorist movements prior to Islamic terrorism and is 
indeed a central effect of wartime propaganda. However, the creation of an Enemy in 
this vein within Islamic terrorism - demonised and ultimately denied of humanity - is 
tied into an essentially fundamentalist religious agenda that posits the 'infidel' as its 
target whose 'world leader is the United States and whose local representative is 
Israel' 40 .
37Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, 99 
38Walzer, Arguing about War, 133 
39Walzer, Arguing about War, 132
40Walzer, Arguing about War, 133. The emphasis on Israel as the target of the enemy's violence is 
crucial to Walzer's formulation. Walzer has long been, and continues to be, a supporter of Israeli 
policies - including more recent incursions into Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2008 - and has through 
his work sought to square this support with his attachment to the left. See, Jerome Slater, "On Michael 
Walzer, Gaza, and the Lebanon War", Dissent 54, 1 (2007) 93; Mathew Phillips, "War and Michael 
Walzer", Mondoweiss [online], January 9, 2011, accessed July 23, 2012.
<http://mondoweiss.net/201 l/01/war-and-michael-walzer.html>.The apparent contradiction between 
these two commitments arises from an acceptance of the idea that Walzer's politics in general, as 
especially his thinking around war, are capable of (or indeed aim toward) providing a substantive 
critique grounded in a truly alternative politics. See below for further discussion of Walzer and the left.
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The emphasis on jihad as the defining backdrop for international terrorism 
illustrates Walzer's acceptance that contemporary terrorism is characterised not only 
exclusively by religion but more specifically by a synonymous affiliation with Islam. 
This position shared by Walzer and those liberal states at the forefront of the 'war on 
terror' is at the very core of the dominant discourse on 'international terrorism' and 
points to what Wendy Brown has termed the 'culturalization of polities' , that 
constitutes one of the most significant 'discourses of depoliticisation' in contemporary 
liberal democracies42 .
Brown additionally notes that this process is ascribed to 'Them' (clearly in this 
context to the terrorist) but 'We' in the west are not seen to be driven by culture. This 
illustrates the liberal denial of the mirroring process evident between the opposing 
ideologies at the core of the 'war on terror'. That this process is at the very core of the 
liberal intellectual analysis of terrorism -for Walzer and substantively for Ignatieff as 
well - illustrates an apparent critical point of convergence between these intellectuals 
and the state in the so-called 'age of terror'.
As a result of this approach the issue of international terrorism is one for the 
Islamic world and for Islamic communities in the west who have failed (or refuse) to 
modernise. What is fundamentally a combined psychopathological and 'cultural' 
explanation of the causes of Islamic terrorism presents it as defined by an 
unwillingness - or incapability - to modernise and ultimately an unwillingness to 
consider any alternative action. Walzer's construction of the Islamic terrorist draws 
upon the idea of the fanatic to construct the 'war on terror' as an Enlightenment 
struggle against the regressive forces of religious fundamentalism43 . Therefore, in 
agreement with Ignatieff, terrorism is presented as an apolitical nihilism that requires
41 This process involves a 'reduction of political motivations and causes to essentialized culture (where 
culture refers to an amorphous polyglot of ethnically marked religious and nonreligious beliefs and 
practices)' whose ultimate effect 'analytically vanquishes political economy, states, history, and 
international and transnational relations'. See, Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the 
Age of Identity and Empire, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) 20.
42 Alongside the 'Culturalization of politics* these discourses of depoliticisation include: Liberalism 
(the legal and political formalism of liberalism); Individualism; Market rationality; and Tolerance. 
Brown, Regulating Aversion.
43 '...the idea of fanaticism has served to support the widespread belief that we are experiencing the 
repetition or continuation of that struggle between reason and unreason, freedom and subjection, 
knowledge and ignorance that was first played out in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries'. Alberto 
Toscano, Fanaticism: On the Uses of an Idea, (London: Verso, 2010) 101. Walzer is here building 
upon the well-established association of Islam and fanaticism and he is reliant upon, as well as having 
the effect of reinforcing, notions of the 'civilizational subalternity of the Islamic world and its supposed 
collective 'rage" Toscano, Fanaticism, 162.
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a repressive response by the west that will out of necessity involve a real (and by 
definition just) war as part of its legitimate response 4 . The appropriate response to 
terrorism is constructed for both Ignatieff and Walzer in opposition to this apolitical 
nihilism - the response itself is presented as justifiably and overtly apolitical as local 
and global political factors are obscured to the point of denial. The depoliticisation of 
terrorism and of the proposed response is as Schmitt predicted based in the moralising 
approach to war that both Ignatieff and Walzer explicitly subscribe to - it is indeed 
this moralising that allows both project's to assume a sense of legitimacy.
While Walzer recognises the dehumanisation of the Enemy within the terrorist 
ideology, he is unsurprisingly at pains to deny the mirroring of this dehumanisation in 
the response to terrorism - a response that the Lesser Evil perspective and JWT 
ultimately seek to reinforce. The 'war on terror' is distinguished from the idea of jihad 
at the core of Islamic terrorism on the basis that the terrorists target innocent people. 
The 'war on terror' by way of response is a targeted and calculated project aimed 
solely at those fundamentalist militants who refuse to accept the realities of modernity 
and seek nihilistic violence as their only considered tactic. Walzer is keen to express 
the significant difference (apparently lost in the Bush administration) between a just 
war and a crusade 'as if a war can be just only when the forces of good are arrayed 
against the forces of evil' 45 . Despite the assurances that the liberal intellectual 
response is more complex and nuanced than this apparently simplified 'good versus 
evil' opposition, it captures precisely the framework of justification that these 
intellectuals provide.
The construction of the terrorist as the enemy is obvious in this approach to 
the 'war on terror' but it is outwardly formulated in opposition to concept of enemy in 
the terrorist ideology. The opponent in the 'war on terror' is portrayed clearly as an 
inhuman, criminal terrorist who targets innocent civilians with wanton abandonment 
and must therefore be opposed by the just forces of modernity. The 'war on terror' is 
legitimate because it is based on a distinction between the guilty and the innocent and 
is thus supposedly restrained by the moralising approach that Ignatieff and Walzer 
promote. This sense of legitimacy is however inaccessible to the terrorist because the
44Ignatieff makes a distinction between political and 'apocalyptic' goals with international terrorism - 
personified by Al Qaida - being based solely on the latter. The resulting lack of political goals render 
such movements incapable of political engagement or negotiation and thus in Ignatieff s words, 
echoing Walzer, they 'can only be fought by force of arms'. Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, 126.
45 Walzer, Arguing about War, 10
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distinction between the guilty and the innocent is denied in two ways. Firstly, in 
Walzer's presentation of the terrorist ideology there are 'no innocent Americans'46 ; 
and secondly, in both the denouncement of the 'culture of excuse and apology' and 
the essentially depoliticised interpretation of terrorism, Walzer removes any sense of 
'guilt' from the west and in turn withdraws any possible legitimate political 
motivation from the terrorist. The opposition between guilt and innocence that is 
central for a legitimate and just war in Walzer's theory is therefore entirely absent in 
the terrorist cause. Essentially Ignatieff and Walzer formulate a paradox whereby an 
apolitical cause is at the basis of both terrorist's illegitimacy and the legitimacy of the 
'war on terror'.
Indeed within this paradox the terrorist's absolute lack of legitimacy serves 
ultimately to reinforce the legitimacy of the 'war on terror' and to present it as a just 
war. The construction of a dehumanised enemy for which Islamic terrorism is 
denounced is essentially mirrored in the construction of the enemy to be confronted 
by the 'war on terror'. As the terrorist is unwilling to distinguish between guilt and 
innocence his legitimacy - and ultimately his 'protected' status as an enemy in war - 
is withdrawn. The terrorist is not therefore a human enemy to be defeated in a 
political war but an enemy of humanity who must be annihilated. Defining the enemy 
as a terrorist from the outset constructs the 'war on terror' as a just war. Ignatieff and 
Walzer serve to refine this construction and provide it with the gloss of an ostensibly 
detailed expansion of the illegitimacy of current terrorist movements.
It is thus clear that Ignatieff and Walzer's theories are rooted in the moralising 
approach that characterises liberal politics. Their promotion of this approach serves to 
reinforce the monopoly of legitimacy that the proponents of the 'war on terror' 
require. Schmitt made clear that 'the discriminatory concept of the enemy as a 
criminal and the attendant implication ofjusta causa run parallel to the intensification 
of the means of destruction and the disorientation of the theatres of war' 47 . This 
process is clear in the both the liberal intellectual approach shared by Ignatieff and 
Walzer and in the development of the 'war on terror' at the state level. Walzer's 
theory serves to unite the concept of the enemy as criminal and the just cause - and
46Walzer, Arguing about War, 134. Indeed for Walzer this sense of a blanket of guilt across America is 
at the core of certain extremist Islamic group's defence of terrorism.
47 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth: in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, 
trans. Gary Ulmen, (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2006) 321
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even a brief analysis of the 'war' on its foreign and home fronts illustrates its use of 
unrestrained violence in tackling terrorism48 .
Walzer's application of JWT to the 'war on terror' is at once a process of 
legitimisation and a derestriction of the means of destruction utilised to combat terror. 
The formulation of just war in this context is not a return to Medieval Christian 
doctrines of just war but simply an effect of the criminalising of the enemy. Stripping 
out any sense of political motivation or incitement serves to reinforce the naked 
criminality of Islamic terrorism and to reinforce thejusta causa of the 'war on terror' 
in its military endeavours. Walzer's attempt to distinguish the military campaign from 
the other 'components' of the 'war on terror' - suggesting that military action can be 
conceptually detached from the policing project - serves only to further mystify the 
nature of security. This mystification is a valuable tool utilised by the liberal 
intellectual to legitimise the 'war on terror'.
The neutralisation of conflict and the depoliticisation of politics
While there is some degree of separation between Ignatieff/Walzer and 
Dworkin/Rorty in terms of their formal commitment to regulation, in terms of their 
over-arching political framework the distinction is ultimately insubstantial. Dworkin 
and Rorty's total commitment to regulation is combined with the moralising and 
depoliticising approach to politics that characterises Ignatieff s and Walzer's work. 
By way of a clear example, hinging the liberal approach on the apolitical concept of 
'shared humanity' is coherent with the liberal approach to politics exposed by Schmitt 
and confirms Dworkin's subscription to a depoliticised framework for action in 
response to terrorism. While Dworkin would undoubtedly seek to distance himself 
from the calls for reduced regulation found in Ignatieff and Walzer's work - as he has 
with the same calls from within the Bush administration - his presentation of 
regulation built on this moralising framework arguably provides further legitimacy to 
the dehumanisation at the core of the war on terror.
48 The 'disorientation of the theatres of war' is also an undoubted factor of the 'war on terror'. The 
geographic boundaries of the war are constantly reformulated and expanded to open ever new fronts 
outside the conventional understanding of warfare constrained by geographic boundaries (and political 
boundaries if we consider Guantanamo Bay for example).
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The distinction between the intellectual (re)formulation of the liberal approach 
to the 'war on terror' and the reality of state operation is at its most pronounced in 
Dworkin's work. His emphatic commitment to regulation reveals his inability or 
unwillingness to acknowledge the reality of the liberal state's conduct that is exposed 
most glaringly in its response to terrorism. By conflating regulation with the 
moralising approach to politics Dworkin actually provides crucial legitimation to both 
the Ignatieff/Walzer approach and by extension to the state's use of unrestrained 
violence that comes as part of its war against the inhuman terrorist. Moreover, the 
depoliticisation at the core of Dworkin's approach renders the current status quo - of 
which the 'war on terror' is a prominent feature - effectively undisturbed. Dworkin's 
concern with the relationship between human rights and security is part of his broader 
concern with the 'war like' formulation of US politics in which conflict between the 
'two cultures' of red and blue prevents 'shared principles' and political debate49 . 
Dworkin is explicit that liberalism should define the new politics - indeed liberal 
politics for Dworkin is politics - and the concept of shared humanity alongside a 
reaffirmation of liberal individualism should form the basis around which politics can 
be 'rejuvenated' and conflict denied50 .
In his construction of these 'two principles of human dignity' Dworkin offers 
a 'Third Way' in political philosophy between the appreciation of equal value of 
every human life (often associated with the Left) and personal responsibility for the 
realisation of such value (associated with the Right)51 . Dworkin's project in relation to 
US politics makes explicit the depoliticising function of the construction of a Third 
Way and this approach to politics runs throughout his work and not least in response 
to the liberty-security relationship in the post-9/11 era. It is important to understand 
that the third way approach to politics has, in its liberal formulation, the effect of 
defining all non-liberal perspectives as 'extremist' (and thus illegitimate) and it is 
clear that as the under-current to Dworkin's political philosophy this approach serves 
further to confirm the monopoly of legitimacy for liberalism in the current era52 . It is
49Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?,\60.
50 This aspiration is in line with the liberal aspiration par excellence: to overcome conflict and thus to 
overcome politics leaving only economic competition and the competition of opinions.
51 Jules Townshend, "Review: Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate", 
Democratiya, 9, (Summer 2007) 118.
52 This approach to politics is not novel to the post 9/11 era, although it has been given additional 
impetus in this period. Arguably it is post 1989 (as opposed to post 2001) that this notion of legitimate
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in the context of this broader depoliticising project that his approach to the liberty- 
security relationship is situated.
Dworkin's function as an intellectual can be aligned with Ignatieff and Walzer 
to the extent that his articulation of the 'true' liberal response serves to reinforce the 
legitimacy of not only current security policies but also the broader political and 
economic arrangement. The reinvigoration of liberalism serves only to further 
marginalise and delegitimise conflict and deny any potential for truly alternative 
politics. The reformist strain in Dworkin and more clearly in Rorty's work does at 
least initially mark them apart from Ignatieff and Walzer but it is clear on further 
analysis that the marginalisation of conflict remains a process unaffected by reform.
Rorty's reformist project in relation to human rights was proposed prior to the 
era of the 'war on terror' 53 but understanding the thrust of these reforms illustrates 
much about his response to the post 9/11 security regime. His reformulation is not an 
attempt to transcend the human rights framework but to reconfigure the process by 
which this framework is 'sold' outside the Enlightenment tradition. There is nothing 
innately problematic for Rorty in appeals to shared humanity - it is not the cause of 
the construction of the inhuman or subhuman that he rightly notes has continued in 
the human rights era - it is simply insufficient as a method of rallying the rest of 
humanity to respect each other's human rights54 . His concern with the current 
response to terrorism lies more specifically with the potential this has to hold back the 
globalisation of the liberal democratic framework and the human rights principles so 
central to it.
The aim of promoting a Eurocentric human rights culture beyond the West 
amounts, de facto to an attempt to extend the essentially liberal depoliticised political 
framework. A sense of Enlightenment continues to be the reserve of the Westerner as
politics has been more firmly entrenched, although Dworkin illustrates that it preceded this historical 
marker as well.
53 See, Richard Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality" in The Politics of Human 
Rights, ed. The Belgrade Circle (London: Verso, 1999)
54Rorty assumes that the idea of universal human nature finds its only basis in the idea of rationality 
which Eagleton has noted is clearly not the case. See, Terry Eagleton, The Idea of Culture, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2000) 136n. It is this assumption of a direct correlation that seemingly leads to Rorty's 
outright rejection of the idea of a universal human nature. In reality his problem lies with appeals to 
rationality and his alternative approach does not involve the substantive rejection of the principle of 
appeals to absolute human equality that Badiou locates at the core of a critique of the politics of human 
rights. Rorty's appeals to acquaint people on the basis of a shared 'similarities' seems in essence to 
replace one apolitical process with another.
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there is a pivotal difference in the construction of a sense of identity between people 
in the West and those outside. For those 'untouched by the European Enlightenment' 
their sense of identity is 'bound up in a sense of who they are not'55and thus rooted in 
conflict. The concern with this sense of identity and the drive to rectify it is 
symptomatic of Rorty's fear of conflict which is rooted in his subscription to the 
moralism of the contemporary humanitarian ethics that his 'revised' approach to 
human rights is incapable of transcending.
It is clearly apparent that Rorty's project is not based on a substantive 
confrontation with the politics of human rights as is found at the core of Schmitt and 
Badiou's critiques - indeed his hardened liberalism would make that impossible. 
Instead, his 'reformulation' of human rights involves a recasting of the promotion of 
human rights that leaves the depoliticisation at their core undisturbed. Acquainting 
people on the basis of a sentimental education as opposed to appeals to reason does 
not involve a return to ideas of political equality or a truly political basis for action. 
The process of making connections on the basis of sentiment is as apolitical as 
appeals to a sense of shared humanity. While the dehumanisation at the core of 
appeals to an absolute human equality appears to be negated, Rorty's construction of 
the unenlightened other of the non-western world fails to make any impact on the 
absence of political relations at the core of the human rights framework. If 'the 
moralist inevitably feels antipathy towards politics as a domain of open contestation 
for power and hegemony' 56 this is as clear in Rorty's essentially depoliticised 
framework as it is for Ignatieff, Walzer and Dworkin. The aim of the liberal 
intellectual is the neutralisation of conflict and this lies at the root of the pervasive 
depoliticisation evident in their work pre and post 9/11.
It is ultimately clear that Dworkin and Rorty contribute - in the same way as 
Ignatieff and Walzer - to the project of imposing formal regulation on the state that in 
turn paradoxically provides a sense of legitimacy to the same political and military 
project they seek ostensibly to resist. This two pronged contribution with its inherent 
contradiction serves to sustain the void between formal presentation and operation of 
the state. In converging with the position of those liberal states leading the 'war on 
terror' all four intellectuals serve to bolster this 'war' by offering a sense of
55Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", 75 original emphasis
56 Wendy Brown, Politics out of History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 30.
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legitimacy to the violence it employs. This contradiction is seemingly implicit in what 
appears to be a shared understanding of the role of the liberal intellectual.
The convergence between liberal 'critique' and state policy: There is no 
alternative
At the core of the position of each of these intellectuals is a drive to legitimate and 
sustain the current political and economic conditions defined as they are by liberal 
democracy and free-market capitalism. A critical analysis of their work pre and post 
9/11 illustrates that their function as intellectuals consists ultimately in upholding the 
conception of the world shared by the liberal state. This has continued post 9/11 in the 
form of a clear convergence with the liberal state around the necessity of a 'war on 
terror' and an agreement on the form it should take.
Illustrating the convergence between the liberal intellectual and the liberal 
state around the form and subsequent legitimacy of the 'war on terror', Walzer has 
been cited in the introduction to The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency 
Field Manual (2007) for having 'restored our ability to think clearly about war - 
including its legitimacy and its demands' 57 . The fact that Walzer has been able to 
provide this assistance to the state whilst maintaining his position as one of (if not the)
fQ
leading leftist critic in the US illustrates the vital service the 'critical' liberal 
intellectual provides to the liberal state. The legitimating function of such 'critical' 
interventions is only most explicitly illustrated in the apparent paradox of Walzer's 
position vis-a-vis 'the left' and the state. His intervention has provided a pivotal 
source of legitimacy to the 'war on terror' that is at present the most explicit current 
manifestation of the logic of security but his function is not unique. The liberal 
intellectual is in fact continually occupied in a process of helping the state to 'rethink' 
its approach to security ultimately allowing it to continually present violence and war 
in the guise of peace. If the 'war on terror' stands as the latest in a long line of code
57 See, Sarah Sewall, "Introduction to the University of Chicago Press edition. A Radical Field 
Manual" in The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, ed. United States Army 
and United States Marine Corps (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007) xxii.
58 Walzer is editor of Dissent magazine that purports to 'dissent from the bleak atmosphere of 
conformism that pervades the political and intellectual life of the United States ...The accent of Dissent 
will be radical'. Lewis Coser, "A Word to Our Readers," Dissent 1, 1 (1954) 3
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words for the 'permanent pacification required in/of the bourgeois polity' 59 then the 
liberal intellectual serves only to reinforce the mystification of this process.
To further grasp the conservative function of the liberal intellectual it is crucial 
to understand that fundamentally, Ignatieff s articulation of the human rights project 
has been from its inception an attempt to provide 'a political-economic account of 
what markets need to survive' 60 . It is in this context that his Lesser Evil perspective 
seeks at its core to reinforce the status quo in both political and economic terms post 
9/11. Ignatieff s intervention makes clear that the current politics of security are 
intrinsically bound up in the liberal political and economic project. His fundamentally 
uncritical (re)articulation of the 'true' liberal approach illustrates that the function of 
the liberal intellectual in this epoch is to sustain the conception of the world that 
defines this project.
This attempt must be placed at the core of the liberal intellectual project. The 
collective articulation of the 'true' liberal response serves to reinforce the legitimacy 
and hegemonic status of not only the current security policies but also the broader 
political and economic arrangement. As Peter Gabel noted at the time of publication 
of Dworkin's seminal text on human rights61 , 'the specific behaviours legitimated by 
Dworkin's theory are those which are made necessary by the immanent logic of
f\^
capitalism during the current historical period' . The drive to legitimate the economic 
framework in which the liberty-security regime is located defined as it is by market 
capitalism remains a central force behind Dworkin's work. By way of clear example, 
in Is Democracy Possible Here Dworkin not only 'confronts' the relationship between 
human rights and security but also taxation and the central tenets of the economic 
framework required for a rejuvenated liberal America. The two issues (of the human 
rights-security relationship and economic 'justice') are in reality inseparable, 
conjoined in the overarching project of legitimating and sustaining the liberal status 
quo. His central principle of personal responsibility - essentially a reaffirmation of 
liberal individualism - can for him unsurprisingly only be properly achieved through 
market capitalism. Townshend has suggested that the world that Dworkin constructs
59 Mark Neocleous, "War as peace, peace as pacification", Radical Philosophy 159, (Jan-Feb 2010), 17 
emphasis added.
60 Brown, "The Most We Can Hope For", 457
61 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London: Duckworth, 2007) 
Peter Gabel, "Review of Taking Rights Seriously". 91 Harvard Law Review 302(1977) 309
61
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in economic terms confers with, and is underpinned by, the notion of 'possessive 
individualism' so clearly set out by Macpherson63 . This suggestion is underpinned by 
the idea that Dworkin's conception of human dignity is not Kantian: this is not true 
human reason but instead is acquisitive reason. Dworkin's formulation of human 
dignity in this sense underpins his emphatic commitment to human rights and one is 
thus pointed to the idea that rights in this formulation serve to secure the acquisitive 
capacity to property.
It should be noted that the centrality of this human rights theory in the liberal 
intellectual response to security in no sense constitutes a deviation from the current 
politics of security. If security is the supreme concept of bourgeois society then it is 
entirely unsurprising that it is intertwined with the refrain of "human rights" that is 
'nothing other than the ideology of modern liberal capitalism' 64 . Indeed, the 
depoliticisation at the core of human rights is an integral component of the politics of 
security and the liberal intervention based as it is on human rights serves by definition 
to reinforce the mystification of the violence at its core.
Walzer and Rorty's engagement with the left - as well as Ignatieff s drive to 
remove any 'left tilt' and political ambition from human rights projects and 
Dworkin's attempt to neutralise political conflict - is premised on the attempt to 
maintain the status quo. For this to be possible political alternatives have to be 
marginalised and rendered illegitimate - no wonder then that the attempt to 'reform' 
or reconfigure the left be central to this project. Walzer has called for the formation of 
a 'decent' left that will be able to contribute to a 'serious debate' about security on the 
basis of its transcendence of any ideological framework. From this standpoint any 
critical perspective that rejects the liberal framework and instead locates itself on the 
left in truly emancipatory terms should be excluded from any debate on security. For 
Walzer a 'decent' left is one that is explicitly post-ideological and refuses to maintain 
the seemingly archaic and unhelpful distinctions between liberalism and the left.
Rorty has advocated similar 'reforms' based on his wish to dismantle the 
Marxist hold on leftist politics that is again at the root of a desire to abandon any
63 Townshend, "Review: Is Democracy Possible Here?"
64 Alain Badiou in Christopher Cox & Molly Whalen "On Evil: An Interview with Alain Badiou", 
Cabinet Magazine Online [online] 5, (Winter 2001702), 
<http://www.cabinetmagazine.Org/issues/5/alainbadiou.php>
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distinction between liberalism and the left65 . The unwillingness to accept - so the 
claim goes - the viability of capitalism and the cluttered vocabulary of words such as 
'commodification' and 'ideology' are symptomatic of the redundancy of Marxism 
that renders the leftist-liberal distinction outmoded. It is vital to note here that for 
Rorty (and the liberal intellectual more generally) a rejection of the validity and 
legitimacy of capitalism is symptomatic of a dead politics. We have passed the end of 
history and must in this post-ideological age be willing to accept the seemingly self- 
evident logic of capitalism. Unsurprisingly, given what we know about security, any 
political project that resists the legitimacy of bourgeois society is rejected outright.
The supposed transcendence of an ideological 'age' and the substitution of 
ideology with a culturalization of politics is the central premise of this depoliticised 
approach to security that is exemplified by the liberal intellectual in the response to 
terrorism. A failure to engage in the debate on liberal terms depicts the left as 
nihilistic not only devoid of any meaningful contribution but itself a threat to security 
that must be opposed (aligned in this sense with international terrorism on the basis of 
the resort to nihilism). This essentialist 'analysis' of the contemporary left unites all 
leftist anti-war (or anti 'war on terror') sentiment together to be readily dismissed. 
The fear of any truly alternate politics confirms that notion of leftist politics offers 
only a reinstatement of the liberal framework. The 'decent left' cannot offer an 
alternative political alignment not least because it is unwilling to reject the politics of 
security.
The liberal response to security reinforced by the 'decent left' is symptomatic 
of today's post-politics that serves to 'undermine the possibility of a proper political 
act' based as it is on the depoliticisation of economics66 . This political stance instead 
creates the space for an avowedly apolitical response to the contemporary world 
including to the current security regime. The depoliticisation at the core of the liberal 
intellectual's intervention serves to further mystify the issue of war and its role at the 
heart of security. However, this must not be considered as an issue confined to the 
'war on terror' as it is 'a long-standing ideological feature of the global war of
65 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America, (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1998)42
66Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology, (London: Verso, 1999)
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capital' 67 . The liberal intelligentsia stands as the vanguard of liberal politics masking 
of the social war of capital through the depoliticisation that defines their intervention. 
The importance of human rights to the liberal intellectual project is based on their 
main effect being the 'depoliticisation of politics itself 68 . If we understand rights as 
having become in the current context 'rewards for accepting the dominant order' and 
have the effect of 'depoliticising conflict' 69 then their integral status in the politics of 
security is unsurprising.
The conservatism of the 'critical' liberal intervention
The critique of the left is intrinsic to the liberal intellectual project. The conservatism 
of these intellectuals is founded in the conscious attempt to legitimate and sustain the 
current political and economic order. Human rights are exposed as vital tools to this 
project. The commitment to human rights principles and the critique of alternative 
politics are two sides of the same political position and Rorty's intervention illustrates 
only most clearly the coherence of this politics. His project does nothing to restore a 
political identity and is aimed at maintaining the current global political hierarchy. A 
sense of Enlightenment continues to be the reserve of the 'Westerner' and it is thus no 
surprise that the human rights culture has developed and been secured in the west. 
Rorty's 'reform' of human rights is an attempt to reinvigorate the current 'ethics' and 
his view of the role of the West exemplifies Badiou's observation that this ethics 
coincides with (and arguably heightens) 'today's sordid self-satisfaction in the 
West' 70 .
Rorty's approach - and the now seemingly obligatory approach for the West - 
toward the non-Western human rights abuser is not to treat him as irrational but as 
'deprived' 71 . The sense of deprivation is based for Rorty not on a lack of moral 
knowledge but on an absence of two 'more concrete things: security and sympathy' 72 . 
There is an obvious lack of sympathy outside the West exhibited by the continued
67Neocleous, "War as peace, peace as pacification ", 16 
68Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire, 102 
69Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire, 108 
70Badiou, Ethics, 13
7 'Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", 77 
Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", 7772
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abuse of human rights. Furthermore, the concept of'security' that Rorty sees as found 
wanting is a precondition of sympathy understood as: 'conditions of life sufficiently 
risk-free as to make one's difference from others inessential to one's self-respect, 
one's sense of worth' 73 . Without the conditions of security appeals to sympathy 
cannot be expected to take hold - people cannot be expected to exhibit the altruistic 
concern for others when their own situation is drastic. This is why the human rights 
culture premised on sympathy has been able to take hold only in the West where the 
necessary conditions of security can be observed. In this formulation only the west 
can be sympathetic as it has the conditions of security and material wealth that allow 
us to transcend our egoism.
In this formulation 'spiritual and material progress here go hand in hand' 7 
because security is here understood in essentially material terms. For Rorty the move 
toward the Enlightenment Utopia - that the development of a human rights culture is 
symptomatic of - can only be brought about by material gain. In a true liberal 
formulation security is understood to be economic security brought about by material 
progress - security is not without reason the supreme concept of bourgeoisie society. 
Rorty's project serves only most explicitly to exert the necessity of the globalisation 
of Western capitalism as a cornerstone of the spiritual progress brought about by the 
development of the human rights culture. The maintenance of the status quo that has 
been identified as a core consequence, if not premise, of the liberal intellectual project 
clearly extends to the economic as well as the political framework. The idea that these 
intellectuals (and most specifically Rorty given his pretence) are reformers must at 
this point be fully abandoned. Their mission involves only an affirmation of the 
liberal system seeking to make the politics of human rights more powerful and 
ultimately more suited to the process of globalisation.
The function of the liberal public intellectual
The liberal intellectual would on the basis of their appeal to human rights seem to be 
at the other end of the intellectual spectrum to the security intellectual, yet in reality 
they have the same conservative function. If we understand security studies to be 'as
73Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", 77 
74 Eagleton, The Idea of Culture, 47
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far as could be imagined from the idea of critique' 75 then the liberal critique based on 
human rights is equally as distant. This is because they both occupy the same 
essentially liberal political terrain and both share the 'central categories and key 
conceptions of power, subjectivity and knowledge' with the hegemonic powers . 
However, the precise legitimating function of liberal intellectual cannot be played by 
a straight defender of the current security regime because the regime is not predicated 
solely on the notion of security. Security is intertwined with the discourse of human 
rights and thus the most decisive legitimating function can only come from those who 
by virtue of their own position and status are willing and able to rubber stamp the role 
of human rights in the 'war on terror'. Having the guardians of liberalism (and human 
rights) substantively sanction the use of human rights in the 'war on terror' provides 
and unrivalled source of legitimacy to the orchestration of this 'war' from within the 
liberal democratic framework.
The prioritisation of security above all else is categorically liberal but so too is 
the maintenance of a fa9ade that posits liberty as the primary concern. The role of the 
liberal intellectual is to maintain this age old fa9ade that posits liberty as the central 
concept in liberalism. The continued assertion that liberalism prioritises liberty over 
security is reliant upon the perseverance of the mythical distinction in this sense 
between Hobbes and Locke. It is crucial to understand that the utility of this concept 
of balance (inevitably the central tool for the liberal intellectuals) continues to be 
based in its ability to hide the fact that security is the supreme concept of liberal 
society. A critical analysis that deconstructs this mystification must make clear that 
the politics of security are liberal politics and not some form of aberration or 
distortion. The attempt to define an alternate, truly liberal relation between liberty and 
security is not simply a fruitless task (from the point of view of any true alternative 
politics) but its dominance as the overarching goal of the liberal intellectual maintains 
the fa9ade that is the crucial source of liberalism's perceived legitimacy.
Following Gramsci's analysis it is clear that the public liberal intellectual 
plays a pivotal role in organising the consent of the population to the current order in 
political and economic terms as much as in relation to the liberty-security 
relationship. Despite the overwhelming focus on the international dynamic of the 'war
75Neocleous, Critique of Security, 183 
76Neocleous, Critique of Security, 183
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on terror' in these intellectual's accounts it is in the internal 'realm' - in which central 
freedoms are continually eroded - that organising the consent of the population is so 
vital to the state. Therefore, it is in this context of legitimating the curtailment of 
freedoms and delegitimising any possible alternatives within the liberal state's 
committed to the 'war on terror' that the function of the intellectual is so important. 
Their role as mediators between the state and what liberalism understands as civil 
society seems decisive in securing liberalism's hegemony.
It would therefore be absurd to continue to labour under the apprehension that 
the public liberal intellectual's approach to the current politics of security constitutes 
anything close to a critical intervention contesting the current regime in any form. 
There is a fundamental concern in the following analyses (of the interventions made 
by scholars and academics and of the interventions by human rights organisations) 
with the influence this intellectual position has on other levels of intellectual activity. 
In the first instance the concern is with the 'guidance' the key themes and language in 
this substantively shared position (between Ignatieff, Walzer, Dworkin and Rorty) 
provides to those scholars, academics and practitioners working on the liberty- 
security relationship. The potential for the central themes exposed above to set the 
parameters for all further interventions on this topic suggests the possibility of a 
common intellectual approach to the relationship between liberty and security. This in 
turn raises concerns about the dominance of a depoliticising approach to security 
politics that delegitimises and marginalises all effective critique.
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Chapter 2
Critiquing an illiberal regime and charting the return to liberalism: 
The scholarly and academic approach to the liberty-security relationship
This chapter seeks to identify the features of the debate that has occupied scholars and 
academics working on the post-9/11 relationship between liberty and security. More 
specifically, the review of literature in this chapter seeks to ascertain the extent of 
convergence or substantive disagreement between those contributors to this debate. 
The analysis will therefore seek to identify the parameters within which such a debate 
takes place to decipher firstly if this debate is confined solely to a liberal terrain and 
secondly, if it exhibits evidence of guidance provided by those public intellectuals 
considered above. The potential for Ignatieff, Walzer, Dworkin and Rorty to have, 
through direct or indirect influence, confined the debate at this level of intellectual 
activity is of central importance to identifying a common intellectual approach to the 
relationship between liberty and security. The narrower readership for this literature 
(in comparison to the public intellectuals) does not negate the potential influence that 
these scholars and academics have over the existing liberty-security regime. Their 
function as intellectuals is still arguably incisive in terms of their ability to reinforce 
the shared liberal intellectual position set out by Ignatieff et al above, or alternatively 
in terms of their ability to diverge from this position and forge a new approach from 
within an alternative political and intellectual framework.
The analysis will therefore seek to determine if the four themes of balance, 
exception, depoliticisation and legitimisation structure and define the response of this 
specific intellectual stratum. The identification of relevant literature at this level was 
grounded in the UK-Australia comparison that will run through into the analysis of 
state strategy. The dialogue between the governments of these two nations has been 
accompanied by a conversation between scholars and academics focussed primarily 
on the differences in the formalisation of the liberty-security relationship at the 
antipodes. This particular focal-point does not confine the literature considered here 
but it is used to provide a starting point from which some of the central reference 
points for the debate are sketched out and considered in detail. This specific debate is 
considered initially with a view to allowing the identification of subsequently 
connected and relevant areas of debate. This section will therefore begin with that
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literature that considers explicitly what a liberal approach to the liberty-security 
relationship should look like in a post-2001 liberal democracy. The latter part of the 
chapter will consider some of the ostensibly critical accounts of the liberty-security 
regime found in this literature to identify the substantive basis of such criticism and to 
subsequently ascertain if this debate is capable of accommodating interventions that 
consider a truly alternative political framework to the one that defines the current 
regime.
This section begins with a critical analysis of the position of George Williams 
who as a prominent Australian legal scholar and campaigner for human rights 
legislation has been at the centre of calls for the introduction of human rights 
legislation in Australia. Beginning with Williams' framing of the issue of human 
rights protection in the era of the 'war on terror', the analysis seeks to reveal the 
central principles on the basis of which this campaign has become for many liberal 
scholars symptomatic of the attempt to address the seemingly fraught relationship 
between liberty and security in the contemporary era. Taking this as a starting point 
for a broader review of literature enables the analysis to reveal the central principles 
of the scholarly elucidation of the relationship between liberty and security in the 
context of this popular campaign. This in turn will ground an interrogation of the 
central concepts that frame the broader debate among liberal scholars and academics.
Australia and the adoption of UK style human rights legislation: solving the 
fraught liberty-security relationship
Australia is the only western democracy without a Charter or Bill of Human Rights 1 . 
On the basis of this absence there have been repeated calls for the introduction of 
some formal, legal recognition of human rights obligations in Australia and these calls 
have more recently been contextualised by Australia's commitment to the 'war on 
terror'. While Australia has been at the forefront of the intervention by the Coalition 
of the Willing in Afghanistan and Iraq, the domestic response to the 'war on terror' 
has been focussed on the introduction of the first Commonwealth anti-terrorism
1 "Charter or Bill of Rights: Questions and Answers", Law Council of Australia, accessed July 27, 




legislation . The introduction of anti-terrorism law as the necessary response to 
international terrorism has for several commentators enhanced the calls for 
corresponding human rights law. The campaign in the current epoch has been 
underpinned by a concern about the relationship between liberty and security in a 
state that is committed to the 'war on terror' but does not have a human rights Bill or 
Charter.
At the centre of this campaign, providing its academic presentation has been 
George Williams who is professor of law at the University of New South Wales and a 
practicing barrister. Williams' calls for a human rights bill predate the events of 9/11 
and the introduction of Commonwealth counter-terrorism policy. These developments 
have however given added impetus to Williams' scholarly work on not only the 
potential benefits of human rights legislation, but its absolute necessity post 9/11. In 
the 2004 edition of his series of 'Briefings' on the case for a Charter or Bill of rights3 
Williams has explained that in the context of a heightened security environment in 
which anti-terrorism laws are passed with 'great haste', the legal system and its 
underlying principles of 'the rule of law and the liberty of the individual can come 
under considerable strain' 4 . It is within this context that a Bill of Rights has even more 
of a central role to play in a liberal democracy:
They [Bills of Rights] remind governments and communities of a society's 
basic values and of the principles that might otherwise be compromised at a 
time of grief and fear. After new laws have been made, a Bill of Rights can 
also allow courts to assess the changes against human rights principles. This 
can provide a final check on laws that, with the benefit of hindsight, ought not 
to have been passed. The absence of such a check is one reason why, in some 
respects, Australian law after September 11 has restricted individual rights 
more than the equivalent regimes in Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
United States5
2 The Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 was the first ever Commonwealth anti- 
terrorism legislation.
3 Williams series of books on the case for human rights legislation in Australia began with George 
Williams, A Bill of Rights for Australia (Coogee: UNSW Press, 2000) and has included George 
Williams, The Case for an Australian Bill of Rights: Freedom in the War on Terror (Coogee: UNSW 
Press, 2004) and George Williams, A Charter of Rights for Australia (Coogee: UNSW Press, 2007).
4 Williams, The Case for an Australian Bill of Rights, 28
5 Williams, The Case for an Australian Bill of Rights, 28
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Williams shares the confidence of the public intellectuals considered above in 
the role human rights play (and the validity of human rights legislation) in restraining 
the state and yet he remains wholly committed to this function in the context of the 
'war on terror'. However, by way of an apparent departure from Ignatieff s position, 
Williams suggests the relationship need not be rethought in Australia as it is yet to 
formally take shape. In general for Williams, human rights obligations need not 
render the state's security policies impotent and instead a Bill of Rights may 'serve as 
an anchor at times of crisis' 6 . The relationship between a Bill of Rights and national 
security is for Williams, as for Ignatieff, one of balance:
After September 11, new laws on terrorism must strike a balance between 
national security, on the one hand, and important public values and 
fundamental freedoms on the other7 .
The concept of balance is at the core of Williams' campaign for a Bill or Charter of 
Rights for Australia and is for Williams the appropriate tool for managing the 
relationship between liberty and security in the era of the 'war on terror'. The calls for 
the adoption of a UK style human rights policy in Australia, of which Williams has 
been most vocal8 , is based on the idea that the UK Human Rights Act 1998 has 
provided the necessary restraint to counter-terrorism policy and enabled the UK to 
combat terrorism while maintaining basic rights9 .
6 Williams, The Case for an Australian Bill of Rights, 28
7 Williams, The case for an Australian Bill of Rights, 28 emphasis added
8 Williams played a pivotal role in the adoption The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vie) that along with the ACT Human Rights Act 2004 'demonstrates how 
an Australian state or territory can enact better protection for human rights without undermining 
parliamentary sovereignty, transferring power to the courts or causing a surge in litigation'. These laws 
are openly based on the UK Human Rights Act 1998 and for Williams as a human rights scholar and in 
his advisory role at state and federal level, the UK HR Act is the model to follow because basing the 
Australian state and territory legislation on the UK Act (as opposed to the US Bill of Rights for 
example) enables them to be 'innovative if modest, changes to the Australian system of government in 
the form of an ordinary act of parliament that protects a range of civil and political rights that have 
broad popular support'. Williams, A Charter of Rights for Australia, 72
9 Indeed Williams is supported in this confidence in the UK HRA by those who (not in an altogether 
celebratory fashion) define the UK human rights record with respect to counter-terrorism 'as a 
balancing act between a US-influenced interpretation of national insecurity and the European Court's 
conditioning of domestic legal regimes'. This balance reflects Williams' and Ignatieff s confidence in 
the UK style regime that can plot a realistic course through the opposing concerns for liberty and 
security. See Alison Brysk, "Human Rights and National Insecurity" in National Insecurity & Human 
Rights: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, eds. Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir, (London: 
University of California Press, 2007)
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Williams' scholarly work on the relationship between counter-terrorism and 
human rights has been predominantly concerned with an elucidation of a balancing 
approach to explain that it is in fact at the core of the state's operation and should thus 
be openly acknowledged and confronted from a scholarly standpoint. In response to 
this, Williams' work has sought to give 'content, structure and direction to what is an 
imprecise task' 10 but ultimately to assert the appropriateness of such a tool in a liberal 
democracy. Williams has presented the balancing approach in opposition to the 
construction of counter-terrorism legislation as 'human security legislation' as has 
been done at the state level in both Canada and Australia11 . The notion of human 
security in this sense is based on a supposed reconciliation of human rights and 
national security that denies the opposition of these two concerns that is at the core of 
the idea of balance. The campaign for a Bill of Rights based on the UK model for 
Williams is encouraged by the ability of such legislation to enable an ongoing process 
of weighing and balancing through the inclusion of derogation clauses that enable 
rights to be continually rebalanced against security within the context of a legal 
framework of human rights protections. It is this process of derogation that underpins 
Williams' confidence that a Bill of Rights will not debilitate counter-terrorism efforts 
and upset the balance in favour of liberty.
Debating the concept of balance and the securitisation of rights
The notion that liberty and security are irreconcilable and therefore in need of 
'balancing' has been adopted by other scholars who like Ignatieff and Williams, see 
the metaphor as essential to simultaneously prevent the debilitation of the state in the 
face of terrorism, and ensure the restraint on the state necessary in a liberal society 12 . 
In a seemingly contradictory fashion, the central opposition of liberty and security
10 Ben Golder and George Williams, "Balancing National Security and Human rights: Assessing the 
Legal response of Common Law Nations to the Threat of Terrorism", Journal of Comparative Policy 
Analysis?., 1, (March2006)
1 'Colder and Williams, "Balancing National Security", 44
12 Dieter Grimm, Visiting Professor of Law and Oscar M. Ruebhausen Distinguished Senior Fellow at 
Yale Law School, is a subscriber to the view that 'it is impossible to maximise both security and liberty 
at the same time'. While he is aware that 'the price for enhancing security is paid by liberty', 'there are 
limits maximising security if one wants to preserve the liberal system' and this is why the acceptance 
of security measures 'depends on the right balance'. Dieter Grimm, "How to Balance Freedom and 
Security", Spiegel Online: International April 26, 2007, accessed February 12, 2010, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/worloVO, 1518,479668,00.html,
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inherent in the balance metaphor has enabled it to be adopted by both 'extremes' of 
the debate within liberalism. The concept has been employed by both scholars who 
present it as maintaining a central place for human rights in the war on terror, and 
those who see it allowing for an increased emphasis on security and corresponding 
reduction in liberty 13 . On both sides of this debate within the adoption of the concept 
of balance there is agreement that it is the tool to maintain a relationship between 
liberty and security that is loyal to the principles of a liberal democracy.
Striking a balance between liberty and security has however been criticised 
from within the same liberal circles for oversimplifying the issue that confronts a 
liberal democracy in the post 9/11 period. It has been suggested that an alternative 
approach should involve the balancing not of abstract understandings of liberty and 
security but instead of different sets of rights 14 . The conflict between liberty and 
security is presented as a clash between two 'equally significant human rights 
values' 15 that are 'not completely compatible' 16 . In this case the critique of the 
balance does not involve a substantive disagreement with the concept itself but a 
dispute over the opposing forces that must be reconciled in the context of a 'war on 
terror'. The concept of security in this alternative approach is understood through the 
human right to security that retains the understanding of human rights as system of 
limitation but at the same time accepts that the right to security is imperative in a 
liberal democracy and is not wholly compatible with the exercise of all other central
13 The concern that human rights are not only irreconcilable but antithetical to security concerns has 
given the balance metaphor credence among liberal security 'experts' who see the post 9/11 
environment as necessitating a rebalance in favour of security as exemplified by Bertil Duner: 'The 
events of 11 September 2001 may have changed the balance or tipped the scales to the detriment of 
human rights'. Bertil Duner, "Disregard for Security: The Human Rights Movement and 9/11", in 
Terrorism and Human Rights, eds. Magnus Ranstrop and Paul Wilkinson, (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2008). Professor of International Relations and acclaimed 'terrorism expert' Paul Wilkinson, has noted 
that the vulnerability of democracies to terrorism is compounded by their openness and central 
freedoms and thus lead him to confirm that the response to terrorism must come in the form of a 
'balanced multipronged strategy': Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and Democracy: The Liberal State 
Response, (Abingdon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2006).
14 See, Clive Walker, "The United Kingdom's Anti-Terrorism Laws: Lessons for Australia", in Law 
and Liberty in the War on Terror, eds. Andrew Lynch, Edwina MacDonald and George Williams 
(Annandale: The Federation Press, 2007) 191. Walker employs a denouncement of the concept of 
balance that involves a substitution of the 'language of balance' with a 'language of rights'. However, 
the shift to a language of rights is essential only to enable a 'balance within rights discourse' (Ibid, 
191).
15 Stefan Sottiaux, Terrorism and the Limitations of Rights: The ECHR and the US Constitution, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) 8
16 Michael Freeman, "Order, Rights and Threats: Terrorism and Global Justice", in Richard Ashby 
Wilson, (ed) Human Rights in the 'War on Terror ', ed. Richard Ashby Wilson, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) 52
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freedoms. This complex arrangement within a liberal democracy can for these 
scholars still be accommodated through an application of the balance metaphor but 
the difficulties must be acknowledged in defining what is to be balanced.
The concept of security as a right denies the notion of a conflict between 
liberty and security and suggests instead that respect for individual liberty and human 
rights are actually at the very heart of security. Rejecting a conflict that apparently 
causes complications for a liberal democratic state compelled to present its 
commitment to both liberty and security in the current context has made the concept 
of human security very attractive as a political tool for liberal governments . The 
particular interpretation of human security found at the official level has enabled a 
further entrenched status of the concept of balance within official discourse.
However, the official interpretation of 'human security' has been the subject 
of criticism by human rights scholars. The governments who have adopted the 
concept of human security have supposedly responded to the critiques of a simplistic 
application of the balance metaphor by offering a more 'refined' approach that retains 
balance whilst diffusing the conflict that a necessary opposition between liberty and 
security infers. The concept of a right to security in this sense serves to give further 
legitimacy to the 'war on terror' (to which they are committed) placing it in the just 
war tradition. Framing security as a right enforces the moralisation that is implicit in 
the good vs. evil rhetoric of the 'war on terror' and at the very core of the 
contemporary humanitarian ethics. The utility of this approach to the official 
justification of the 'war on terror' has been outlined in response to Walzer's 
employment of just war theory in this context but the construction of security as a 
right (at least in the official version of this) reinforces the moral justification of this 
'war' that defines it in the tradition of humanitarian interventionism.
The critique of the concept of human security as employed by certain liberal 
governments is however based on it being a misappropriation of a critical term that 
has been developed by human rights and development scholars. The concept of
17 The former Australian Attorney General Phillip Ruddock has drawn on the view of Canada's former 
Attorney General, Irwin Cotler in denying the conflict between liberty and security that is evident in 
the status of the human security as the most fundamental human right. See Andrew Lynch, "Achieving 
Security, Respecting Rights and Maintaining the Rule of Law", in Law and Liberty in the War on 
Terror, eds. Andrew Lynch, Edwina MacDonald and George Williams (Annandale: The Federation 
Press, 2007). The commitment of the UK government to the concept of balance is set out in their 2005 
European Union Presidency Paper. See, Charles Clarke "Liberty and Security: Striking the Right 
Balance" speech given to EU Parliament, Brussels, Belgium, October 2005
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human security has been developed to 'shift the focus of debate from the security of 
the state to the security of the people' 18 and this development has in turn been 
perverted by the likes of Phillip Ruddock to retain the emphasis on the state and 
reinforce the formulation of liberty and security already dominant in state policy. The 
concept of human security in the scholarly literature has emerged in the context of the 
confidence in human rights after the end of the Cold War and seeks to attend to the 
apparently insuperable opposition between liberty and security in the current context. 
This concept has been presented as the solution to the search for 'a new language of 
reconciliation' between liberty and security that has 'for liberals....become one of the 
most urgent intellectual challenges' 19 . A solution to this liberal challenge is 
imperative in the wake of the apparent damage to the liberal position invoked by the 
simplistic use of the balance metaphor. For these scholars, despite Ignatieff s 
assurances, balancing liberty and security is an illiberal response that jeopardises the 
intrinsic principles of liberal democracy and has given justification to a security 
environment in which rights are compromised. These intrinsic principles of liberal 
democracy are understood to be defined through the notion that 'security is a 
precondition of liberty, and human rights as the constituents of liberty, are thus 
inherent parts of the broader liberal democratic project' 20 . Ultimately, despite the 
disagreement there is widespread acceptance that liberty is to be understood 
exclusively through human rights principles.
The idea of human security has expanded the discussion of security beyond 
the military defence of a sovereign state and attempts to infer a positive right to 
security that instils a requirement on the state to provide for the more substantive 
social security of the population. It takes issue with both the current understanding of 
security that emphasises only protection from harm by others and the current 'rights
0 1talk' that has been used to undermine rights . The reconceptualisation of security 
infers that the 'state's positive duty to provide security from poverty, illness and
18 Simon Bronitt, "Balancing Security and Liberty: critical Perspectives on Terrorism Law Reform", In 
Fresh Perspectives on the 'War on Terror', eds. Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew (Canberra: ANU 
Press, 2008) 69
19 Benjamin Jervis Goold and Liora Lazarus "Introduction Security and Human Rights: The Search for 
a Language of Reconciliation", in Security and Human Rights, eds. Benjamin Jervis Goold and Liora 
Lazarus, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 1
20Goold and Lazarus, "Introduction Security and Human Rights", 2
21 Sandra Fredman, "The Positive Right to Security" in Security and Human Rights, eds. Benjamin 
Jervis Goold and Liora Lazarus, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 307
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degradation is at least as fundamental as the duty to protect individuals from harm by 
others' 22 . The right to security seeks to fill the gaps in existing rights as opposed to 
consuming them under one ultimate right as has been done in the various official uses 
of the term. As formulated by human rights scholars, the concept must be as narrow 
as possible and avoid the perils of 'securitising rights' that has been so seductive to 
human rights campaigners and scholars in the heightened security environment post 
9/11. The right to security should be grounded in other fundamental rights as opposed 
to inferring their usurpation and must be aware of the perils of harnessing the 
language of security that risks 'the danger of simultaneously eroding the non-
^o
instrumental foundations of rights' . The concept ostensibly involves a 'return to 
rights' and an injection of further legal regulation over the state that is lost in the 
current political discourse on the right to security24 . However, there is a real lack of 
consideration of the implication even this 'critical' use of the term has on legitimising 
the broader project of the securitisation of politics that will be discussed in chapter 
four.
The debate on the concept of human security revolves to a large extent around 
on a scholarly critique of the official manipulation of the idea. The appearance of 
conflict between scholars is misleading as the arguments against are aimed at the
O c
official line and the arguments for are based in the scholarly exposition outlined 
above. There is widespread agreement that the official interpretation found in official 
discourse in Australia and Canada denies the regulatory potential of human rights. 
Underlying the appearance of conflict is a common opinion among scholars and 
academics that the liberal response must be lead by human rights principles and 
despite the rejection of balance by some scholars, the emphasis remains on the 
potential regulatory function of rights. There is agreement that this regulatory function 
is at the core of the relationship between liberty and security in a liberal democracy.
22Fredman, "The Positive Right to Security", 307
23Liora Lazarus, "Mapping the Right to Security" in Security and Human Rights, eds. Benjamin Jervis 
Goold and Liora Lazarus, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 327
24 There is merit given the dangerous opacity and rhetorical power of security, to injecting a more sober 
and legalistic approach into the political discourse surrounding the 'right to security'. Lazarus, 
"Mapping the Right to Security", 329
25 See, Andrew Lynch, "Exceptionalism, politics and liberty: a response to Professor Tushnet from the 
Antipodes", InternationalJournal of Law in Context 3, 4, (2008) 306
76
The 'debate' is about the formulation of this regulatory function and the relation of 
rights vis-a-vis security.
Balance as applied by Ignatieff and Williams is rejected by some scholars as 
illiberal on the basis that it is perceived to imply, or at least give way to, an inferior 
position for liberty as a result of the construction of an opposition with security. The 
human rights scholars who have formulated the right to security have had to distance 
themselves from the 'balancing act' to secure the reconciliation of liberty and security 
that is for them intrinsic to the liberal response. They seek to reinforce the legalism of
0 f\
security discourse that is found wanting in the current 'climate of exceptionalism' . 
The concern with addressing exceptionalism through a restoration and enhancement 
of the regulatory function of human rights is unquestionably liberal. These scholars 
have at the core of their work a defence of a vision of liberalism defined by a liberty 
as its central concern. The maintenance of this fa9ade defines their contributions.
Liberty here is understood in opposition to security and this formulation drives 
the overarching project of 'rescuing' liberalism from the security policies measures 
seemingly legitimated by the concessions inherent in the politics of compromise that
*77
defines the approach exemplified by Ignatieff et al (and thus also by Williams) . The 
emphasis on the supposedly truly liberal prioritisation of liberty (over security) 
illustrates a fundamental lack of awareness - or arguably more an unwillingness to 
accept - the primacy of security in liberal politics. The emphasis of these scholars 
(and the public intellectuals in consideration above) on the prioritisation of liberty 
demonstrates the ideological function crucial to their work that is shored up further by 
the pretence of a serious debate between positions. Essentially, their contributions and 
the debate in general serve to legitimise the liberal framework in this context. The 
presentation of divisions between camps obscures the unanimous agreement on the 
ultimate goal of defending the monopoly of legitimacy that liberalism is understood to 
possess in the current era.
26 Lazarus and Goold, "Introduction Security and Human Rights", 4
27 It is worth noting that the project of formulating a right to security with its rejection of an opposition 
between liberty and security would however resign these scholars to the 'moral perfectionism' that 
Ignatieff sees as unrealistic and Williams sees as unneeded (in the context of 'effective' HR 
legislation).
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Shoring up the presentation of the liberalism
The right to security approach is in reality a reconfiguration of what is being balanced 
as opposed to an outright rejection of the principle. For these human rights scholars 
their project is understood as a pragmatic response to a culture of 'rights scepticism'
OCthat has accompanied the rise of human rights discourse since 1945 . It is this very 
scepticism towards human rights principles that has left rights discourse 'vulnerable 
to the competing and increasingly powerful discourse of security' 29 and it is in 
response to this crisis that the right to security has been formulated to reconcile 
security and human rights. The question that these scholars seek to answer is 'how to 
balance between the individual and the collective, between political and the legal, and 
between political sovereignty and the rule of law' 30 . The concept of balance is in fact 
retained in this approach as the inevitable liberal approach to any opposing concerns 
and the project of mapping a right to security is exposed as yet another liberal attempt 
to wrestle with the relationship between state sovereignty and the rule of law. The 
importance of human rights is reinforced on the basis of their regulatory function that 
prevents the demise into exceptionalism. The right to security is therefore ultimately a 
reconceptualisation of the same project at the core of Ignatieff s work of imposing the 
appropriate framework of restraint to prevent the state from declaring an exception. 
The 'debate' within the literature is reduced to a disagreement over the formulation of 
the opposing forces that dominate the current context. Balance is either explicitly or 
more subtly at the core of each of these perspectives and the convergence on this 
'tool' for action is widespread among liberal scholars.
The avoidance of the question of exception is at the core of these various 
interpretations of the balance metaphor as would be expected in a liberal approach to 
the state and illustrates a reiteration of the substantive position of the liberal public 
intellectual 'class'. However, in this scholarly literature there has been further 
criticism of the concept of balance for denying the legal regulation that should be at 
the heart of a liberal response. In the context of UK security policy human rights are
28 'Although human rights have been the benchmark of the liberal democratic ideal, there are deep 
controversies as to how they should be realised, under what institutional conditions they should be 
pursued, and which specific rights may be branded as sufficiently fundamental to trump majoritarian 
desires'. Lazarus and Goold, "Introduction Security and Human Rights", 6
29 Lazarus and Goold, "Introduction Security and Human Rights", 6
30 Lazarus and Goold, "Introduction Security and Human Rights", 7
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perceived by some scholars to be 'traded away as a threshold issue' through a 
balancing model that allows for what has been termed an 'uncivil politics of law 
reform' 32 . The legal principles evident in counter-terrorism legislation in both the UK 
and Australia is characterised by a 'sense of impending apocalyptic disaster' that 
'promotes a fatalism in which both liberalism and established legal norms are viewed 
as simply too costly' 33 .
The decoupling of balance and regulation within this liberal response 
illustrates a further mystification of the liberal framework. Despite the critique of the 
UK and Australian government policy, the concern is with attending to and revising 
the liberal position which in this case attempts to deny that balance is central to any 
liberal response to opposing concerns. There is a paradox created here within which 
these liberal scholars are attempting to save liberalism from itself.
The view that human rights principles are too costly in the fight against 
terrorism has been cited as underpinning the UK government's approach to the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) in the post 9/11 period. While the HRA has had an 
apparent restraining effect on certain counter-terrorism powers34 this has lead only to 
a marginal shift in policy and the subsequent employment of what have been 
identified as 'devious legal strategies' 35 that have seemingly enabled the government 
to circumvent the regulation imposed in human rights law. The 'human rights era' is 
now apparently marked by the use of 'more subtle tools' 36 that allow the continuation 
of repressive and under-regulated counter-terrorism measures. In this context the UK 
government has been able to utilise these 'devious legal strategies' to provide the 
mechanisms for constraining the liberties of a small group of suspect individuals37 .
31 Lazarus and Goold, "Introduction Security and Human Rights", 82
32 Lazarus and Goold, "Introduction Security and Human Rights", 83
33 Lazarus and Goold, "Introduction Security and Human Rights", 83
34 See, ConorGearty, "Human Rights in an Age of Counter-Terrorism: Injurious, Irrelevant or 
Indispensable?" Current Legal Problems 58, (2005)
35Colm O'Cinneide, "Strapped to the Mast: The Siren Song of Dreadful Necessity, the United 
Kingdom Human Rights Act and the Terrorist Threat" in Fresh Perspectives on the 'War on Terror', 
eds. Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew (Canberra: ANU Press, 2008) 339
36O'Cinneide, "Strapped to the Mast", 340
37 Following Dworkin, the notion of the restriction of the liberties of a few to supposedly enhance the 
security of the majority is a common theme of several critiques of the concept of balance. Balance is 
attacked for the way it obscures the agency implicit in the tradeoff between liberty and security and 
hides the fact that the restriction of liberty is in most cases predominantly the restriction of the human 
rights of a 'suspect' population. See Daniel Moekli, Human Rights and Non-Discrimination in the
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These 'devious legal strategies' are not understood to be intrinsic to the functioning of 
the law but instead the result of manipulation by those who fail to conform to liberal 
principles. In this commitment to legal regulation the law remains an unproblematic 
entity in stark opposition to the violence that characterises those spaces outside the 
law.
The process of restraining the rights of the few is stated to be at odds with 
human rights principles by scholars who emphasise the paradox of a selective
o o
withdrawal of universal rights . However, despite the problems highlighted in the use 
of the HRA by the UK government, the focal point of these critiques is not the 
impotence of human rights legislation but instead the lack of legal regulation. The 
HRA fails to impose the full regulatory function of human rights and the solution to 
the problem of current counter-terrorism policies is further legal regulation as 
opposed to any real alternative solutions being considered. In agreement with the 
public intellectuals the necessary dominance of human rights principles is confirmed.
The lack of legal regulation has apparently given rise to and sustained a 
culture in which emergency powers are utilised repeatedly without the required 
restraint. Legal processes are held up as the mechanism for 'nudging the use of 
emergency powers towards greater conformity with normal criminal law' 39 . Some 
scholars are willing to accept that the current use of human rights legislation in the 
context of the 'war on terror', in the UK at least, has provided a veil of legitimacy to 
enable the state to continue to employ repressive counter-terrorism powers. Yet this 
veil of legitimacy is not attributed to human rights principles per se but is instead 
apparently the result of an insufficient commitment at the official level to human 
rights and a resulting diffusion of the regulatory function. The issue to be confronted 
for these scholars is the government's attempts to manoeuvre within the constraints of 
human rights principles and the commitment to human rights as a system of limitation
War on Terror, (Oxford: OUP, 2008); Jeremy Waldron, "Security and Liberty: The Image of 
Balance", in The Journal of Political Philosophy 11,2 (2003)
38 'The very predicate of a "human" right is that it stems from the respect owed to every human being 
by virtue of their very humanity'. David Cole, "Human Rights and the Challenge of Terror" in 
Democratic Responses to Terrorism, ed. Leonard Weinberg, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008) 161. See 
also, Clive Walker, "The United Kingdom's Anti-Terrorism Laws: Lessons for Australia", Law and 
Liberty in the War on Terror, eds. Andrew Lynch, Edwina MacDonald and George Williams, 
(Annandale: The Federation Press, 2007) for an application of the universality of rights that should 
underpin the liberal approach to HR legislation in Australia.
39O'Cinneide, "Strapped to the Mast", 351
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is instead reinforced by this critique. Comprehensive regulation of counter-terrorism 
powers is vital to maintain the principles of a liberal democracy and avoid the slippery 
slope into exceptional measures that is seemingly a result of the watering down of the 
legal regulation implicit in human rights principles.
To come full circle, the campaign for a UK style human rights act for 
Australia is underpinned by the commitment to legal regulation of counter-terrorism 
powers that is ultimately to be provided by human rights law. The lack of a HRA in 
Australia is posited as evidence that political controls over security policy are 
insufficient while the UK HRA is held aloft as the proof that legal regulation is 
essential and ultimately effective40 . The emphasis on legal regulation in the form of 
human rights legislation is underpinned by an essentially liberal inability to conceive 
the mutual exclusion of judicial and political controls41 and more pressingly an 
inability to conceive of politics outside the liberal framework. Politics as conflict is 
denied and the emphasis on legal regulation serves to further depoliticise the liberal 
scholarly response to the 'war on terror'.
The limited preference for political control of exceptional measures is based in 
the liberal commitment to parliamentarianism, yet the lack of a corresponding 
cornmitment to legal regulation is criticised as insufficient in a liberal democracy in 
the current context. Ultimately, for rights scholars, legal and political controls cannot 
be distinguished to enable a choice between one and the other, The UK liberty- 
security regime is presented as allowing the appropriate regulatory framework in 
allowing political and legal controls to 'interact' 42 . The UK HRA has induced a 
'culture change' in which the courts have a greater willingness and ability to 
intervene43 . This added potential for the courts to regulate is not absolute but an added 
emphasis on the 'empire of the judges' 44 has been posited as a potential improvement 
of the UK regime for Australia.
40 Lynch, "Exceptionalism, politics and liberty"
41 See, Mark Tushnet, "The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Parliamentary and Separation- 
of-Powers Regulation", InternationalJournal of Law in Context 3 (2007), for an exposition of the idea 
that political controls are favourable to the protection of human rights than legal ones.
42 Lynch, "Exceptionalism, politics and liberty", 307
43 Walker, "The United Kingdom's Anti-Terrorism Laws'
44 See, Manent, A World Beyond Politics?. Specifically Manent highlights that in the contemporary 
situation the desire is that 'not only should law rule but that it alone should rule'. Manent, A World 
Beyond Politics?, 171. The critique of political controls is, despite the claims of an interaction between 
politics and law, underpinned by an essentially liberal formulation of the sovereignty of the courts.
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Throughout the debate on the relationship between liberty and security in this 
literature the law is positioned as the guarantor of a liberal framework. A commitment 
to a legal framework - ensured through human rights legislation - is the guarantee of 
liberty and current security politics are illiberal through their real or potential 
departure from legal regulation. The liberal approach is defined by a 'legal 
fetishism' 45 in which the law is understood as autonomous and capable of providing 
the ultimate defence against the violence of the state. Even among those scholars most 
critical of the state's approach to security there remains an understanding that state 
violence is indicative only of the withdrawal of law. The only possible (liberal) 
response is to demand a return to law and its exclusive rule.
The liberal as external observer of the 'war on terror'
It is from the perspective based on an absolute commitment to legal regulation, that 
Ignatieff in particular (as the chief proponent of balance albeit phrased alternatively) 
has come under attack. Ignatieff has been decried as a 'post-liberal' by proponents of 
the 'human security' position for his acceptance of the division of human rights that 
underpins his Lesser Evil perspective46 . The selective concession of rights to a 
security agenda, as Ignatieff s position allows, has been cited as the underpinning of 
the demise into exceptional measures through which seemingly unthinkable acts such 
as torture can be legitimated. By conceding the regulatory function of human rights 
and supposedly abdicating from the absolute status of the rule of law Ignatieff has 
conceded his liberal status. Ignatieff s support for 'humanitarian intervention' in Iraq, 
legitimised in his Lesser Evils text and elsewhere in his work, has opened him up to 
condemnation as an apologist for torture and human rights abuses 7 and for some a 
necessary exorcism from the liberal tradition.
The articulation of this critique arguably sits these scholars in the 'naive moral 
perfectionist' camp that Ignatieff makes clear the 'realistic' liberal response must 
avoid. However, the resulting critical exchange reinforces the fact that the debate here
'Neocleous, Critique of Security, 73
Brysk, "Human Rights and National Insecurity", 12
Gearty described Ignatieff as 'probably the most important figure to fall into this category of hand- 
wringing, apologetic apologists for human rights abuses'. Conor Gearty, "With a Little Help From Our 





remains concerned primarily with the precise character of a liberal response. 
Ignatieff s concessions to the security agenda (and those by other liberals who reject 
'perfectionism') have been highlighted as the underlying cause of a liberal culture 
capable of accommodating torture. It has been suggested that the transformation of 
liberal culture to accept such a non-liberal idea only appears so difficult to imagine if 
one 'underestimates the ability of intellectuals to change the nature of the discussion, 
and of lawyers to explain why there is no conflict between torture and our liberal code 
of laws' 48 .
The new security agenda that has developed since September 11 is defined by 
Donald Rumsfeld (and his supporters - the 'Rumsfeldians') and has been able to take 
its current form within a liberal democracy because there has emerged a 'coterie of 
well-meaning liberal intellectuals and human rights lawyers (who have) handed him 
(Rumsfeld) the intellectual tools with which to justify his government's 
expansionism' 49 . Ignatieff is cited as probably the most important figure to fall into 
this category and the Lesser Evil position specifically contains those essential 
intellectual tools that have legitimised the post 9/11 security agenda. The legitimating 
function of Ignatieff s intervention(s) has been illustrated above and while this type of 
critical analysis ostensibly arrives at a similar conclusion it is necessary to set out the 
central points of contention on which this critique is based.
This argument appears to denote a substantive point of division in the liberal 
literature setting Ignatieff (and others) apart on the basis of their understanding of, and 
intervention in, the current liberty-security regime. However, the impotence of such a 
critique is exposed through its selective interpretation of the central principles of 
Ignatieff s project. From this perspective, such an intellectual aberration from liberal 
principles as exemplified by Ignatieff starts with taking 'the 'human' out of 'human 
rights' 50 . Human rights have in this vein been transformed into a 'larger narrative' and 
are now presented as 'a key component in the story of democratic success, and an 
important, perhaps the supreme, indicator of the moral and cultural superiority of this
48Gearty "With a Little Help From Our Friends", 46 
49Gearty "With a Little Help From Our Friends", 51 
50Gearty "With a Little Help From Our Friends", 47
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form of government' 51 . It is therefore seemingly inevitable that the threat from 
terrorism raises the stakes to the point that 'they encompass our very survival as a set 
of democratic communities' 52 . In this sense the opposition between 'the West' and 
terrorism is constructed to be one between 'good and evil' and fundamentally it is at 
this moment that the human rights discourse 'has fatally compromised its integrity' 53 .
Identifying the moralisation inherent in Ignatieff s project is crucial but the 
explanation of its root cause in a deviation from the fundamental principles of human 
rights - as opposed to identifying it as the central premise of the current humanitarian 
ethics - is, whilst unsurprising, a critical obfuscation of human rights and their 
function within liberalism. That a moralising approach to human rights leads to the 
legitimation of massive human rights abuses is not presented as a problem of human 
rights discourse per se but a result of a 'reconstruction of the language of rights' 
through which they are able to be to appropriated by those orchestrating the 'war on 
terror'. Human rights must be conceptualised solely as regulatory tools firmly rooted 
in international humanitarian and human rights law. It is this legal formulation of 
human rights that has supposedly involved a pivotal de-moralising of human rights 
'removing the language of good and evil from the relationship between states54 .
This selective but much echoed (mis)understanding of the moralisation in 
current human rights discourse is exemplified by the summary of the importance of 
human rights law being based on 'our shared humanity rather than the superiority of 
our particular cause' 55 . This, we are told, should have enabled just war theory to be 
superseded but through Ignatieff s (and one would suggest here, Walzer's) 
intervention and its accommodation by the likes of Rumsfeld we are 'back in a pre- 
rule stage where, in effect, despite the liberals' best hopes, anything goes' 56 . This 
illustrates the widely held concern that human rights are, through this apparent 
reconstruction, bereft of their regulatory function and denied their essential legalistic 
foundation. The liberal fear of exceptional measures is made explicitly clear whilst
51 Gearty "With a Little Help From Our Friends", 47. Here one is reminded of Rorty's assertion that 
there is no shame in the globalisation of an essentially Eurocentric (human rights) culture because it is 
undoubtedly 'morally superior' to any potential alternative
52Gearty "With a Little Help From Our Friends", 47. 
53Gearty "With a Little Help From Our Friends", 49 
54Gearty "With a Little Help From Our Friends", 50 
55Gearty "With a Little Help From Our Friends", 50 
56Gearty "With a Little Help From Our Friends", 50
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the foundation of the moralisation implicit in humanitarian ethics is reinforced 
through this confused account. In contrast the 'true defenders of human rights' are the 
judiciary57 (not the liberal intellectual) as they alone are willing and able to preserve 
the regulatory function of human rights principles and keep them grounded in their 
legal form. The liberal commitment to an empire of the judges is exemplified in this 
'reconceptualisation' of the foundation of human rights.
This critique highlights the narrow parameters in which much of this debate 
takes place. The unwillingness to accept that the concept of shared humanity is at the 
root of this moralisation and moreover, lays out the terrain on which a just war to 
defend the human from the inhuman is fought, prevents a substantive critique of 
Ignatieff or indeed of the current liberty-security regime. The legitimising function of 
the liberal intellectual is openly apparent in this context and the analysis in the 
preceding section here has illustrated this is not confined to Ignatieff. However, this 
critique of the intellectual fails to identify the basis for the legitimisation of the 
current security regime committed as it is to human rights and liberal politics. The 
function of the liberal intellectual is of vital importance to this regime but those 
scholars articulating this 'critical analysis' are clearly not devoid of such a 
legitimating function even if their position is in this context based on an opposition to 
others. Within this critique, the substantive features of the current liberty-security
CO
regime as outlined by Ignatieff are largely reinforced .
The notion that at the core of the current liberty-security regime there is an 
absence or a distorted interpretation of human rights principles forms the basis of 
other ostensibly critical interventions. Following Dworkin's critique of the specific
57Gearty "With a Little Help From Our Friends", 51
58 Whilst the debate is clearly devoid of an alternate framework and serves only to reconfirm the 
narrow parameters within which discussion on the liberty-security relationship is permitted, the 
response to this article does reveal more about the role of the liberal intellectual and the possibilities for 
criticism. Ignatieff responded to this article by resigning from the editorial board of the journal in 
which it was published and demanded that all syndication of the article be ceased. His concern lay with 
the impact on his reputation that arguably extended beyond his intellectual status and most pressingly 
to his attempted move into Canadian politics. It was noted following this intellectual 'spat' that while 
Ignatieff had been previously quite prepared to accept critique from the left over his support for 
intervention in Iraq he now found himself 'being attacked by those who had always constituted his 
principle reference group: liberal academic human rights practitioners'. Taylor, "No more Mr Nice 
Guy". The response by Ignatieff reemphasises a predominant dynamic in the literature in that, arguably 
a result of the dismissal of any relevance of the left, a liberal critique questioning a commitment to 
liberal principles incites greater hostility than a critique offered from the outside the liberal tradition. 
This is symptomatic - as is Gearty's intervention - of the fact that the debate around the liberty- 
security relationship is a debate almost exclusively about the formulation and presentation of a liberal 
regime.
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balance between liberty and security due to its ability to obscure agency in this 
process, it has been suggested that the current regime has jeopardised the 'most 
fundamental of all moral principles: the principle of shared humanity' 59 . Even those 
scholars aware of the dehumanisation that characterises the current approach to 
human rights (ultimately rendering those most in need of human rights outside the 
political community) have exhibited an unwillingness to consider how this central 
principle of the current humanitarian ethics is implicated in this process. Dworkin's 
influence is further exemplified by the underlying notion in such a critique that the 
states orchestrating the current 'war' in the domestic and foreign policy arenas are 
becoming 'less liberal' 60 . The notion of a distortion of human rights is also applied to 
the current regime to explain the apparent paradox of a human rights regime that 
accepts the denial of human rights to specific populations. The current liberty-security 
regime is for these scholars not based on a loyal interpretation of human rights but 
instead on one that is tarnished by a securitisation of rights discourse. The human 
rights abuses that characterise the 'war on terror' are a result of states having 
abandoned the central principle of universality enshrined in the notion of shared 
humanity.
From this perspective the UK Human Rights Act must be secured (even if 
reformed) to prevent the country being lead into 'unchartered waters' 61 . As in the 
concern with preventing a situation where 'anything goes', the term 'unchartered 
waters' is clearly a euphemism for a non-regulated exception that these authors devote 
much time and space to seeking to avoid through their unfailing commitment to 
human rights principles. The reliance on euphemisms further illustrates what is in 
reality an attempt to avoid the question of exception. The emphasis in this intellectual 
intervention is on reform to the interpretation of human rights and by definition the 
approach is incapable (or unwilling, despite its professed critical intention) of 
considering an alternate politics to the one that defines the current regime.
Such a 'critique' is unsubstantial due to its unwillingness to abandon those 
very principles that in reality underpin the dehumanisation inherent in the current 'war
59 Derek McGhee, The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, integration and human rights, 
(Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2008) 27; Derek McGhee, Security, Citizenship and Human 
Rights: Shared Values in Uncertain Times, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
60 McGhee, The End of Multiculturalism, 14
61 McGhee, The End of Multiculturalism, 179
86
S' f\
on terror'. Indeed there is evidence of an intellectual lineage that whilst not 
restricted to these specific scholars illustrates the development of a convergent, and 
one would argue based on this review, a dominant approach to the liberty-security 
relationship. The acknowledged influence of Dworkin and the much disputed but 
latent influence of Ignatieff suggest that the shared position exhibited by the public 
intellectuals has provided guidance to the 'lower' levels of intellectual activity. The 
position set out by these public intellectuals has seemingly set the parameters to 
subsequent interventions and this appears to have reinforced a common approach to 
the liberty-security relationship that locates the required response firmly in the liberal 
tradition. From this perspective, despite the line in the sand drawn between this 
'critical camp' and the likes of Ignatieff, these authors are still implicated in the same 
process of legitimising the basic principles of the current framework (as illustrated 
above by revealing the substantively shared approach between Dworkin and 
Ignatieff).
The idea that critical analysis need only be externally focussed - on the 
supposedly non-liberal features of the current regime - defines the critical component 
of this literature. The process of revisiting the liberal framework to reconfigure the 
liberty-security relationship is not resigned only to the public intellectuals and 
structures much of the scholarly and academic literature leading to a seemingly 
hegemonic position that suggests that the supposedly illiberal features of the 'war on 
terror' are a result of the contamination of this project by non-liberal forces - or at 
least by those who have abandoned their liberal credentials. The very nature of the 
war on terrorism has incited the critique that the current era is characterised by the 
'illiberal practices of liberal regimes' 63 in which exceptionalism is maintained inside 
liberalism. Employing the concept of war has seemingly enabled the justification of 
any practice that can be legitimated ostensibly on the basis of the protection of a 
liberal regime. This contemporary conundrum of a liberal exceptionalism rooted in 
the current politics of security is, as would be expected, denounced as illiberal. There
62 Most clearly from Dworkin to Gearty and to McGhee who is not alone in presenting this line of 
criticism. Among others considered above, see: Ben Hayes "There is no 'balance between security and 
civil liberties -just less of each", in The War on Freedom and Democracy: Essays on Civil Liberties in 
Europe, ed. Tony Buyan, (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 2005)
63 See Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, "Understanding (in)security" in Terror, Insecurity and 
Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11, eds. Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala. 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2008
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is unsurprisingly a complete absence of introspection within the liberal intellectual 
community in terms of a critique of the central principles of liberalism and the 
resulting project is one preoccupied with maintaining the 'purity' of liberalism. The 
overarching goal of these ostensibly critical accounts of the current regime is to posit 
a 'purified' liberal framework (the precise formulation of this is the source of much of 
the 'debate') as the solution to the problems encountered in the post-2001 liberal 
democracy.
For these scholars an exceptionalism that denies the rule of law cannot be part 
of liberal politics and the idea that security measures can and do transcend legal 
regulation must be resisted to maintain the truly liberal status of liberal regimes. 
Security 'cannot be conceptualised as 'beyond normal polities' and as a 'politics of 
exception" 64 because liberalism demands a 'normal [read liberal] polities' in which 
the rule of law is absolute. The problem for many is that the lack of a 'normal polities' 
is a result of those external forces that have constructed the 'war on terror' in an 
alternate - non-liberal - framework within a liberal democracy. For many this 
external force is identified as neo-conservatism, presented as a distinct political 
framework that has risen to dominate post-9/11 politics (in the US at least) and by 
doing so has marginalised the truly liberal perspectives within the debate around 
liberty and security.
The identification of this 'external' threat has forced the liberal to face in two 
directions: confronting global terrorism and American neo-conservatism65 . Put 
simply, the assertion is that the threat to security comes from global terrorism but the 
threat to liberty is a result of a neo-conservative response. Liberalism is positioned as 
a middle way between these two forces and ultimately a liberal response is defined 
once again as a balancing act. Defining an alternate 'liberal grand strategy', involves 
acknowledging the threat from terrorism but more pressingly highlighting that by 
virtue of the dominance of neo-conservatives the current strategy of response to 
terrorism is distinctly non-liberal. Identifying the 'neo-cons' (or alternatively, the 
'Rumsfeldians') removes any compulsion to think critically about the liberal character 
of this regime - the problem is an external force that must be identified and rebutted.
64Bigo and Tsoukala, "Understanding (in)security", 5
65 Tom Farer, Confronting Global Terrorism and American Neo-Conservatism: The Framework of a 
Liberal Grand Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)
A liberal strategy must by definition be distinct from the 'proudly illiberal' 
neo-conservative project that has in the context of security politics illustrated its 
antithetical status to liberalism through its 'championing of uninhibited executive 
power post 9/11 whatever the consequences for civil liberties and human rights' . 
The liberal strategy is once again defined in opposition to an unregulated approach 
and this in turn brings together the central themes of the liberal literature that 
essentially revolve around the primacy of human rights and their regulatory function. 
The neo-conservative project is devoid of regulation because it defines itself on the 
vague notion of democracy without the necessary correlate of human rights.
Liberalism provides the only viable political framework from which to 
respond to global terrorism because it is most open to 'reasoned and fact-based 
argument' and, by virtue of it being the culmination of the Enlightenment tradition, 
posits 'no one great truth' 67 ; fundamentally, liberalism is presented as being without a 
defining ideology68 . It can therefore avoid a reductionist account of terrorism that fails 
to consider causes and is instead open to 'political solutions'. Liberalism is said not to 
be restricted by ideological conviction and is therefore capable of a measured and 
rational response to terrorism that is unavailable to the neo-con project.
Liberalism is positioned in opposition to the reductionist account of terrorism 
supposedly articulated only by non-liberal scholars (or again by those who have lost 
their way) and subsequently mirrored by both the state and the terrorist in the current 
era. The mirroring of opposing reductionist perspectives in the 'war on terror' is a 
crucial insight69 but it is presented as one unconnected to the liberal intellectual and 
characteristic of only those who sit outside the liberal tradition. The critique of a 
reductionist account that refuses to accept any political causes for international
66 Farer, Confronting Global Terrorism, 223
67 Farer, Confronting Global Terrorism, 224
68 This understanding of liberalism is for Farer aligned with the post-war UK Conservative party and 
New Labour under Tony Blair as it is supposedly devoid of a set of rigid ideas and thus able to 
accommodate a wealth of differing perspectives. The notion of New Labour having moved beyond 
ideology converges clearly with Giddens' notion of post-ideological politics in which liberalism is 
essentially the only political option. Indeed, Giddens is echoed further as liberalism is essentially 
positioned 'beyond left and right'. The depoliticising function of the construction of a middle (or third) 
way is made explicit in this account. The idea of liberalism being free from the shackles that restrict 
both the 'old left' and the 'new right' further entrenches Walzer and Rorty's shared understanding of 
liberal politics in the era of international terrorism.
69 See Chapter 4 for further discussion
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terrorism - defining it to be instead 'immured in a culture of death' 70 - is not in this 
account aimed at Ignatieff and Walzer as required. The critique is directed outward 
from a selective understanding (or selective presentation) of the liberal framework 
that is unable to accept that the political division between liberals and neo- 
conservatives is, in the context of the 'war on terror', largely a fa9ade.
The critique of military intervention is based on its motivation. Due to a lack 
of humanitarian motivations couched in the language of human rights there has been 
for a number of scholars an inevitable lack of regulation restraining the 'war on terror' 
in its foreign escapades. In response to this, human rights are posited as the basis for a 
regulated intervention because 'a crusade to defend core human rights has built-in
71
restraints that a crusade for the general expansion of democracy does not' . In 
denying that a war for human rights is defined by a lack of restraint, this confirms the 
influence of Ignatieff (and Walzer) by suggesting that war in the liberal understanding 
must be restrained by human rights principles and ultimately must always be
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understood to be a 'lesser evil' .
This apparently critical analysis of the liberal intellectual however blurs the 
liberal/neo-conservative distinction claiming Ignatieff for the liberal camp whilst 
critiquing many of his central points. As with the dominant liberal critique of the 
application of human rights in the current context, this critique of just war theory in 
relation to the 'war on terror' is short-sighted at best, focussed on the misuse of what 
should be a mechanism of restraint over warfare. The confidence in just war theory 
extends to a view that it will, if employed correctly, lead to a break with the current 
status quo despite its use by Ignatieff (and more explicitly by Walzer) to substantively
7^
reinforce the formation of the current regime . Human rights have in this
70 Farer, Confronting Global Terrorism, 230
71 Farer, Confronting Global Terrorism, 40
72 Ignatieff is referenced directly here and also provided a blurb for the book in which he describes 
Farer's account as 'a passionate, reasoned case for a liberal grand strategy of containment which will 
enable America and her allies to master the challenges of the 21st century terrorism, war, nuclear 
proliferation and genocide without sacrificing the principles of prudence, human rights and basic 
decency on which America's legitimacy as a world power depends', Michael Ignatieff, "Early 
Review", review of Confronting Global Terrorism and American Neo-Conservatism: The Framework 
of a Liberal Grand Strategy, by Tom Farer, www.tomfarer.com, accessed August 6, 2012, 
http://www.tomfarer.com/reviews.html. Moreover, Farer suggests that coercion in general is for 
liberals a lesser evil with the preference lying with a 'search for cooperative mechanisms'. Farer, 
Confronting Global Terrorism, 245 emphasis added.
73 Farer's critique of the misapplication of just war theory is aimed predominantly at Jean Bethke 
Elshtain and her book Just War Against Terror. See, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Against Terror:
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interpretation been co-opted by a non-liberal project that has led us down the path to 
the 'war on terror'. What is required is a return to a liberal framework for responding 
to terrorism that centres on a 'true' interpretation and application of human rights 
norms. The dominant line in this literature is reiterated here: liberalism and human 
rights are in no way implicated in the violence of the current regime; instead it is due 
to a lack of these principles that this 'war' has been characterised by such violence at 
home and abroad.
In agreement with the public intellectuals considered above, liberalism is 
legitimated on the basis of its apolitical, post-ideological approach to terrorism and it 
alone is capable of considering the root causes of terrorism and the necessary 
responses without a predominant recourse to military means. The fallacy of this 
presentation of liberalism is further exposed (if further proof was needed) by the 
account given of the necessary political and economic response to terrorism. 
Economic 'restructuring' is advocated in response to the 'relevance of poverty' but is 
limited to a reallocation of military expenditure to education projects in the Muslim 
world without any broader consideration of a redistribution of wealth74 . In the true 
liberal sense poverty and inequality are not viewed as systemic features of the global 
capitalist system and their existence in the Muslim world is unrelated to the economic 
system defined and legitimated by liberalism.
The mystification of the reality of liberal responses to terrorism in the current 
era is astounding in this account as indeed it is throughout the liberal literature. The 
support for (and returned by) Ignatieff serves to reinforce a fa9ade that ultimately 
revolves around the selective critique of the function of the intellectual (and the denial 
of its relevance for those scholars articulating these critiques). Fundamentally, the
The Burden of American Power in a Violent World, (New York: Basic Books, 2003). Elshtain's 
intervention has for Farer provided an intellectual articulation of the neo-conservative project from a 
formally liberal standpoint and on this basis requires critique. Elshtain's position on the 'war on terror' 
serves to extend the justification for military intervention to Iraq (as opposed to stopping at Kabul as 
many of her contemporaries have done) through the application of just war theory. She derides the left 
for its inability to understand the reality of the threat (much like Walzer has sought to do in his 
application of just war theory) and outlines an account of the 'war on terror' that echoes much of 
Ignatieff and Walzer's position. The critique however for Farer does not extend to these liberals and is 
focussed on Elshtain in typical fashion on the basis of her apparent abdication of liberal principles.
74 Based on this 'redistribution' the assertion is that the 'poverty' of the Muslim world is an intellectual 
one before an economic one. This can be attended to without any substantive reordering of the 
economic status quo and in Farer's understanding requires the empowerment (financially and 
intellectually) of liberal leaning scholars in the Muslim world. The implied intellectual poverty of the 
Muslim world echoes Rorty's construction of the unenlightened other of the non-Western world. 
Intellectual acumen is measured solely by the adoption of liberal ideas.
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depoliticisation of the response to terrorism is combined with the presentation of the 
liberal approach based on an outright denial of its ideological foundation. The liberal 
strategy is ultimately one that reaffirms 'limits on violence' and seeks to return to a 
liberal foundation abandoning the unrestrained, unbalanced and overtly ideological 
project defined at present by the Right. Liberalism is politically a third way between 
equally unsuitable political 'extremes' - a 'moderate', 'measured' response has been 
lacking only due to a marginalisation of liberal voices75 .
The legitimisation of the current regime through support and 'critique'
While not all contributors share the confidence of those scholars behind the Australian 
campaign for a HRA, the emphasis on human rights principles as the essential 
regulatory tool for the response to terrorism endures throughout the critiques aimed at 
the current regime. The concern with the real or potential slide into exceptional 
measures is a continuous theme among liberal scholars and academics working on the 
liberty-security relationship and ultimately reinforces a common approach based on 
human rights principles employed to secure the sovereignty of the law. The 
proponents of balance in their multifarious guises see it as the essential tool to 
maintain the place of human rights and concerns for liberty in the current politics of 
security that will ultimately restrain the state to remain within the rule of law. Those 
few who are altogether dismissive of balance base their critique on the idea that it 
provides the justification for an overriding concern for security to be imposed without 
regulation and opens the door for the type of exceptional measures that liberalism 
cannot sustain. The arguments for and against balance ultimately involve no more 
than a disagreement about how to regulate the sovereign.
There is undoubted evidence of a convergence among liberal scholars in the 
contemporary era on the concept of regulation being based in human rights principles. 
As Schmitt forecast, the concept of balance is for the predominant number of scholars 
the essential liberal tool for the reconciliation of opposing forces. The apparent 
conflict in this literature is in reality superficial and there is widespread agreement on 
the importance of withdrawing from the 'dangerous' politics of security in which the
75 The potential influence of this perspective beyond the academic sphere is arguably enhanced by the 
position of Farer and Gearty on the advisory board of Human Rights Watch. The relevance of this will 
be considered in the next chapter.
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executive is free to make exceptional decisions. Applying the concept of exception in 
a Schmittian sense as a test to submit liberalism to reveals that the intellectual and 
scholarly approach to the relationship between liberty and security conforms to the 
essential depoliticised framework of liberal politics that Schmitt exposed. The 
location of human rights principles at the centre of law and the subsequent 
prioritisation of these principles as regulatory tools underpins a common approach 
that unites the voices across the levels of intellectuality. These contributions are 
united through a commitment to the rule of law that posits the law as an autonomous 
force that serves to restrain the state and if imposed (or return to) the violence that 
characterises the current regime would be avoided.
This common approach serves to exclude any alternative perspectives that 
seek to confront the current politics of security outside the parameters of legal 
regulation. Any substantive critique of the status quo that would go so far as to 
substantively question the validity of human rights principles and legislation is 
dismissed as a dangerous ploy to provide the state with unrestrained power. This 
potential cannot be accommodated within the liberal system and the quest to 'save' 
liberalism from exceptionalism unites the liberal intellectual and scholarly community 
concerned with liberty in the context of the 'war on terror' and marginalises the 
'solution' to within a set of essentially depoliticised parameters.
The influence of the public intellectual strata is clear throughout the literature 
and has had the effect of defining the debate as one exclusively about the liberal 
relationship between liberty and security. The apparent range of perspectives 
accommodated in this debate share the common view that the resulting framework 
arising from these interventions should be liberal in character. There exists an 
apparently paradoxical situation in which those interventions that purport to advocate 
a critical perspective offer an essential source of legitimacy to the current regime. 
Critical perspectives accommodated within this debate are ultimately devoid of 
substance as their inclusion is premised by conformity to a liberal agenda. These 
critical analyses are tied up in the same project as their more conservative 
counterparts of revisiting and revitalising the liberal framework (despite the 
occasional identification of an alternate project) and are all defined by an 
unwillingness or inability to transcend the parameters to the debate set by the public 
intellectuals considered above.
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The accommodation of critical perspectives ultimately gives the impression of 
a regime that is open to critique and transformation and thus the resulting common 
approach is presented as the result of much soul-searching within the intellectual 
community. This fagade of self-critique provides a vital source of legitimacy to the 
current intellectual debate and fundamentally presents the political regime as one that 
is able to sustain critical evaluation. In reality, truly alternative perspectives that are 
willing to consider a different political framework in which to confront the current 
regime are marginalised, stripped of any legitimacy and dismissed as extreme to the 
point of constituting a threat of their own. Indeed, the threat they pose is real in terms 
of an attack on the legitimacy of the current political framework in which the liberty- 
security regime is located yet this threat is equated with or assimilated to the threat to
*7 £.
'security' that apparently defines the current epoch . The dismissal of political 
alternatives is done through a process of depoliticisation that is aimed at all threats to 
the status quo. Liberalism is the only option available to organise the response to 
terrorism as much as it is the only option we have to organise the current political and 
economic regime. It is from this understanding that the current debate - including 
here the interventions of public intellectuals and the scholars and academics 
considered above that labour under their direct or indirect influence - is confined to 
the revisiting and 'reforming' the liberal framework.
76 The threat is equated with a physical threat to security but this equation arguably reveals further that 
the concern with security is in reality a concern with the stability of the current regime before it is a 
concern with the physical security of the nation.
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Chapter 3.
Outside looking in? 
Human rights organisations and the politics of liberty and security
This chapter considers the intervention of human rights organisations in the debate on 
the liberty-security relationship in the context of the 'war on terror'. The legitimating 
effects of the 'debate' that has occupied those working within the traditional 
intellectual sphere raises questions about the extent to which the function of the 
liberal intellectual extends beyond this sphere. This chapter therefore seeks to 
ascertain if this legitimising function can be understood to inform, or even define, the 
work of human rights organisations. The literature drawn upon here is taken from 
some of the most well known human rights organisations that have an international 
remit including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch as well as those who 
have a more regional focus including Liberty. In the post 9/11 era the apparent effect 
that the 'war on terror' has had on the protection of human rights has emerged as one 
of the foremost issues occupying leading national and international human rights 
organisations. These organisations have at different intervals focussed their attention 
(and subsequent campaigning activities) on specific national issues and development 
of legislation as well as on the broader international impact the 'war on terror' has had 
on the position of human rights vis-a-vis security.
These national and international human rights organisations are considered in 
terms of their intellectual function understanding that they constitute a different level 
of intellectual activity to those individuals considered in the previous sections. 
Understanding the human rights organisation as having an intellectual function to 
some extent distinct from the academic or even public intellectual (although there are 
of course individuals and groups who cross these 'boundaries') is based in their work 
being aimed predominantly 'on the ground' so to speak. The active campaign work 
that defines these human rights organisations separates them - at least in popular 
understandings of their function - from the intellectual whose work is first and 
foremost from the chair. The decisive legitimating function of interventions that 
remain (in this over-simplified sense) 'on the page' has been illustrated above but the 
concern in this section is with the literature produced by human rights organisations in 
accompaniment to their campaigning activity.
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The analysis seeks to ascertain what is specific about this literature as well as 
identifying any points of convergence with the central principles exhibited in the 
intellectual 'levels' considered in the previous two sections. Given that the 
legitimating function of the liberal intellectual is one which cannot be played by the 
more conservative or straight supporters of such security politics this analysis seeks to 
ascertain if there is a more specific (and potentially more powerful) legitimating 
function that is the sole preserve of the human rights organisation by virtue of their 
role and status in a liberal democracy. The relationship between the state and these 
organisations is a central concern and the analysis is concerned with the potential 
legitimating function these organisations have in relation to specific national security 
regimes and the broader politics of security.
The international reputation of these organisations as well as their campaign 
budgets and ability to disseminate information to a public audience suggests their 
intervention in this debate is potentially decisive - a concern reinforced by their 
popular status as the guardians of human rights. Furthermore, in a liberal 
understanding of politics these organisations are understood to be apolitical. Their 
status as NGOs (non-governmental organisations) is seen to detach them from the 
political process and present them as objective observers able to provide impartial 
critique. Understanding the crucial legitimising function that a professed apolitical 
status plays in liberalism this analysis will critically consider these interventions to 
decipher whether in reality the position of these organisations is essentially 
conservative, or if in their presentation of various critical analyses there exists a 
substantive contestation with the political framework in which this regime is 
constructed and sustained. The depoliticising potential of interventions made from an 
apparently apolitical perspective is a central concern in this chapter.
Liberty as the means to security
The intervention of human rights organisations is presented almost universally as a 
critique of the current regime. At the core of this critique is the idea that in the context 
of the 'war on terror' states have been willing to devalue human rights and 
deconstruct the framework of regulation provided by the commitment to the rule of 
law and an independent judiciary. In reference to the UK's involvement in this 'war' 
there is some acknowledgement that the understanding of counter-terrorism (or
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security more generally) requiring a revised and reduced commitment to human rights 
is not entirely a feature of the post 9/11 environment. The tendency to erode human 
rights in the fight against terrorism is one well established in the UK response to the 
'troubles' in Northern Ireland and human rights organisations have been vocal in their 
critique of UK counter-terrorism policy for many years 1 . However, despite the initial 
acceptance that some foundations to current counter-terrorism policy were laid in the 
pre 9/11 period (in the UK at least) there is a unified sense among human rights 
organisations that the rapid evolution of security strategy in the current post 9/11 
period has been marked by a fundamental, epoch defining departure from the 
principles of liberal democracy. The assertion is made that we have seen a departure 
from a previous age in which states were willing and able to stay loyal to the liberal 
tradition and sought to maintain security without impacting negatively on human 
rights. The obfuscation of liberal politics and the history of liberal state intervention in 
domestic and foreign policy is pronounced from the outset.
That the condemnation of the current liberty-security regime is premised on 
the negative impact on human rights is unsurprising but the additional concern of each 
of the main human rights organisations is that the abdication of human rights 
principles is not simply problematic from a human rights point of view but is, 
moreover, counterproductive. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and 
Liberty are committed to the goal of ensuring security and share the idea that 'true 
security is ultimately about ensuring an environment in which all human rights are 
fulfilled, respected and protected' 2 . The opposition between liberty and security that 
has occupied both sides of the debate is for these organisations ultimately a false one. 
The notion of balance is to be retained to provide the appropriate framework for 
accommodating all rights3 and indeed they are at pains to point out that there is an
1 Catherine Scorer, The Prevention of Terrorism Acts 1974 and 1976, (London: National Council of 
Civil Liberties, 1976); Amnesty International, Northern Ireland: Report of an Amnesty International 
Mission to Northern Ireland [28 November 1977 - 6 December 1977], (London: Amnesty 
International, 1978); Catherine Scorer, Patricia Hewitt, Sarah Spencer and National Council for Civil 
Liberties, Prevention of Terrorism Act: The Case for Repeal, (London: Civil Liberties Trust, 1985); 
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Northern Ireland: A Helsinki Watch Report, (New York: 
Human Rights Watch, 1991)
2 Human Rights Watch, In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Abuses Worldwide, (New 
York: HRW, 2003)
3 Amnesty International, Cruel. Inhuman. Degrades Us All: Stop torture and ill-treatment in the 'war 
on terror', London: Amnesty International, 2005)
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'inherent balance' built into the human rights system4 but human rights law is not 
seen to be in opposition to security - the inverse relationship that underpins the 
position of many advocates of the balance metaphor is rejected. The understanding of 
the conditionality of security on liberty has built explicitly on the perceived validity 
and utility of Ignatieff s framing of the issue5 and the notion of the interrelationship 
between liberty and security is a central feature of this literature.
There is agreement that human rights law is not an obstacle to security as it is 
'sufficiently flexible to allow governments to respond to security threats without 
tearing up the rules' 6 . Regulation is ensured by human rights and while exceptional 
measures are ostensibly permissible they remain, in the defining paradox of liberal 
interventions in this debate, regulated by human rights principles and law. Human 
rights are constructed as a means to security with security constituting the ultimate 
end of human rights advocacy. This is of course a true representation of the liberal 
tradition in which liberty is subordinated to security - they exist in fact as synonyms 
rather than antonyms7 - but the implications of this are in reality antithetical to what 
these human rights organisation formally advocate in the primacy of human rights.
Human rights are presented as non-negotiable because they are ultimately 'the 
route to security' 8 and thus any security strategy that impacts negatively on human 
rights is at once illegal and destined to failure. Counter-terrorism strategy must 
confront the fact that terrorism is 'the very antithesis of human rights' 9 (to the point 
that it is explicitly defined as evil10) and thus effective security strategy must be based
4 Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Ambivalence: UK Policy on Torture Since 9/11, (New York: 
Human Rights Watch, 2006)
5 'I thought he (Ignatieff) had it exactly right. We do need to explain how respect for human rights 
increases our security rather than jeopardizes it' William Schultz, Tainted Legacy: 9/11 and the Ruin of 
Human Rights, (New York: Thunder Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2003) 10 original emphasis. At the 
time of writing and publication of this book Schultz was the Executive Director of Amnesty 
International USA. The book is sole authored by Schultz as opposed to being formally authored or 
published by AI but he grounds his discussion in his role as Executive Director. On account of this he 
is arguably granted greater freedom in the articulation of his argument unconstrained by an official 
publication but he makes no substantive departure from the line pressed in AI publications.
6 Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Ambivalence, 9.
7Burchell in Neocleous, "Security, Liberty and the Myth of Balance", 133
8 Amnesty International, United Kingdom: Human rights are not a game, (London: Amnesty 
International, 2005)
9 Human Rights Watch, In the Name of Counter-Terrorism; see also, Amnesty International, Terror 
and Counter-Terr or: Defending our Human Rights, (London: Amnesty International, 2006)
10 Schultz, Tainted Legacy, 19
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in response on the preservation and promotion of human rights. In constructing rights 
as the condition for security they are definitively securitised and implicated as a 
central component of the logic of security. A critique of the current security regime 
that is at its core concerned with its inability to ensure security fails absolutely to 
transcend this logic: instead, it serves only to reinforce the legitimacy of security and 
the unquestionable status of the current regime.
From war to law: the 'reformation' of counter-terrorism
For these organisations, the fundamental problem with the current regime, and the 
reason why it is incapable of realising the centrality of human rights, is that it is based 
on a model of war and not one of criminal justice. As a result of this, the counter- 
terrorism framework has been based on an alternative or 'shadow criminal justice 
system' 11 within which the rule of law is compromised and the balance of powers 
distorted as power is passed from the judiciary to the executive. The revised human 
rights led response advocated by these organisations is defined by a move (or return) 
from 'war to law' 12 and the reinstatement of the 'ordinary' criminal justice system as 
the framework for the response to terrorism. This reform is championed on the basis 
that it will restore the independence and power of the judiciary and the rule of law that 
have been casualties of the 'war on terror' on both sides of the Atlantic 13 . Essentially, 
these organisations construct their response again in the form of the two political 
demands of liberal rationalism outlined by Schmitt: the postulate of openness in 
political life and the demand for the division of powers.
This proposed reformation of security strategy that unites the major human 
rights organisations is predicated on an absolute faith in the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system and the rule of law. It is unsurprising that organisations defined by the 
commitment to human rights law base their criticism on the illegality of the current 
regime but through this agreed approach law itself is presented as wholly 
unproblematic and the only sound basis on which to restrain state violence. This
1 ' Amnesty International, Human rights are not a game, 3
12 Liberty, From 'War' to Law: Liberty's Response to the Coalition Government's Review of Counter- 
Terrorism and Security Powers 2010, (London: Liberty, 2010)
13 Human Rights Watch, Fighting Terrorism Fairly and Effectively: Recommendations for Obama, 
(New York: HRW, 2008)
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narrow response reinforces a legal fetishism based as it is on the liberal myth of law 
as the foundation of justice 14 . In treating the law as an autonomous reality designed to 
protect human rights these organisations contribute decisively to the mystification of 
the foundation of the rule of law in something other than class domination and 
oppression 15 . Furthermore, the equation of law and justice allows for (and 
necessitates) a commitment to policing powers that are presented in this dichotomy 
between war and law as the legitimate force (even if in need of increased restraint 
through oversight mechanisms) to tackle terrorism. The 'from war to law' model is 
underpinned not only by a legal fetishism but by a. fetishism of the police that is based 
on the same absolute commitment to the rule of law16 . By way of illustration, these 
organisations are willing to accept an extension of police powers 17 as a supposed 
alternative to the current regime defined through the model of war.
That an extension of police powers can be presented as part of an 'alternative' 
framework illustrates how the critique offered by these organisations is fundamentally 
insubstantial. It is clear that a commitment to the rule of law prevents any truly 
alternative politics and locates the human rights organisation on precisely the same 
liberal terrain as those states orchestrating the 'war on terror'. By emphasising the rule 
of law and the implied legitimacy of the police these organisations confirm the 
conservative character of their intervention.
The legitimising function of these organisations is based ultimately on the 
preservation of the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. This is 
illustrated in both the faith in police powers that is central to the return to the criminal 
justice model and in their response to the proscription of violent groups. As part of a 
concern for preserving freedom of speech there has been condemnation of 
criminalisation of 'extreme' organisations and 'offensive' speech18 in the context of 
counter-terrorism. However, there remains a wholesale commitment to the 
proscription of 'violent' groups with an apparent faith in the state's ability to 
designate the boundary between offensiveness and violence. The understanding of
14 Neocleous, The Fabrication of Social Order, 110.
15 Mark Neocleous, "The problem with normality: taking exception to "permanent emergency"", 
Alternatives 3\, 2 (2006).
16 Neocleous, The Fabrication of Social Order, 110.
17 Human Rights Watch, Hearts and Minds: Putting Human Rights at the Center of United Kingdom 
Counterterrorism Policy, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2007) 17
18 Liberty, From 'War'to Law, 9
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what constitutes an extreme politics posited here does not disturb the state's definition 
and these organisations reinforce the pacification that is a central feature of both 
human rights principles and the politics of security. The call for the tightening of state 
powers is based on this distinction between violent and non-violent dissent and in 
reality there remains a commitment to counter-terrorism powers as long as they are 
only aimed at those individuals and organisations that promote and incite 'violence'. 
The terrorist, on the basis of their commitment to violence and rejection of human 
rights is to be not only to be expelled from political debate but to be legitimately 
subjected to the force of the state on the basis of their inhumanity.
From this perspective human rights must be at the forefront of security 
strategy to prevent peaceful political dissent disintegrating into extremism and 
violence 19 . However, the support for dissent remains circumscribed within liberal 
notions of politics defined by discussion and negotiation. The potential for truly 
alternative politics that seek to transcend this liberal understanding of legitimate 
politics is denied as a result of the presentation of the 'polities' of human rights. In 
agreement with Dworkin, human rights are to be the rallying point for modern
onpolitics , with modern politics understood to operate between poles marked by 
Conservatives and the liberal-left. All other political perspectives that cannot, or will 
not, unite around a campaign for human rights are excluded from the political process. 
The marginalisation of alternative politics is not simply insufficiently criticised by 
these organisations, it is reinforced and exacerbated as they promote the idea that 'by 
their very nature, human rights serve the more moderate elements in any culture' 21 .
The politics of human rights (organisations)
The notion that human rights should provide a point of unity for a contemporary 
politics - a politics defined by both security and the protection of human rights22 - has 
led these organisations to celebrate the supposedly apolitical status of human rights.
19 Human Rights Watch, In the Name of Counter-Terrorism, 3
20ShamiChakrabarti, preface to Churchill's Legacy: the Conservative Case for the Human Rights Act, 
by Jesse Norman and Peter Oborne, (London: Liberty, 2009).
21 Schultz, Tainted Legacy, 200
22 This 'dual' concern seemingly now presents a tautology given that they cannot exist for these 
organisations in isolation from one another.
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Human rights abuses fuel terrorism (and in turn render a counter-terrorism strategy 
not led by human rights counterproductive) through recruiting individuals and groups 
to the opposition to the 'war on terror'. Therefore, the maintenance of human rights 
avoids the 'politicisation of the uncommitted' 23 and reduces the reserve army of 
terrorists. The notion that politicisation is to be avoided and moreover, is negated 
through human rights is a clear illustration of the depoliticisation that is not only 
latent in the position of these organisations but is positively celebrated.
The discussion of terrorism is typically rooted in discussions of Islamic 
terrorism and Al Qaeda. The targeting of the West by terrorist groups is presented as a 
cynical ploy to exploit the grievances of the 'uncommitted' and recruit them to a 
cause that they would otherwise reject. The assertion is, following Walzer, that 
international terrorism is defined exclusively by a religious fanaticism and any 
resemblance of politics is only 'bolted on' as a propaganda tool. The absolute 
separation of religious fanaticism and politics is again here crucial to the hegemonic 
construction of the oppositions that define the 'war on terror'; this rejection of the 
relationship between religious fanaticism and politics, of religious politics, serves a 
crucial ideological function in this construction24 .
The discussion of the events of 9/11 is symptomatic of the depoliticised 
interpretation and presentation of international terrorism:
Those who died that day, regardless of their realities of their respective lives, 
stood in for all people around the globe who wish little more than to live 
productively, care for their children, do no harm to their neighbours, spread 
good will as it is given to them, and stave off the magnet of death25 .
y f* £
The site, or as Zizek puts it, the 'obstacle' , is nowhere acknowledged: the site of the 
World Trade Centre is irrelevant and the WTO is presented effectively as an entity 
'spreading good will' around the globe. The blanket depoliticisation of terrorism is 
crucial to the depoliticised framework in which the human rights led response to 
terrorism is constructed.
23Amnesty International, Cruel.Inhuman.Degrades Us All, 21.
24Contra to this construction, the possibility of an understanding of religious fanaticism as political, not 
least in relation to Islam, as constituted in political thought is discussed in depth by Toscano. Toscano, 
Fanaticism, 149-171 .
25 Schultz, Tainted Legacy, 198.
26Slavoj Zizek, Violence, (London: Profile Books, 2008) 78.
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The fact that human rights and human rights organisations are vital to the 
reduction of politics to a process that takes place within exclusively liberal parameters 
is not an altogether surprising finding but it is vital to reiterate that these organisations 
are not at any level offering a vision of liberalism that differs from the current regime. 
Of course like the liberal intellectuals considered above the rationale for these 
supposedly critical interventions is to reform the current regime and return it to its 
previous liberal foundations - and indeed this justifies the human rights organisation's 
existence as much as the liberal intellectual's - but the literature produced by these
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organisations quickly reveals the insubstantial nature of their reforms . The 
conservatism of the human rights organisation is illustrated most clearly in a 
document published in the UK by Liberty entitled Churchill's Legacy: The 
Conservative Case for the Human Rights Act published in 2009. This document seeks 
to explain that the Human Rights Act is an essentially conservative (and 
Conservative) document and while this is not a new perspective and not a new one to 
come from Conservatives, the fact it was published by Liberty, one of the leading 
human rights organisations in the UK and one that has been continually vocal in its 
criticisms of the current regime is illustrative of the substance (or lack of) of such 
critique and the absence of a truly alternative perspective.
That a leading human rights organisation has been willing to put its name to a 
document that celebrates the central ideas of the ECHR as 'restraint on the power of 
the state and a deep understanding of the link between individual liberty and private
Oftproperty' is indicative of the politics that underpin human rights organisations more 
generally. Understanding the UK Human Rights Act as a 'charter against socialism
27 The convergence between the liberal intellectual and the human rights organisation in this context is 
apparent here. The physical proximity of the liberal intellectual and these organisations is illustrated 
further in the advisory committee of Human Rights Watch (HRW) that includes Tom Farer and Conor 
Gearty (see above for analysis of their respective interventions). This advisory committee also includes 
Bruce Hoffman who is arguably one of the security intellectuals/?^ excellence. Hoffinan's importance 
to HRW points to the intellectual convergence of the human rights intellectual and security intellectual 
as well as illustrating their shared importance to human rights organisations. Hoffman has served as 
Scholar-in-Residence for Counter-terrorism at the Central Intelligence Agency and as an adviser on 
counterterrorism to the Office of National Security Affairs, Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, 
Iraq. The fact that one of the leading human rights organisations takes advice from some of the same 
sources as the US government demonstrates how close the human rights organisation sits to the official 
position on counter-terrorism and the liberty-security relation more generally. Again here we are 
reminded of Walzer's provision of intellectual assistance to the US Marine Corp as further illustration 
of the close relationship between the state, the liberal intellectual (both human rights focussed and their 
security counterparts) and the human rights organisation.
28 Norman and Oborne, Churchill's Legacy, 6.
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and state interference' 29 as well as one that should be celebrated on the basis that it 
asserts no right to economic equality30 is liberal in the purest sense but does not sit 
comfortably with the vision of liberalism formally professed by human rights 
organisations. The reality of contemporary liberalism, still tied firmly to the central 
tenants of the classical tradition, is here brought to the surface.
There is an attempt by these Conservative human rights advocates to maintain 
a distinction between Conservative and liberal or even radical conceptions of rights
^0but it is clear on further inspection of this literature that the Conservative and liberal 
understanding of the politics of human rights is essentially the same. They remain 
grounded in notions of balance (including the capacity to be flexible and thus realistic 
in the current so-called 'Age of Terror'), compromise and the restraint of executive 
power. This document provides an illustration of the reality of liberal principles that 
continue to underpin human rights and define them as an essentially conservative tool 
in political and economic terms. This reveals why human rights can, and must, 
provide the rallying point for a contemporary politics that extends only as far as 
Conservatives and the liberal-left that are in reality two 'poles' in very close 
proximity.
The notion of a new politics being implicitly bound up with human rights 
places the human rights organisation at the heart of the political framework. The basis 
for human rights has been posited as 'political consensus' 33 a concept that suggests 
again that human rights are the rallying point for a unification of disparate groups who 
seek political empowerment. This consensus should include human rights courts (and 
by extension the judiciary) and human rights organisations who have in this sense a 
definitively legalistic role in monitoring the transgression of human rights law. The 
truly political character of this 'consensus' is exposed when guidelines for its 
realisation instruct the human rights organisations and human rights advocates more 
generally to stop thinking of generals, police chiefs and politicians as adversaries and
29 Norman and Oborne, Churchill's Legacy, 6
30 Norman and Oborne, Churchill's Legacy, 9
31 See chapter 6 below for consideration of the 'radical' or leftist conceptions of rights and of their 
substantive difference from Conservative or liberal understandings.
32 This based on an understanding of those human rights organisations in focus here assuming a liberal 
presentation of rights that bares great resemblance to the liberal intellectual position that has been 
substantively expanded in the previous two chapters.
33 Schultz, Tainted Legacy, 116.
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start thinking of them as 'potential partners' because 'we' are 'all in this together' 34 . 
The emphasis on political consensus understood to be defined by the dissolution of 
conflict and of critique is, even given what we have revealed about the depoliticising 
force of the liberal intellectual, quite staggering. 'They' are all in this together 
because the human rights organisation is focussed in reality not toward an alternative 
goal but toward ensuring their (distinctly non-counter-hegemonic) understanding of 
security is maintained. The human rights organisation can work with the general, the 
police chief and the politician because they understand there to be the same end to 
each of their work and there is in reality only insubstantial disagreement about the 
most appropriate, or effective means of achieving it35 .
Understanding the future achievement of this 'political consensus' to be a 
beneficial reform to the current regime is based on the idea that we currently have a 
system in which those various groups offer fundamentally opposed views about the 
liberty-security relationship. This is clearly not the case and indeed we already have 
'political consensus' established through the hegemonic status of the liberal political 
framework in which those who subscribe to liberal principles - of which human rights 
are of central importance - are accommodated into the political debate and those who 
reject them are themselves denied any sense of legitimacy. This 'reformation' is in the 
continuation of the character of liberal reforms an attempt to confirm the monopoly of 
legitimacy that liberalism requires.
Law or war or both
The most important effect of this political consensus is the legitimisation of a liberal 
interventionism. Humanitarian intervention according to these organisations must be 
sanctioned by the international community and human rights are presented as the only 
legitimate basis for military intervention. As long as we understand military 
intervention to be 'a last resort' 36(or indeed a lesser evil) it is quite reasonable for the
34 Schultz, Tainted Legacy, 193
35 Reinforcing this consensus, David Chandler has cited Peter Fuchs' (the Director General of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross) observation that 'the respective roles of the politicians, 
generals and humanitarian actors are not clear anymore' - See, David Chandler, "The Road to Military 
Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda", Human 
Rights Quarterly 23, 3 (2001)
36 Schultz, Tainted Legacy, 141
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human rights organisation to be involved in the decision to go to war (and indeed they 
must). This is justified on the construction of humanitarian intervention as a policing 
project and, as it is one based on human rights principles, as a legally regulated 
project. The legal fetish and the fetish of the police underpin the legitimisation of 
military intervention. Fundamentally, it has been through the discourse of human 
rights that these organisations have been able to advocate 'war' by another name and 
play a major role in the construction of humanitarian militarism as a tautology37 .
The criticism of the military form of response to terrorism in the 'war on 
terror' is not concerned with the violence of war per se but with the lack of human 
rights based regulation of the military and security services. These human rights 
organisations' reports and campaigns serve to mystify the nature of warfare and 
exacerbate this by presenting a humanitarian intervention as a legally regulated 
project in which illegitimate violence is avoided and violence in general is limited. 
These organisations thus play a pivotal legitimating role in the context of military 
intervention and serve to reinforce the idea that legitimate violence is the sole reserve 
of the human rights defender - violence is only legitimate when accompanied 
seemingly paradoxically by a concern for human rights. For these organisations, war 
is not really a model to be abandoned but it must be justified along the right lines to 
be legitimate. Through this formulation the notion that violence and law are not in 
opposition but inextricably bound up together is reinforced. In accepting this we are 
not to discount the very real possibility for truly exceptional violence in the arena of 
war but it is made clear that legal regulation through human rights is not a guarantee 
of non-violence, but for the liberal it is a guarantee of legitimate violence.
The dual constraints of the NGO model and the human rights framework
In continuation of the liberal intellectual justifications for humanitarian intervention 
the ostensibly apolitical character of the human rights organisation provides them 
with a perceived objectivity and subsequent legitimacy. Those on the left who 
opposed the war in Iraq for example are again castigated for 'indulging their ideology 
at the expense of others' suffering' 38 . Those who refuse to accept the post-political
37 Chandler, "The Road to Military Humanitarianism".
38 Schultz, Tainted Legacy, 145
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framework in which humanitarian intervention is deemed to take place are denied all 
legitimacy. We have to be willing to work on a post-ideological terrain and those who 
continue to assert a political character to military intervention are following Walzer, 
Rorty and others' criticism, deemed to be so out of date as to have nothing to offer. 
We are told critique is not enough, the current era demands pro-active work on the 
ground; it demands that all resistance and intervention in current debates take on the 
model of the human rights organisation. The channels of political expression are 
reduced to speaking as (or being spoken for by) a human rights organisation in their 
capacity as an 'influencing organisation' 39 .
It is unsurprising from this perspective that there is an active call for what 
Arundhati Roy has termed 'the NGOization of resistance' 40 because this process of 
constructing all political movements in the model of these human rights organisations 
serves to turn confrontation into negotiation. NGOs act as a buffer between the state 
and the people diffusing conflict and political anger and ultimately denying politics41 . 
The depoliticising force of the NGO framework is also in this context reinforced by 
the legalism of human rights campaigns. Legalism serves to 'translate wide-ranging 
political questions into more narrowly framed legal questions' 42 divesting political 
questions of their most crucial concerns and this process is exacerbated by the human 
rights framework that fundamentally restricts - if not closes - the options for 
legitimate resistance. Having the human rights organisation follow this model and 
essentially assuming a monopoly on what constitutes legitimate 'resistance' is 
therefore very useful to the current regime. As Roy has noted, 'it is not for nothing 
that the "NGO perspective" is becoming increasingly respected' 43 . The major human 
rights organisations are increasingly invited to contribute to reviews of counter- 
terrorism legislation marking explicitly their inclusion in the liberty-security debate44 .
The inclusion in this debate appears to be based on their operation on the same 
political terrain as the state. This is marked by a shared moralisation that is ultimately
39 Lars J0rgensen, "What are NGOs Doing in Civil Society?" in NGOs, Civil Society and the State: 
Building Democracy in Transitional Societies, ed. Andrew Clayton (Oxford: INTRAC, 1996) 53.
40 Arundhati Roy, Public Power in the Age of Empire, (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004) 43
41 Roy, Public Power in the Age of Empire, 43
42 Wendy Brown and Janet Halley, 'Introduction' in Left Legalism /Left Critique, ed. Wendy Brown 
and Janet Halley (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002) 19.
43 Roy, Public Power in the Age of Empire, 44.
44 See, Liberty, From 'War' to Law.
107
the marker of state rhetoric and human rights organisations campaigning (and of the 
liberal intellectual) in this context. Human rights organisations have sought to 'justify 
their strategic choices through the language of morals and ethics rather than polities' 
in an attempt to maintain their neutral and "non-political" status45 . Human rights 
discourse has been integral to preserving the fa9ade of an apolitical framework for 
these organisations in the same sense that it has apparently allowed the state to present 
its security policy as an apolitical response to an apolitical problem. The human rights 
organisation serves as the model par excellence of post-politics and as a result these 
organisations have an exclusive legitimising function in relation to the politics of 
security.
Possibilities for critique?
In being told that critique is not enough we are expected to abandon the 'outmoded' 
ideological constraints of 'previous' political models. We have to 'modernise' and 
assume a post-political framework exemplified by the human rights organisation. It 
clearly serves these organisations' own interest if political engagement is dependent 
on their involvement and leadership but there is a need to illustrate that this 
framework for (political) engagement is pivotal to the politics of security that define 
the current regime. Human rights organisations define this supposedly new politics 
because they are (as they are only too happy to explain) willing to 'set aside personal 
political predilection, doctrine or ideology' 46 . They do this because human rights 
values themselves apparently transcend ideology: they are post-political in that they 
can and should be adopted by all political perspectives - bearing in mind that the 
spectrum of (legitimate) political opinion is very narrow. The transcendence of 
'culture, ideology and faith' is done 'in service to that which is recognisable to all: the 
human face of suffering' 47 reinforcing Ignatieff s reading of human rights reduced to 
a definition of the minimum conditions for any kind of life at all48 . The NGO
45 Chandler, "The Road to Military Humanitarianism", 683
46 Schultz, Tainted Legacy, 207
47 Schultz, Tainted Legacy, 208
48 'The campaigning human rights-based NGOs did much to denigrate the non-Western state and 
legitimize Western activism through the creation of the incapable human rights victim'. Chandler "The 
Road to Military Humanitarianism", 691 emphasis added.
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framework and human rights principles are not simply manifestations of but vital 
components in this post-political politics that serve fundamentally through their 
operation and formal presentation to obfuscate the real political decisions and 
ideology that operate behind this thin fa9ade erected at the so-called end of history.
The thinness of this fa9ade is clearly exposed throughout the literature 
produced by these organisations. There is an acceptance that as human rights are 
central to security in the so-called Age of Terror, human rights organisations are 
directly implicated in counter-terrorism. These organisations are central to the 'battle 
for ideas' that is crucial to the fight against terrorism49 . This involves for example 
substantive support for the UK government's PREVENT (counter-radicalisation) 
programme50 as well as a more explicit acknowledgement that the 'battle for ideas' 
requires the promotion of 'our' political and economic systems as an 'alternative 
ideology' that 'the retinue needs if it is to reject the dead-end blandishments of Al 
Qaeda' 51 . The human rights organisation does not operate abstracted from 'our' 
political and economic frameworks and is intrinsically bound up in the opposition to 
terrorism that is challenged by not simply by the assertion of human rights but by the 
assertion of liberal democracy and free-market capitalism. Those who refuse to offer 
alternatives and 'resort' to critique are indulging their ideologies but those who seek 
to oppose terrorism in this explicitly western-centric fashion are not indulgent or 
ideological but pragmatic in their Rorty-esque assertion that human rights culture and 
the political and economic models it is borne of and in turn reinforces are 'the best 
we've got'.
In reality, in this framework critique is not 'insufficient' as we are told, but is 
disruptive and must be marginalised. True critique that seeks to identify and name the 
politics of security is again identified as a threat in itself. The conservative, 
legitimating function of the human rights NGO is here in line with that provided by 
the liberal intellectual. Presenting critique as nihilism and the mark of lazy ideologues 
standing in contrast to the constructive and effective intervention from within the 
NGO framework serves to further mystify the nature of true political action and 
reinforces the monopoly of legitimacy for the human rights organisation. If instead we
49 Human Rights Watch, Hearts and Minds, 1
50 See chapter 4 for a consideration of this programme
51 Schultz, Tainted Legacy, 62
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understand critique allowing for a 'focus on the workings of ideology and power in 
the production of existing political and legal possibilities' 52 then it is vital for an 
alternative politics that must expose the ideological and expressly political character 
of the current liberty-security regime and by extension the expressly political nature 
of human rights advocacy within this organisational framework.
The role of the human rights organisation is to be understood in line with the 
liberal intellectual as broadly conceived here, but we must remain aware of the 
specific character of the intervention by these organisations. Their status as the 
guardians of human rights and their direct public campaigning provides them with far 
greater potential to affect public opinion and the legitimating function of their 
intellectual work is intensified on this basis. The popular acceptance of their location 
outside the political sphere again provides them with a legitimating function not 
wholly available to the liberal intellectual work confined to 'the chair'. The relation of 
these organisations to the state is one of legitimisation that builds upon the 
organisation's apparently apolitical position and the pretence of (objective) critique. 
Substantively their position is in line with the liberal intellectual reinforcing the 
convergence in position between apparently diversely situated voices but their 
proximity to the state (demanded by their 'influencing' role) provides them with an 
intensified legitimating function the result of which needs to be considered through an 
analysis of state strategy.
52 Brown & Halley, Left Legalism, 27
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Chapter 4
The official presentation of the liberty-security relationship 
Drawing out the state politics of national security
This section is concerned with the state politics of security. Having established an 
understanding of the true nature of the liberal intellectuals' intervention and illustrated 
the depoliticisation and subsequent legitimisation of the 'war on terror' that is at the 
core of their work, there is a need to consider how the state in the current era 
understands, presents and enacts its approach to the security in this context. This 
chapter therefore considers precisely how the politics of security have been set out 
and developed through the production and evolution of the official approach to 
security in the post-9/11 era. The analysis seeks ultimately to draw the politics of 
security from the security strategy documents produced in this period.
The analysis focuses on the national security and counter-terrorism strategy 
documents produced by the UK, Australian and US governments in the era of 'war on 
terror'. In continuation of the UK-Australia comparison this analysis seeks to identify 
at the level of state strategy the extent to which there has emerged a common liberty- 
security regime at the antipodes. The analysis seeks to identify if there exists a 
specifically Anglo-Saxon regime shaped by the specific political culture and legal 
system in the UK and Australia in which the liberty-security regime is installed and 
maintained or alternatively whether there exists a convergence between all three 
nations considering the influence of the US formulation of security on its allies in the 
'war on terror'. The analysis is concerned with how these states conceive security - in 
both domestic and international contexts - in the current epoch but moreover how 
they define the current situation within which security strategy is developed and 
employed. Essentially, this equates to how the state positions the politics of security 
historically and this question is at the heart of the analysis.
From this starting point, against the backdrop of an official understanding of 
the current situation, the analysis seeks to ascertain how the state defines security 
issues in relation to those populations and phenomena it credits with posing a risk to 
security. At its core, this involves a focus on the construction of an enemy; the 
process by which the state establishes and subsequently defines the opposition that 
characterises the liberal state's approach to security. This will involve a consideration
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of how the state defines both external and internal enemies in the current era as well 
as a continual focus on the strategies employed to legitimise the response.
The analysis begins from an acceptance that much of what is to be drawn from 
these documents is, in a broad sense, well known. However, there is a need to 
demonstrate clearly the ideas that guide current liberal politics and to analyse the 
extent to which simplistic ideas that have already been subject to critique do in fact 
provide the level of guidance that is attributed to them. Engaging in a critique of the 
liberal state is again on first impression an easy target in this context, yet, as has been 
demonstrated in the previous chapters, such an 'easy target' may only be so when an 
analysis fails to consider in depth the decisive function that these ideas may have and 
the political consequences of their employment. The analysis therefore remains 
concerned with the ideas that underpin the state's presentation of the current situation 
considering throughout the ideological function of what appears in these documents to 
be a process of marketing the politics of security.
Security in the age of human rights
The emphasis on 'national security' as a specific state concern is a feature of the latter 
part of the twentieth century 1 and the production of national security strategy (NSS) 
as a standalone document is a new phenomenon to the post-9/11 era. From the outset, 
the formal presentation of the current situation has been the central concern of these 
strategy documents. There is universal agreement across these documents that the 
issue of (in)security and its response have to be understood in the specific context in 
which they have evolved and as a result strategy documents play a vital role in 
presenting a very specific, state sanctioned vision of the world. This is an explicit role 
of security strategy and of the counter-terrorism strategies that are located under the 
banner of national security. It is essential in this analysis to decipher how the current 
era is presented through security strategy to establish the vision of the world presented 
by the liberal state. From this point the analysis will be able to ascertain how the 
politics of security are historically located and positioned in relation to (and as an 
integral part of) the broader politics of the liberal state.
1 Mark Neocleous, "From Social to National Security: On the Fabrication of Economic Order", 
Security Dialogue 37, 3 (2006).
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In the first instance we are told that both the contemporary threat to security 
and the state response to it have to be understood in line with how the world has 
changed in the twenty-first century. The current situation is located this side of a 
definitive break between centuries and the features of this new era are we are told, 
integral to understanding the current security situation. The twentieth century ended, 
albeit eleven years early, with a 'decisive victory for the forces of freedom' that left 'a 
single sustainable model for national success' defined by 'freedom, democracy, and 
free enterprise' 2 . The struggles of the twentieth century have been overcome with the 
'forces of freedom' unanimously victorious. The defining opposition of this period, 
that between 'two power blocs' driven by ideology (and located either side of a 
freedom/tyranny binary), has been replaced by 'more complex and unpredictable sets 
of relationships' leaving a 'transformed international landscape' 3 . Essentially, this 
'transformed landscape' is one on which their remains no defining opposition 
between nation states, 'power blocs' or ideologies. The current era began in 1989 with 
the defeat of the opposing world view and there is now no 'sustained global challenge 
to the liberal, market-oriented vision of a free society' 4 . We have reached the end of 
history; the age of political oppositions, of politics, is over.
So how then is the current era to be understood? It is clearly to be understood 
in the first instance not as an age of politics - not as an age in which world views or 
ideologies compete and conflict - a 'fact' much celebrated by the 'victorious forces of 
freedom'. These forces have therefore carte-blanche to define this era in their own 
image and this is as a result an age of freedom, democracy and human rights starkly 
distinguished from a previous era blighted by war, barbarism and inhumanity. The 
'militant visions of class, nation and race which promised Utopia and delivered misery 
have been defeated and discredited' and in its place we have a vision of the world 
defined by human rights:
2 Executive Office of the President United States, National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002) iv
3 HM Government, National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent 
world, (London: HMSO, 2008) 3.
4 HM Government, National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Update 2009 - Security for the 
Next Generation, (London: HMSO, 2009) 5.
National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, 1
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In the twenty-first century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting 
basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be 
able to unleash the potential of their people and assure future prosperity6 .
Human rights are central to the victorious forces of freedom that closed the twentieth 
century in possession of the only viable political and economic models. Moreover, 
human rights have not simply replaced visions of class, nation and race they have 
replaced politics becoming the only point of distinction between nations. As has been 
noted above, this formulation reinforces the idea that the main contemporary effect of 
human rights is to 'depoliticise politics itself 7 and it is in this frame that the current 
era is presented. The age of politics has given way to an unavoidably depoliticised age 
of human rights.
However, it is important to note that freedom is defined in political and 
economic terms. Free-market capitalism is presented post-1989 as the victorious 
economic model and in turn as an inevitable defining feature of the current era. We 
are to understand the post-1989 period as the period of the triumph of the market 
which has secured universal acceptance as the only route to 'peace, prosperity and 
liberty'. There is now no possibility, or even desire, for an alternative model:
People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern 
them; worship as they please; educate their children male and female; own 
property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are 
right and true for every person, in every society and the duty of protecting 
these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving 
people across the globe and across the ages8 .
The economy, in its current very specific form, is taken as a given both as the defining 
feature of the current global situation and as the end point for the development and 
consolidation of the new post-political era. Free trade is understood to be 'real 
freedom' 9 and the economy is thus presented in this formulation as the overcoming of 
the political. The economy is depoliticised - the age of politics in which economic 
models and political ideologies were opposed has given way to an 'age of freedom' 
defined by free-trade and the free-market - and global capitalism is posited in the
6 National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, iv 
7Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire, 102
8 National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002: iv
9 National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002: 18
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contemporary era as the objective state of things. As history is here divided in two 
eras either side of 1989, global capitalism (or moreover the economic sphere in 
general) is withdrawn from consideration; the end of history marks the end of 
questioning the role and form of the economy.
This vision of the age of freedom is set out most explicitly in twenty-first 
century US security strategy produced in its first form in 2002. UK and Australian 
documents produced later in the last decade (2008, 2009, 2010) demonstrate the 
subsequent convergence of all three states around this formulation; the existence of a 
post-political age of human rights and the free-market are taken as a given. There has 
remained a clear need throughout the evolution of security strategy in each nation 
reinforce this vision of the world and this is ultimately because security is to be 
understood in this frame.
The goal of security strategy is to 'safeguard the nation, its citizens, our 
prosperity and our way of life' 10 . 'Our way of life' has to be understood in line with 
the presentation of the current era, defined by a commitment to human rights and the 
free-market. The defence of this 'way of life' is framed in terms of the defence of 
these 'shared values' (human rights and free-enterprise) that is both premise and 
consequence of security strategy. The notion of an international order defined by 
(human) rights is shared in UK, US and Australian NSS and the defence of this order 
is at the core of security strategy. Accordingly, we are told that there exists a broad 
consensus on the features of security strategy among those who share 'our' values and 
goals 11 . Security is presented as a common goal of those who share a commitment to 
human rights and by extension the formulation of current security strategy advocated 
by these states is presented as compatible with, and essential for, the defence of 
human rights. The fusion of human rights and security here serves to extract any 
political dynamic from the international relations that characterise the current security 
environment. Security becomes solely about the protection of rights not about the 
defence of a given political order. In this sense, conflict is reduced to disagreements 
about rights and politics is effaced from security strategy.
However, given the conflation of 'freedom and free-enterprise' (human rights 
and the free-market) security is about the defence of 'our way of life' understood in
10 National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom 2008: 3
11 See, Kevin Rudd, The First National Security Statement To The Australian Parliament, 4th December 
(2008), 3
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economic as well as (post)political terms. Based on the status of the capitalist 
economy as an objective feature of the current era integral to our freedom, defending 
the free-market as a central component of defending 'our way of life' can be 
presented as an uncontentious, non-political feature of security strategy. Building a 
consensus among allies in the 'war on terror' around shared values is clearly about 
developing a unified force behind the promotion of human rights but is also about 
sustaining and expanding the consensus around the unequivocal status of free-market 
capitalism. Indeed the two cannot be separated; security is about defending the current 
political and economic status quo, but presented in a depoliticised frame that mystifies 
what is clearly a well defined political project.
The utility of the notion of balance
The relationship between freedom and security in security strategy is, as expected, 
unanimously mediated through the application of the metaphor of balance. As we 
have seen in relation to the liberal intellectual this is an almost universal liberal 
tendency and it is unsurprising that the state follows this approach. However, the 
specific formulation of a balance between liberty and security as currently deployed in 
security strategy has several crucial effects that reveal much about the liberty-security 
relationship and its integral role in the 'new' era of post-politics. In the first instance, 
the apparent opposition between liberal notions of liberty and security is emphasised 
through its application allowing the prioritisation of security (as liberalism in reality 
demands) to be concealed behind a balancing act that supposedly serves to protect the 
concern for liberty.
As an indicative example, the UK NSS (2009) positions 'core values' in a 
balance with security and the right to life. Equating security with the 'right to life' in 
effect sets up a balance between rights, understanding security to be a right in itself. 
However, security is here not simply one right amongst others to be balanced, but the 
foremost right that will be guaranteed through security strategy 12 . The formulation of 
security as the supreme right illustrates the hegemonic status of the language of rights
12 'There is no greater individual liberty than the liberty of individuals not to be blown up on British 
streets or in British skies'. Jacqui Smith, "Home Secretary's statement on the counter-terrorism bill", 
October 13 th 2008, accessed April 14, 2011, 
http://www.labour.org.uk/jacqui_smith_statement_on_counter-terrorism_bill,2008-10-13
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within the politics of security. Moreover, it enables the balance between liberty and 
security to be reduced to a balance of rights which in turn enables all security 
measures to be presented as a defence of rights. The 'opposition' between security 
and liberty is diffused in this formulation as security is presented as the ultimate right 
- the right to security - and as a result freedom is reduced to the freedom from 
insecurity.
As the application of balance allows for the prioritisation of security, it opens 
the space for the expansion of security measures whilst maintaining the essentially 
liberal charade of balance as a regulatory force. While there is widespread agreement 
that striking this balance is the 'fundamental challenge for any government' 13 balance 
is not simply a framework for the necessary accommodation of opposing forces; it is 
the route to a more 'effective' 14 and 'coherent' 15 security strategy. Balance defines the 
official approach to the relationship between liberty and security but also defines the 
response to a number of opposing concerns within the context of security strategy. 
The supposed novelty of the new security environment has required a deconstruction 
of the distinction between domestic and international security 16 and in response there 
has been an attempt to 'rebalance the instruments of statecraft' 17 . The (re)balancing 
process here affords the government the flexibility to reorder the tools it has at its 
disposal in defence of security and leaves open the option of extended state powers as
13 HM Government, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering 
International Terrorism, March 2009, (London: Stationary Office, 2009) 55. The idea that striking a 
balance between liberty and security is the fundamental challenge or dilemma of the current era was 
explained by Tony Blair in his speech to the Labour Party conference in 2006 'The fundamental 
dilemma: how do we reconcile liberty with security in this new world?' Illustrating the dominance of 
this idea, David Cameron suggested in a paper setting out the plan for a British Bill of Rights (a paper 
in which he criticised Tony Blair and New Labour's approach to the liberty-security relationship) that 
'the fundamental challenge, then, is to strike the right balance between security and liberty'. See, Tony 
Blair, 2006, "Speech to the Labour Party Conference", The Guardian, 26 September, accessed April 
14, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/sep/26/labourconference.labour3; David Cameron, 
Balancing Freedom and Security - A Modern British Bill of Rights, (London: Centre for Policy 
Studies, 2006) 2.
14 Australian Government, Counter-Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia - Protecting Our 
Community, (Canberra: Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010) i.
15 National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom 2008, 58
16 This fusion of international and domestic elements of national security and counter-terrorism is a 
feature of security strategy in UK, Australian and US strategy and is central to the 'new' approach. It 
was integral to the Australian 'national security reform agenda' under Kevin Rudd. See, Kevin Rudd, 
Robert McClelland and Stephen Smith, Securing Australia, Protecting Our Community Joint media 
release - Prime Minister, Attorney General, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Canberra, 23 February 2010, 
accessed April 15, 2011, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2010/fa-sl00223.html
17 United States Executive Office of the President, National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 18
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long as these can be subsequently justified within the framework of balance. The use 
of force in defence of domestic and international security is, we are told, indicative of 
the resolve to 'maintain a balance of powers that favours freedom' 18 . Security strategy 
and the 'war on terror' more specifically are seemingly not restrained in their tactics 
by the balance framework; its employment appears to widen as opposed to narrow the 
state's options in protecting national security.
In this formulation security and freedom 'should be reinforcing' 19 as they both 
form part of the national interest but have become through the current formulation in 
NSS to a large extent interchangeable. The concept of a 'national interest' is 
comprised of security, freedom and prosperity and these three concerns are said to be 
'interconnected' 20 suggesting that the realisation of any one of these is conditional on 
the simultaneous realisation of the others. The inclusion of prosperity as a central 
concern alongside, or more accurately, bound up in the notion of national security, is 
a feature of NSS in the UK, Australia and the US. Prosperity underpins security by 
affording the 'skills and capabilities needed to advance our security from military 
training and arms, to technical and scientific expertise and equipment' 21 . In this sense, 
prosperity and security are said to form a 'virtuous circle' 22 through which security is 
conditional on the preservation or extension of prosperity. In effect we cannot be 
secure without being prosperous enough to buy the weapons required to defend 
ourselves. By extension, we cannot preserve the 'core values' and freedoms that a 
liberal democracy provides without being prosperous enough to buy our security. 
Protecting prosperity and the means by which prosperity is secured are thus the 
definitive aims of security strategy. Here the understanding of freedom defined by the 
free-market is reiterated and infused with notions of security, allowing the essential 
aim of the defence of the free-market to be central to the defence of 'our way of life' 
and the national interest. Human rights as the rights to prosperity and more 
specifically, to property ownership, must be defended.
18National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, 29.
19 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, 
(London: HMSO, 2009) 23
20 National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom 2010, 22
21 National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom 2010, 22
22 National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom 2010, 22
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Depoliticising the Other
It is from this starting point that the claim that counter-terrorism strategy is 'grounded 
entirely in human rights' 23 needs to be understood. Terrorism threatens these rights 
and thus constitutes the primary (traditional) threat to security - defined by the US as 
the 'common foe' 24 - for the international community. This 'community' is here 
defined by its commitment to human rights as those who reject their validity are 
'isolated', or more appropriately, excluded. The terrorists' unwillingness (or inability) 
to justify its actions inside the language of human rights posits them as relics of the 
previous age of politics; they are presented as the 'heirs of all the murderous 
ideologies of the twentieth century.....following the path of fascism, Nazism and
JC
totalitarianism' . Given that this age of politics, definitively resigned to the twentieth 
century, is over, the terrorist's commitment to politically motivated violence and 
ideology is seen to distort political action. The idea that the security environment is 
defined by a clash of ideologies is rejected in NSS (and counter terrorism strategies) 
because ideology is the sole preserve of the terrorist. The ideological foundation of 
terrorism is not to be opposed by an alternate ideology but by values26 of which 
human rights are central. Official security discourse relies upon a false opposition 
between values and ideology as though an ideology is something other than organised 
ideas and values; and as though 'values', even more so when they are fundamental or 
'core' values, are anything other than valued-ideas (i.e. ideology).
Legitimate forms of political action - defined exclusively by (the values of) 
liberal democracy - are said to be antithetical to terrorism and this is essentially 
because the terrorist fails to circumscribe their politics within the parameters set by 
human rights. Terrorism is underpinned by 'destructive visions of political change' 27 
and these must be undermined through counter-terrorism. The goal is to bring about a
23 HM Government, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare 2009, 55
24 Executive Office of the President United States, National Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003) 2
25 George W Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People", September 20, 
2001, in US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, 5.
26 National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom 2010, 16
27 Executive Office of the President United States, National Strategy for Countering Terrorism 2003, 
29
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consensus around one vision of politics and political action defined through human 
rights.
The essential problem that security strategy is to address arises from the 
impossibility of an age of post-politics. As the reality of true politics is 
insurmountable there exists a major issue with how political oppositions that arise in 
the current era (or transcend the apparent break between ages) are to be managed. It is 
here that security strategy has its decisive role. The process of constructing issues as 
ones of (in)security is about seeking to negate, or at least obscure, the political and it 
is in this frame that security strategy seeks to define the current threat.
The presentation of the current threat(s) to security involves at its core the 
construction of an enemy that is distinguished from 'us' not in terms of a political 
opposition but through its inability or unwillingness to share the vision of the world 
articulated above. It is vital that security strategy documents provide the space to set 
out this vision as it allows for the subsequent construction of an enemy understood as 
its antithesis.
Security strategy documents provide space for the official understanding of the 
threat to be set out definitively on a depoliticised terrain framed by the distinction 
between two eras. The ability to locate the threat historically and politically has a 
fundamental effect on the content of the counter-terrorism strategy that has become 
more pronounced in the most recent developments. One of the key revisions to the 
UK counter-terrorism strategy in 2009 was the addition of a 'detailed account of the 
history of the terrorist threat to the UK, explaining what led to the emergence of the 
threat we face today. It also theorises as to how the situation may evolve in the
0 o ^^
coming years' . The provision of such a historical analysis arguably allows the state 
unrivalled control over defining the current threat that is crucial to the justification of 
the response.
The historical account provided affirms the dominant diagnosis that the threat 
is driven solely by a 'violent extremist ideology' 29 and in this sense this further 
reinforces the notion of a post-political era. This is reinforced through a selective 
account that attributes no western involvement with, or incitement of, any of the 
factions of the terrorist threat. The threat is identified by a shared attachment to Islam
28 Home Office "Taking a new approach to counter-terrorism", March 23, 2009, accessed April 25, 
2011, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/news/taking-new-approach-ct
29Gordon Brown, Foreword to Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare 2009 by HM Government, 4
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and only really tied together in the contemporary era by the Al Qaida 'organisation'. 
This account serves by way of an introduction, to homogenise and thus depoliticise 
the whole range of movements and causes that are lumped together under the banner 
of international terrorism. The fact that the only common link is supposedly provided 
by Al Qaida and their 'extremist ideology' further dismisses the idea of coherent 
grievances deriving from common causal factors. The history of western military, 
political and economic involvement in the Middle East is not part of the history of the 
evolution of the contemporary terrorist threat. The role of UK foreign policy in 
inciting the terrorist threat does appear to be acknowledged but instead this 
connection is restricted to 'perceptions' 30 of foreign policy. By formulating views of 
western foreign policy as 'perceptions' the suggestion is made that all such views are 
unfounded31 . This provision of a selective and favourable historical account alleviates 
the west of any involvement in the development of the contemporary terrorist threat 
and thus essentially depoliticises the response of those groups defined as 'terrorist'. 
Ultimately, this historical analysis is set in opposition to the 'fabricated narrative of 
contemporary politics and recent history' 32 that is said to be at the root of an extremist 
ideology33 .
This account is reinforced by the continued emphasis on the distinctive nature 
of the contemporary terrorist movement in contrast to that faced in previous decades. 
The previous threat is presented as having been manageable through conventional 
methods and distinct in motivations and strategy from the modern threat that 'is intent
30 HM Government, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare 2009, 9
31 The FCO is undertaking a major program of foreign policy outreach to domestic Muslim 
communities. Led by the Foreign Secretary, 'Bringing Foreign Policy Back Home' is a campaign to 
debate and explain foreign policies to 'challenging audiences'. These challenging audiences include 
domestic Muslim populations who harbour these apparent 'misunderstandings about UK foreign policy 
that give rise to perceptions of grievances. The US have also more recently expressed a need to 'do a 
better job of explaining US policies to foreign publics and debunking myths about the United States' 
See, Daniel Benjamin, US Government's Efforts To Counter Violent Extremism, Testimony Before the 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 
10th 2010, accessed May 11, 2011, http://www.state.gOv/s/ct/rls/rm/2010/138175.htm. The problem 
clearly is that 'foreign' populations just don't understand Western foreign policy.
32 HM Government, Channel: Supporting individuals vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists: A 
guide for local partnerships, (London: HMSO, 2010) 10.
33 The US Strategy for Combating Terrorism presents the extremists' worldview as underpinned by a 
'subculture of misinformation and conspiracy'. Executive Office of the President United States, 
National Strategy for Countering Terrorism, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006) 10.
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on inflicting mass casualties without warning, motivated by an extremist ideology' 34 . 
The distinction between 'old' and 'new' terrorism is based on the partial 
acknowledgement of the political goal and resulting political status of previous threats 
that is now conclusively absent in the modern threat35 . This distinction is based on a 
distinctly revisionist account of previous terrorism that allows the current strategy to 
attribute to it a political cause. This marks a fundamental departure from the official 
line on the IRA in the 1970s and 1980s for example that was defined predominantly 
through a process of criminalization36 . This revised understanding of past terrorist 
movements allows the UK government to point toward a relationship between the 
devolution of powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly and the decline of terrorist 
groups in this context. Most importantly, it also allows them to depoliticize and 
discredit all dissident Republican groups that continue to oppose the post-Good 
Friday Agreement arrangement in Northern Ireland.
The emphasis on the political nature of the 'old' terrorism accompanied by an 
emphasis on the shift to a new and distinct contemporary form, serves to further 
depoliticize the present threat and sustain the formulation of the two eras that frames 
security strategy. Accordingly, we had a political and to some extent 'legitimate' 
terrorism that was confronted (and ultimately defeated or placated) in previous 
decades and this stands in stark contrast to a new terrorism driven exclusively by a 
violent extremist ideology underpinned by a religious fundamentalism. The 
culturalization of contemporary international terrorism in security strategy is both 
explicit and comprehensive. The religious ideology that supposedly underpins all 
contemporary terrorist activity is understood as apolitical because it stands outside of
34 Brown, Foreword to Foreword to Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare 2009 by HM Government. See 
also, Robert Cornall, 2006, "International Responses to a Changing Security Environment", speech by 
Robert Cornall, Secretary, Attorney-General's Department, May 9, accessed April 25, 2011, 
http://www.oilforfoodinquiry.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/AbouttheDepartment_Speeches_2006_Int 
ernationalresponsestoachangingsecurityenvironment.html
35 Robert Cornall, secretary, Attorney General's Department (Australia) described several differences 
between 'old' and new terrorism. His final point was presented as follows: The final point of difference 
is that those earlier attacks were intended to achieve a political objective and not just the random killing 
of innocent citizens in pursuit of an imprecise jihad against Western countries and their values. This 
political definition gave their attacks some structure and predictability. Today's terrorist threat is very 
different'. Cornall, "International Responses to a Changing Security Environment"
36 Most specifically this was evident from 1976 and the removal of special category status for 
Republican prisoners, but was further reinforced under Thatcher emblemised through her mantra that 
'there is no such thing as political murder, political bombing, or political violence. There is only 
criminal murder, criminal bombing, and criminal violence', Margaret Thatcher quoted in Timothy 
Shanahan, The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Morality of Terr or ism, (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2008) 172.
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what constitutes politics in the liberal framework. Official strategy reinforces the idea 
of the fanatic central to Walzer's account (and shared by so many of his 
contemporaries) of the current terrorist threat. This construction creates what Toscano 
has described as a 'spurious form of political simplification, an ersatz intelligibility
 5 *y
that leaves us none the wiser about religious politics and global conflicts' . It is 
precisely the aim of security strategy to keep us in this state of ignorance.
UK strategy sets out four strategic factors that have led to the emergence of 
the contemporary international terrorist threat: conflict and instability, ideology; 
technology; and radicalisation. This framing of the drivers of international terrorism is 
broadly illustrative of a shared understanding between the UK, Australia and the US. 
The acknowledgement of the relationship between conflict, instability and terrorism 
involves recognition that contemporary international terrorism 'is specifically
oo
connected to disputes and conflicts which involve Muslims and the Islamic world' . 
While this involves recognition of the relationship between disputes and instability in 
countries such as Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq and the present 'international 
terrorism', the history of western involvement in these countries is not acknowledged. 
The denial of the history of western interference in these three countries among others 
serves to maintain the pretence that grievances with western foreign policy are based 
wholly on unfounded perceptions.
The concept of an ideologically generated and led terrorist movement is tied 
firmly to Al Qaida and radical Islam:
This ideology challenges the legitimacy of Israel and claims that western 
states sustain 'un-Islamic" governments and are engaged in a global attack on 
Islam. It therefore tries to turn grievances about specific regional issues into 
grievances about the West39 .
The connections between conflict and instability in Palestine and the challenge to 
Israel are not explored. Grievances about the West in the Islamic world are presented 
as the result of a fabrication by extremists seeking to exploit 'regional issues' and 
'force local events into a global narrative' 40 . By formulating the wealth of grievances
37Toscano, Fanaticism, 101
38HM Government, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare 2009, 39 
39HM Government, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare 2009, 40 
40HM Government, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare 2009, 41
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in this way the account presents them as separate local concerns that have no broader 
global political connection or significance. The use of the concept of radicalisation as 
a general theme for all dissenting voices in this arena serves to delegitimate critique 
and construct every act defined as terrorism as the apolitical response of unstable and 
irrational individuals who depend on a 'extremist ideology' drawn from a 'distorted' 
interpretation of Islam. In effect, this formulation of the 'mindset' of the terrorist 
involves a mirroring of a distinctly unilateralistic presentation of opposing forces in 
the 'war on terror'. Both sides seek to present the other as operating without 
provocation; detached from one another in their respective projects, justifying their 
intervention without acknowledgement of their interrelationship. For example, the 
current round of counter-terrorism strategy is at pains to explain that the terrorist 
ideology is 'based upon a selective interpretation of Islam, contemporary politics and 
history' 41 . Yet at the same time much of the work of counter-terrorism strategy is 
devoted to setting out a selective account of contemporary politics and history that has 
itself a vital depoliticising function. The 'war on terror' is defined by an opposition 
between sides who seek, at the core of their approach, to depoliticise the other.
As the terrorist threat is presented in a way that reaffirms the existence of two 
eras, the possibility of the terrorist providing a political opposition is denied. The 
distinction is defined here on the basis of their position vis-a-vis human rights. The 
construction of an enemy in this way serves two purposes: to maintain the 
depoliticised framing and to legitimise the state's response. The legitimacy of security 
strategy is dependent on the maintenance of the fa9ade of an absence of politics both 
in terms of the threat and the response.
Defining/dehumanising the external enemy
The 'war on terror' was declared a war for human rights by Donald Rumsfeld in 2002 
and this idea has (despite a partial withdrawal from emphasis on the notion of war} 
continued to infuse counter-terrorism and national security strategy. The concept of 
war infused with, or underpinned by, human rights norms is integral to the distinction 
between the war against terrorism and the 'war' waged by the terrorist. Obama's
41 HM Government, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare 2009, 44
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Nobel Prize acceptance speech in 2009 set out the distinction between a just war and a 
holy war that is integral to this distinction:
These extremists are not the first to kill in the name of God; the cruelties of the 
Crusades are amply recorded. But they remind us that no Holy War can ever 
be a just war. For if you truly believe that you are carrying out divine will, 
then there is no need for restraint42 .
The mystification of the unlimited violence permitted in a just war is secured in this 
distinction.
The terrorist here is distinguished on the basis of its rejection of human rights 
and also on the basis of its religious or cultural motivation that is in stark contrast to 
the secular liberal tradition underpinned instead by a commitment to the rule of law. 
A just war is here defined by restraint and it is through this stark misrepresentation 
that the 'war on terror' continues to be presented reinforcing again a distinction with 
the enemy who is devoid of a framework of regulation. The mystification of just war 
is compounded by the assertion that it alone is the form of war compatible with peace 
and peace is conditional on the respect for human rights. Walzer's 'assistance' to the 
state's rethinking of war is as clear in counter-terrorism strategy as it is in Obama's 
Nobel lecture and the depoliticisation of the 'war on terror' is here clearly 
compounded through the dominance of human rights.
The humanitarian character of the 'war on terror' is opposed to the religious 
'war' waged by the fanatical terrorist. But the analysis of Walzer and Ignatieff above 
has illustrated that a just war does in fact provide the orchestrator with a sense of 
'divine will' that withdraws the requirement for restraint. Despite this, or more 
accurately because of this, the notion of regulation is a continuing theme throughout 
security strategy seeking to emphasis both the distinction between 'us' and 'them' (we 
self-regulate they do not) and to legitimize the state's response as one that conforms 
to the rule of law.
NSS documents in the UK, Australia and the US devote significant space to 
set out a framework for regulation that is seemingly the definitive feature of 
contemporary security strategy. It is here that human rights have their fundamental 
role; to ground the approach to security and keep it within the parameters demanded
42 Barack Obama, 2009. A Just and Lasting Peace, Nobel Lecture, Oslo, Norway, December 10, 
accessed May 5, 2011, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html
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in a liberal democracy. Security strategy - and even more so counter-terrorism 
strategy - is said to be 'governed' by human rights and the rule of law43 . Commitment 
to international regulation through the UN and compatibility with ECHR are 
presented as markers of the self-imposed regulation that defines security strategy and 
it is through international and domestic law (including human rights law) that security 
strategy is to be restrained. The emphasis on the legal regulation of security policy is 
an omnipresent feature of security strategy and has increasingly become the 
predominant message relayed through these documents.
The response to security, and most notably the response to terrorism, is 
presented as a legal response that sits comfortably within a commitment to the rule of 
law and in the UK, alongside human rights law. While the novelty of the threat has 
necessitated changes to laws - ostensibly to allow the state to adapt and respond as 
required - there exists a continual emphasis on the fact that such revisions have 
remained within the parameters of what is expected of a liberal democracy44 . As with 
the commitment to balance, the regulation of security policy is presented as a 
condition of its success. The commitment to 'core values' and 'guiding principles' is 
at its core an attempt to illustrate conformity to liberal principles of which human 
rights and the rule of law are universally accepted (across UK, Australian and US 
NSS) as the foundation of effective and appropriate security strategy.
More recent strategy documents have been utilised to set out a program of 
'reform' within that has been based on attending to the existing security regime 
established under a previous administration45 . The emphasis here is on ensuring that 
enhanced regulation is imposed so that the approach to security can be more clearly 
(re)accommodated within the domestic and international legal system. Criticism of 
previous regimes is focussed on the apparent inability or unwillingness to orchestrate 
a security and counter-terrorism strategy that remained at all times under an effective 
framework of regulation. The proposed changes seek to return security strategy to its
43 HM Government, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare 2009, 7
44 'Our response has included changes to our laws to reflect the threat we face, but has at all times 
upheld the principles and values of the UK as a liberal democracy'. HM Government, Pursue Prevent 
Protect Prepare 2009, 17
45 This is most notable in the Obama and Rudd administration's critique of their predecessors but also 
is a central point of the UK Coalition government agreement of 2010 that sought to 'introduce 
safeguards against the misuse of anti-terrorism legislation'. See, HM Government, Review of Counter- 
Terrorism and Security Powers: Review Findings and Recommendations, (London: The Stationery 
Office, 2011)4.
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rightful place within the 'legitimate' legal system46 through which the introduction 
and operation of new (and existing) powers will be more effectively restrained by law 
and overseen to ensure transparency. Despite an emphasis on regulation having been a 
continual feature of security strategies there has been a distinction drawn between 
'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' 47 legal frameworks within which the revised security 
agenda initiated by these 'reformers' is, unlike their predecessors, regulated to the 
standard demanded in a liberal democracy.
In line with the academic debate on the liberty-security relationship, criticism 
of the existing security regime is based on its supposedly 'illiberal' transcendence of 
the framework of legal regulation. There remains an unwillingness to accept that 
security strategy employed in the post 9/11 era has transcended the law. The issue is 
with illegitimate regulation as opposed to a lack of regulation in the same sense these 
criticisms assert not that balance was absent in previous strategy but that the wrong 
balance was struck48 . This approach prevents the critique aimed at previous 
administrations from having to accept that exceptional measures imposed in the name 
of security have been outside the law. The nature of this criticism is actually essential 
for those 'reformers' given that their reform is largely ineffectual in terms of the 
substantive features of the security policy. Critique remains rhetorical, confined to 
security strategy documents and seemingly incapable of affecting actual policy49 . 
Reform is exclusively a project aimed at (formally) returning security strategy to the 
liberal terrain defined by the rule of law. This is predominantly a process of imposing 
enhanced oversight of security powers while the continual 'evolution' of the legal 
structures that define security strategy is not put on hold by increasing regulation.
46 See, Australian Government, Counter-Terrorism White Paper 2010, 56.
47 'The decisions made over the last eight years established an ad hoc legal approach for fighting 
terrorism that was neither effective nor sustainable - a framework that failed to rely on our legal 
tradition and time tested institution; that failed to use our values as a compass' . See, Barack Obama, 
2009, Remarks of President Barack Obama - As Prepared for Delivery Protecting Our Security and Our 
Values, National Archives Museum, May 21, 2009, accessed April 18, 2011, 
http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/May/20090521112349eaifas0.6532862.html.
48 The UK Coalition government produced a Green Paper in 2011 that sought to reconsider the 
'difficult' balances that security strategy demands. See, HM Government, Safety and Justice Green 
Paper, (London: HMSO, 2011). This reconsideration is at the core of the new government's response 
to the 'failures' of the New Labour administration and their subsequent 'change of course'. National 
Security Strategy of the United Kingdom 2010,4
49 See here the Rudd government's continuation of the National Counter Terrorism Plan in Australia 
introduced under John Howard, the UK Coalition government's adoption of the Pursue Prevent Protect 
Prepare strategy and Obama's failure to close Guantanamo or substantively change tack in his 
response to overseas intervention.
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There remains a commitment to developing the law to take account of the new and 
continually changing security threat but this seemingly eternal project must be held to 
account through increased oversight and review processes. Transparency is posited as 
a key 'guiding principle' understood to be an integral aspect of the rule of law and the 
concern with increased oversight and continual review of security powers is another 
omnipresent feature of NSS and counter-terrorism strategy.
The enhanced framework for review of security policy (again here the 
emphasis is on counter-terrorism) is posited as a reform that allows for continual 
assessment of the proportionality of security powers (arguably emphasised in more 
recent strategies to placate the criticisms of such powers). However, there remains an 
assertion that whilst the review process has the potential to impose further regulation 
and restraint of security powers, it also leaves the door open to 'any further need to 
expand them or tailor them to deal with any changes in the nature of the threat in the 
future' 50 . Enhanced 'regulation' in this sense does not seek to limit what the state can 
do in the name of security; it serves only to (re)emphasize the commitment to 
regulation that is the definitive feature of liberal security discourse.
As set out in security strategies, regulation (including here the proposed 
reforms) is based both on commitment to (or return to) liberalism and the assertion 
that regulation is itself a driver of security. The rule of law and human rights are, as 
noted in relation to balance, posited as central conditions of effective security 
strategy. The international strength and influence of liberal democracies is said to be 
based on the commitment to 'democracy, human rights and the rule of law' 51 and 
respect for the rule of law and human rights in turn drive stability, security and 
success52 . Through this formulation the desire for increased regulation does not 
necessarily reverse the prioritisation of security over liberty that has been the feature 
of so many criticisms of security strategy. The rhetorical commitment to regulation is 
not a new feature - indeed it has been a central component of both NSS and counter- 
terrorism strategy in the post 9/11 era - but the increased emphasis on regulation in 
more recent strategy allows for an audible response to critique and the presentation of 
a renewed commitment to liberalism. At the same time this renewed 'commitment'
50 Australian Counter-Terrorism White Paper 2010, iv
51 National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2010, 2
52 National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2010, 36
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allows for the preservation of current priorities within the liberty-security regime and 
the maintenance of the same security agenda as well as the total avoidance of the 
question of exception.
The commitment to regulation is ultimately about defining the liberal 
character of the approach to security and more specifically in the current era, the 
liberal character of the 'war on terror' that serves to set up the distinction between the 
liberal and the illiberal terrorist. Daily observation illustrates the great gap between 
the rhetorical commitment to regulation and the reality of the 'war on terror' but the 
emphasis on human rights and legal regulation throughout these documents is 
essential to maintain the distinction between "us" and "them" as well as to set up a 
depoliticised notion of war that allows for the most extreme violence to be employed 
in the name of security.
This process is further compounded by a universal commitment to tolerance53 . 
Terrorists are incapable of tolerance as much as they are incapable of operating within 
parameters set by human rights. The state response is to emphasize the commitment to 
this value (among others) to reinforce the distinction between those seeking security 
and those who resort to terrorism as well as to stress the liberal nature of the security 
regime if we understand tolerance as a, if not the, central liberal value.
Tolerance discourse has the effect of framing a multitude of problems as ones 
of (in)tolerance as opposed to inequality, exploitation and injustice. This is achieved 
through the liberal emphasis on (and commitment to) the culturalization of politics54 
through which politics is effaced and cultural differences are instead emphasized 
withdrawing any potential for political conflict:
53 Tolerance is listed as one of the core values of the approach to security in every UK National 
Security Strategy (2008, 2009, 2010) and UK counter-terrorism strategy (2009), in US National 
Security Strategy under Bush and Obama (2002, 2010) and in US counter terrorism strategy (2003, 
2006). There is no mention of tolerance in the Australian security documents in focus here but it has a 
central place in ancillary security documents in Australia. The Australian National Action Plan 
designed to 'reinforce social cohesion, harmony and support the national security imperative in 
Australia by addressing extremism, the promotion of violence and intolerance, in response to the 
increased threat of global religious and political terrorism' has as one of its central aims the 
encouragement of tolerance. See, Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 
2005, A National Action Plan to Build on Social Cohesion, Harmony and Security, accessed May 8, 
2011, http://www.immi.gov.au/living-in-australia/a-multicultural-australia/national-action- 
plan/nap.htm
54 See, Brown, Regulating Aversion; Slavoj Zizek, "Tolerance as an Ideological Category", Critical 
Inquiry, Autumn 2007, accessed May 9, 2011, http://www.lacan.com/Zizek-inquiry.html
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Political differences, differences conditioned by political inequality, economic 
exploitation, etc., are naturalized/neutralized into "cultural" differences, 
different "ways of life," which are something given, something that cannot be 
overcome, but merely "tolerated" 55 .
The commitment to tolerance so central to contemporary security strategy gives rise 
to an obligation on the state to challenge those who promote intolerance56 and it is 
here, given the status of terrorism as the ultimate expression of intolerance, that the 
rationale for counter-terrorism is reaffirmed. International terrorism faced in the 
current epoch is understood to be based on a 'violent and intolerant distortion of 
Islam' 57 and through such an understanding the notion of (in)tolerance sits within a 
framing of terrorism defined exclusively through culture58 . That the culturalization of 
politics fosters depoliticisation in the context of the contemporary liberal approach to 
security and counter-terrorism has been illustrated above in reference to the 
presentation of terrorism by the liberal intellectual. The notion of terrorism driven 
exclusively by religion (read here Islam) is all pervasive in contemporary security 
strategy set out most clearly in the 'historical analysis' of the new threat and it is 
against this backdrop that the discourse of tolerance has its crucial contribution to the 
depoliticisation of security strategy.
Tolerance is understood in liberalism to be the reserve of the West; it is 
considered to be synonymous with liberal democracy, with Enlightenment and 
modernity and crucially in this sense, it serves to further distinguish "us" from 
"them"59 . The crude distribution of tolerance in security strategy ("we" have it, they 
don't) serves to refine the liberal character of the West's response to terrorism and as 
a consequence the intolerant terrorist is marked out further as an aberration, 
definitively opposed to the liberal West. Moreover, marking the terrorist out to be 
driven by religion and an alien culture is a clear reflection of the process whereby 
'non-liberal polities are depicted as "ruled" by culture and religion' 60 . In stark contrast
55Zizek, "Tolerance as an Ideological Category", 1
56 HM Government, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare 2009, 87
57 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2006, 5
58 This understanding of terrorism in the current epoch framed exclusively by Islam (or an 
interpretation of it) is universal across NSS in the three countries in focus here and certainly not 
restricted to them. It will be considered further in terms of its specific manifestations below.
59Brown, Regulating Aversion, 17 
60 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 171
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the liberal state is presented as being ruled only by law, an assertion that is again 
ubiquitous in security strategy. The 'war on terror' is presented as a war defined by 
religion which needs to be understood in the supposedly post-ideological context; 
ideology has been replaced by religion as the defining feature of twenty-first century 
oppositions. However, in its response the West does not posit an alternate religion, it 
responds through a secular, legally regulated strategy. Religion (much like ideology 
pre-1989) is only what defines "them".
The UK NSS seeks to challenge the 'climate of intolerance and distrust in 
which violence as a tool of political discourse becomes acceptable' 61 . This 
understanding of the relationship between intolerance and violence is indicative of the 
fact that intolerance has become a 'code-word..... .for fundamentalism identified with
the non-west, with barbarism and with anti-Western violence' 62 . The 'climate of 
intolerance' is in this sense associated with the Islamic terrorist who focuses their 
intolerance toward the West. The terrorists' 'intolerance' is understood to be entirely 
irrational, driven by culture and religion and indicative of the void between the 
opposing forces in the 'war on terror'. Through this interpretation the distinction 
between these opposing sides cannot be overcome nor can it be contested politically; 
it is reduced to cultural difference, the response to which can only be tolerance.
The opposition between the tolerant and the intolerant that frames security 
strategy (with particular emphasis in relation to counter-terrorism) involves, according 
to Wendy Brown, a fusion of the 19th century opposition between the civilized and the 
primitive and the Cold War opposition between freedom and tyranny, given that 
tolerance is aligned in contemporary liberal discourse with civilization and freedom 
and intolerance equated with fundamentalism and barbarism63 . In contemporary 
security strategy (considering the UK, Australia and the US) the concept of 
civilization is given explicit acknowledgement only in the earlier Bush era US NSS 
(2002). In this document terrorism is positioned clearly as the 'enemy of 
civilization' 64 but the proclamation of an opposition between civilization and 
barbarism has on first inspection been withdrawn from subsequent security strategy in 
the three countries in focus here. However, if one understands that 'tolerance and
61 National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom 2009, 78
62 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 16
63 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 6
64 National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002: v
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civilization not only entail one another but mutually define what is outside of both' 65 
the continued commitment to tolerance in current security strategy suggests that its 
employment serves to sustain the opposition as the backdrop for security strategy and 
more specifically for the 'war on terror'. The political is associated with barbarism, in 
this sense aligned with the previous age and civilization remains the reserve of the 
ostensibly apolitical liberal. Political conflict is effaced; the irreducible confrontation 
is instead between those with the capacity for tolerance (the civilized) and those 
without (the barbaric).
If we understand that the governmentality of tolerance as it circulates through 
civilizational discourse has as part of its work 'the containment of the (organicist, 
non-Western, non-liberal) Other' 66 , then the role of tolerance in security strategy 
becomes clearer; it serves to delineate the defining oppositions that apparently colour 
the current security environment. That the opposing forces are non-Western and non- 
liberal is to be taken as given against the back drop of a culturalized framing of 
terrorism. However, the notion of an organicist Other defined through the notion of 
tolerance has wider implications. Here, we must understand that tolerance in liberal 
discourse can only be generated by autonomous individuals and thus those who are 
intolerant are defined by their rejection of (liberal) individualism. The rule by culture 
and/or religion that defines the intolerant, and in our case definitively marks the 
contemporary international terrorist, illustrates their opposition to and devaluation of 
the autonomous individual. The liberal individual is itself naturalized, posited as a 
universal norm that only the non-political fundamentalist would seek to challenge.
The utility of the alignment of tolerance in security strategy with human rights 
is here illustrated more clearly when one considers how the discourse of tolerance 
compounds the process whereby any collective identity or collective will is dismissed 
as an evil. Collective identity is presented as the sole reserve of the non-liberal 
intolerant other. In a circular fashion their intolerance is a product of their collective 
identity and their intolerance compounds their rejection of liberal individualism. It is 
ultimately this devaluation of the autonomous individual that defines the intolerant as 
so opposed to the liberal model that it is to be understood as intolerable. In this 
formulation liberalism becomes the 'only political rationality that can produce the
65 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 182
66 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 166
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individual, societal and governmental practice of tolerance and at the same time 
liberal societies become the brokers of what is tolerable and intolerable' 67 . This 
monopoly over the brokerage of tolerance arguably influences the formulation of 
security strategy and has lead to tolerance becoming such a core value in NSS and the 
approach to counter-terrorism. It has allowed the liberal state to define terrorism 
through the cultural difference and to posit tolerance as the only possible mediating 
force. By way of illustration, the primacy of the individual in current security politics 
is reinforced in the UK NSS 2009 as the discussion moves swiftly from its 
denouncement of intolerance to its defense of the commitment to individual privacy 
as a central principle of a liberal democracy. The emphasis on privacy cannot be 
separated from the emphasis on human rights and tolerance in security strategy as it is 
serves to reinforce the centrality of the autonomous individual. Indeed, individual 
privacy, or in Zizek's terms, the freedom from harassment, to be kept at a safe
SQ
distance, has become the 'central human right of advanced capitalist society' . 
Tolerance in this sense is understood to reinforce the distance between individuals; 
'the other is welcomed insofar as its presence is not intrusive, insofar as it is not really 
the other' 69 .
Framing security strategy through tolerance serves to distinguish the 'free' 
from the 'fundamentalist'. It serves to defend this boundary and render it 
insurmountable. Political conflict is denied and any true politics is effaced. The 
backdrop to security strategy - the opposition not between cultures or civilisations but 
between secular liberalism and the religious fundamentalist - is comprehensively 
depoliticised removing any formal consideration of a political response to terrorism 
from the security agenda. However, it is crucial at this stage to acknowledge that by 
framing the terrorist as intolerant and equating intolerance as a byword for 
fundamentalism and anti-western violence the terrorist is depicted as intolerable70 . 
From this premise the response to terrorism is justified in summoning the most
67 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 166
68 Slavoj Zizek, "Against Human Rights", New Left Review 34, July-August 2005, 120.115-131
69Zizek "Against Human Rights", 120
70 'In short, with our friends and allies, we aim to establish a new international norm regarding 
terrorism requiring non-support, non-tolerance, and active opposition to terrorists'. US National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003, 24.
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extreme violence to oppose a threat that is both incapable of being tolerated and 
unable to be met by politics.
Security strategy is built on the continued refinement of the essential 
opposition between 'us' and 'them' defined by whichever specific opposition is most 
convenient in each given area of emphasis. Essentially, this opposition is reduced to 
the liberal/illiberal and equated to the human/inhuman opening up the possibility of a 
'war' of extreme violence. The emphasis on tolerance and the confrontation with the 
intolerant expands this further to build on notions of 'just war' and humanitarian 
intervention that have been shown above to legitimate what in practice is an 
abdication of all regulation and restraint. The emphasis on human rights and tolerance 
allow for the isolation of an external enemy with whom a confrontation will be 
characterised by the legitimate rolling back of civilisation principles and restraint 
ostensibly provided by human rights. The external threat is dehumanised leaving the 
state free to summon whatever force is available.
Criminalising the internal threat
The construction and definition of the external threat has been an integral part of the 
post-911 approach to security. Since its beginning, the 'war on terror' has relied on 
this thinly veiled construction to legitimate the interventionist strategies and provide a 
legitimising gloss to the broader politics of security. Yet in recent years there has been 
an intensification of the internal components of this 'war' as it has been increasingly 
directed at those within the nations at the forefront of the fight against terrorism. This 
internal component has been couched in the language of counter-radicalisation and 
has been to a large extent developed along the lines of the UK model. The concern 
here has been with the identification of an internal enemy supposedly revealed 
through the domestic terrorist attacks orchestrated by those with citizenship in the 
target nation. The London bombings of 7th July 2005 have been presented as the 
prime example of this internal threat and the approach to radicalisation and extremism 
has developed significantly since71 . The potential for the 'war on terror' to assume an 
internal policing role (if indeed this can be separated) raises questions about the 
diffusion of the logic of security throughout state institutions and civil society.
71 The UK counter-radicalisation strategy 'Prevent' was formally developed after 2005.
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UK and Australian counter-terrorism strategies now share an emphasis on 
'radicalisation' and violent extremism understood to be the most important strategic 
factors in the encouragement of terrorism and thus a predominant focus in current
m
strategy . In response, UK strategy presents and discusses the 'causes' of 
radicalisation in some detail as the backdrop to a counter-radicalisation strategy that 
forms a significant component of counter-terrorism work. The UK approach to 
(counter-)radicalisation has been cited as a model toward which the Australian
*T\
government has sought to develop their approach and more recently the US have 
cited both UK and Australian counter-radicalisation programmes as 'possible 
templates' for the development of a US counter violent extremism strategy74 . That 
counter-radicalisation has become such a prominent part of counter-terrorism is 
logical given the official understanding of terrorism fuelled predominantly (if not 
exclusively) by a radical, fundamentalist ideology.
The 'analysis' of radicalisation involves a continued confrontation with and 
rebuttal of the perceptions of western foreign policy that are understood to be at the 
core of the radicalised individual who is in turn 'vulnerable' to the lure of terrorist 
movements. Beyond those grievances that underpin the radicalised subject there exists
72 The US have been slow to take up the idea of a specific counter-radicalisation strategy or strategy to 
counter violent extremism but under the Obama administration efforts have been made to establish 
such a programme with domestic and international projects. See, Benjamin, US Government's Efforts 
To Counter Violent Extremism.
73 The Howard era approach to radicalisation shared much with the UK policy in its apparent drive to 
delegitimise opposition to Western policy in the Islamic world presenting it as radical and misguided. 
While the Rudd government proposed some sort of departure from the Howard era in its approach to 
the Islamic community, the continuation of legislation and planning suggests that the departure in the 
approach to Tadicalisation' was not substantive. The Rudd government's proposed point of departure 
was discussed more specifically in the immediate post-election period as the addition of 'effective 
social policy that enhances social cohesion and lessens the appeal of radical ideology' to sit alongside 
security policy. The proposed construction of such policy was said be informed by an analysis of the 
UK response. See, Angus Campbell, 2007, Home-Grown Terrorism in Australia: The Way Forward, 
speech at the Security in Government Conference December 7, accessed May 10, 2011, 
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf7V AP/(756EDFD270AD704EFOOC 15CF396D6111 )~SI 
G+2007+-+Panel+Discussion+-+Mr+Campbell.pdf/$file/SIG+2007+-+Panel+Discussion+- 
+Mr+Campbell .pdf
74 The UK and Australian models for countering extremism through 'challenging police work with 
diaspora communities' have been of particular interest to the US government. Benjamin, US 
Government's Efforts To Counter Violent Extremism, 4. Furthermore, the US Department of State 
currently (2010) have on detail a senior member from the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office's 
Counterterrorism Research Group from whom there is hope to gain 'greater understanding of the UK's 
experience with countering violent extremism as well as how the U.S. government can create effective, 
locally-targeted programmes and enhance its efforts to counter extremist narratives'. Benjamin, US 
Government's Efforts To Counter Violent Extremism, 4
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'a range of social and psychological factors' 75 that lead to radicalisation. This 
explanation focuses on the 'vulnerability' of individuals and points to 'a crisis in 
identity and, specifically, to a feeling of not belonging' 76 . The association of radical 
ideas with vulnerable individuals is reiterated in other government counter-terrorism 
policy statements77 reinforcing the idea that those who share any radical or 'extreme' 
ideas are vulnerable as a result of their psychological frailties. In this sense the 
extremist is aligned with the mentally ill as they are both outside of reason. It is this 
condition and resulting crisis of identity that give rise to a departure from the 
mainstream. This addition to the 'analysis' of radicalisation comprehensively 
depoliticises the 'radical' and positions these ideas firmly as characteristic of 
individual Muslims, Muslim families or the Muslim community more generally (the 
emphasis on the responsibility of the family and community is shared in Australian
•70
proposals ). This has the effect of discrediting the political and economic grievances 
previously mentioned and constructs the 'perceptions' of western and UK foreign 
policy as a result of the individual social and psychological issues attributed to 
Muslims7 . This employment of classic psychological positivism serves to explain 
radicalisation as the result of an internal issue within the Muslim community and 
more specifically, demonstrates the continued concern with the 'Arab and Muslim 
'mind" that Toscano notes has been a long-term concern of the Atlantic discourse on 
Islam80 . As a result in the official framing of radicalisation the Muslim community 
'suffers' from this infliction due to its lack of family ties, its composition of recent
o i
migrants and crucially, its member's psychological frailties .
75 Benjamin, US Government's Efforts To Counter Violent Extremism, 42
76Tufyal Choudhury, The Role of Muslim Identity and Politics in Radicalisation [A Study in Progress]. 
(London: Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007)
77Home Office. 2008. Government steps up the fight against extremism, December 10, accessed April 
24, 2011, http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/press-releases/government-fight-extremism
78 Campbell, Home-Grown Terrorism in Australia
79 The emphasis on psychological frailties is shared by Australian counter-terrorism strategy 
specifically in the focus on radicalisation.
80Toscano, Fanaticism, 162
81 The concern with the border security agenda is further legitimated here in the association made 
between recent migrants and the crisis of identity that leads to radicalisation. The association is at this 
point made between the Muslim community, migrant populations and radical views and this has the 
effect of associating the Muslim community with recent or unsettled immigration status as well as 
reaffirming the association of immigration and terrorism. Conclusively, this series of associations 
legitimates the current emphasis in security strategy on the Muslim community that in turn reinforces 
the depoliticisation that is grounded in the culturalization of security politics.
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The programme of counter-radicalisation work that sits in UK strategy in the 
Prevent component of UK counter-terrorism strategy (the component vaunted by the 
Australian government under Kevin Rudd) is diffused into all aspects government 
widening the state's policing of suspect populations. All local authorities have the 
accommodation of Prevent built into their 'performance framework' as the facilitation 
of this programme has been installed as an integral part of governance and an internal
oo _
measure of its success . Diffusing counter-terrorism work throughout government 
and public services is possible as a result of the fact that those orchestrating the 'war 
on terror' have sought to break 'old orthodoxies that once confined out
oo
counterterrorism efforts primarily to the criminal justice domain' . Releasing 
counter-terrorism from its confinement within the criminal justice system has been of 
great use in the 'war on terror' as it has enabled the blurring of the boundaries 
between policing and war; between domestic counter-terrorism and counter- 
insurgency in occupied territories, allowing for military adventures to be presented as 
counter-terrorism initiatives. However, presenting the fight against terrorism as not 
simply the work of the police (although of course vital to contemporary policing) has 
allowed such policing measures to expand beyond the criminal justice domain and 
infiltrate all aspects of government. The logic of security (and here counter-terrorism) 
has become all pervasive and seemingly all-consuming defining the work of a whole 
range of disparate institutions and services who are transformed through this new (or 
intensified) policing function.
In the first instance, counter-radicalisation is led by the police but it is not 
concerned with those in custody or even necessarily those guilty of criminality 
arguably marking it as a policing initiative designed to police ideas not (illegal) 
actions. The desire to silence critical thinking let alone political dissent is illustrated 
by the fact that those organisations expected to facilitate the monitoring and reporting 
of extremist ideas include schools, colleges and universities as well as children's 
services, health services, social workers and community groups. This project of
82 The diffusion of counter-terrorism measures across government was presented in the US National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003 as a means to 'maintain momentum' and 'keep the global war 
on terrorism in the forefront'. US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003, 19. As counter- 
radicalisation work is rolled out across local authorities there is evidence that the desire to 'maintain 
momentum' and sustain the prominence of the 'war on terrorism' remains a driving force behind 
counter-terrorism strategy.
83 US National Strategy for Countering Terrorism 2006, 1
137
countering extremism is a state project in the true sense. It unites a multitude of state 
institutions, illustrating Jessop's contention that the state is merely an 'institutional 
ensemble' 84 and also demonstrates the difficultly of marking clearly a state - civil 
society distinction in the case of security politics. The project is reliant on the 
collaboration of innumerable individuals, groups and institutions to assist the police 
(and assume their role) in the monitoring of ideas seemingly with no age group or 
place of sanctuary immune85 . The predominant focus of this component remains of 
course with the Muslim community and the teacher, lecturer or social worker must be 
especially diligent in relation to Muslim children/students but the climate of suspicion 
serves to further problematize or marginalise, and in several cases criminalise, 
dissenting voices.
The notions of radicalisation and extremism86 set against - or in opposition to 
- liberalism and liberal politics (defined again here through 'shared values') already 
infers a dangerous marginality in political terms. The discursive practice of 
designating ideas and populations as radical is in itself an act of depoliticisation and 
when compounded by this official 'analysis' the notion of radicalisation locates said
fi7ideas and populations outside the realm of legitimate politics . That the promotion of 
shared values is integral to countering violent extremism sets up an opposition in 
which extremism is defined by a rejection of liberal values. Non-liberal voices are 
here defined as extreme and thus illegitimate. Ultimately, these ideas are deemed to 
be non-political on account of their rejection of liberal values that define the current
84 Jessop, State Theory, 270
85 The effects of the policing of university students and the role of universities themselves in facilitating 
the surveillance and physical policing of suspect (Muslim) individuals and other dissenting voices is 
illustrated in the case of Rizwaan Sabir. Sabir's case illustrates the government's project of 
transforming lecturers (as well as school teachers and social workers etc) into informers and also 
illustrates how the willingness to quash political dissent inside these institutions has been intensified 
under the Prevent agenda. The treatment of academic Rod Thornton who attempted to expose the 
institutions complicity in this process is further evidence of the proliferation of the policing of ideas. 
See, Polly Curtis and Martin Hodgson. 2008. "Student researching al-Qaida tactics held for six days ", 
The Guardian, May 24, accessed April 24, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2008/may/24/highereducation.uk; Jeevan Vasagar. 2011. "Row 
after university suspends lecturer who criticized way student was treated", The Guardian, May 4, 
accessed May 11, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/201 l/may/04/nottingham-university- 
row-after-lecturer-suspended
86 The revised version of the UK counter-terrorism strategy (2009) expanded its remit from tackling 
violent extremism to tackling all forms of extremism illustrating more clearly the concern with extreme 
(non-liberal) politics.
87 The revised version of the UK counter terrorism strategy (published in March 2009) widened the 
focus of the Prevent section (focused on opposing violent extremism) to include the 'promotion of 
shared values' as well as (or more appropriately, integral to) opposing violent extremism.
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hegemonic understanding of politics. All politics have to subscribe to liberal 
principles to be accepted; a rejection of liberal values and hence liberal politics is 
tantamount to an abandonment of politics itself. In the current era the only available 
politics is liberal politics; the notion of politics defined by conflict between political 
positions is dead. The lack of a clear definition of what constitutes 'radicalism' and 
'extremism' (and indeed their conflation) allows for the delegitimisation, and in this 
framing criminalisation, of all ideas and actions that can be designated as such.
^^ OQ
The official presentation of extremist ideology and the flexibility of its 
definition provided by in official strategy have the ability to denounce all substantive 
political criticism of the current security agenda - as well as criticism of the current 
political and economic status quo - as extremist. The rejection of 'shared values' is 
sufficient to be labelled as an extremist; 'violence' is no longer a prerequisite. It has 
been illustrated above clearly that those who are unwilling to work on the terrain 
defined by human rights and tolerance are excluded from the political process, denied 
all political legitimacy. The attempt to undermine any of the 'core (liberal) values' is 
enough to be designated as, at the very least, 'vulnerable' to extremism (that is in 
itself enough stigma to be equivalent to a full diagnosis). Indeed, a personal opinion 
that illustrates an 'uncompromising rejection of the principle of the rule of law and the
OQ
authority of any elected Government in this country' is sufficient to be an indicator 
of (vulnerability to) extremism. A rejection of the legitimacy of liberal democracy or 
indeed a strident political critique of its failings is easily classified as 'extremist' 90 . 
The radical and the extremist are comprehensively depoliticised in security discourse 
and this has the ultimate effect of closing the door to all truly dissenting (non-liberal) 
voices. The utility of this formulation to the state is unquestionable.
88 'The terms 'moderate' and 'extremist' are at times defined in practice by the degree to which 
Muslims support or oppose central government or local authority policies' Arun Kundnani, Spooked: 
How not to prevent violent extremism, (London: Institute for Race Relations, 2009) 35. Given the large 
amount of funding available and its apparent conditionality on support for, and alignment with, 
government policy the 'moderates' are clearly those who conform to the state position.
89Kundnani, Spooked
90 Of the key factors that contribute to radicalisation, the Australian Counter Terrorism White Paper 
makes explicit that these include 'the identification with, and adoption of, particular ideologies and 
belief systems that are hostile to liberal democratic norms and values'. Australian Government. 
Counter-Terrorism White Paper, 66. The US Institute of Peace (established and funded by Congress) 
has defined 'cognitive radicalisation' (radicalisation that falls short of violent expression) by the 
refutation of 'the legitimacy of the existing social order' Lorenzo Vidino, Countering Radicalisation in 
America: Lessons from Europe- United States Institute of Peace Special Report, (Washington: United 
States Institute of Peace, 2010) 4.
139
The criminalisation of dissent in this form is essential because the radical 
seeks at its core to reverse the process of the culturalization of politics. The 
culturalization of terrorism through its exclusive alignment with Islam is at its most 
explicit in the work on radicalisation and extremism91 . Radicalisation is understood to 
be a 'cultural rejection of modernity, rooted in the misinterpreting of globalisation and 
modernisation as western impositions' 92 . The radical, through their 'misinterpretation' 
seeks to define globalisation and modernisation as conscious processes orchestrated - 
or at least assisted or fuelled - by western interests. This involves at its core the 
politicisation of processes - globalisation most explicitly - that are presented as 'self- 
regulating and implacable Force(s) of Nature' 93 . Radicalisation is 'seen as the 
politicisation of a cultural problem' 94 and thus has the potential to undo the work 
behind the current official presentation of terrorism defined as noted above by the 
culturalization of politics. This explicit politicisation is inherently dangerous to the 
liberal security agenda. It is opposed to a politics of security defined by 
depoliticisation and in response it must be depoliticised by the state to ensure it is 
suppressed. By reinforcing the non-negotiable liberal parameters imposed on 
contemporary politics the construction of the radical and the extremist are effectively 
cast out of the political arena safeguarding the depoliticised framing of terrorism. 
Depoliticisation is at its most apparent and is most necessary in direct response to 
explicit attempts at politicising security issues.
The official presentation of radicalisation exposes its opposition to liberalism 
at a deeper level in Australian strategy. Here the problem of radicalisation is that it 
discourages 'full participation in Australia's social and economic life' 95 illustrating 
that the opposition to liberalism posed by radicalisation cuts to the heart of the liberal 
production of the subject. Radicalisation prevents the subject from fulfilling their 
productive potential and clearly must be opposed. The concern with the
91 Counter-extremism work is ostensibly focused on all extremism but the allocation of funding has 
illustrated that it is exclusively focussed on Muslim communities. Indeed, local authorities have been 
'pressured to adopt 'Prevent' in direct proportion to the number of Muslims in the area'. Kundnani, 
Spooked, 10.
92 MI5 statement on radicalisation quoted in Kundnani, Spooked, 45m
93 Stuart Hall, "The Great Moving Nowhere Show", Marxism Today (Special Issue), 
November/December, (1998), 11. Hall made clear that this understanding of globalisation defined the 
New Labour project and underpinned the wider neoliberal presentation of global processes.
94Kundnani, Spooked, 45fn
95Australian Government. Counter-Terrorism White Paper, iv
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marginalisation of the radicalised Other is genuine but not driven by a concern with 
the participation of the individual in social and political life. The concern lies with the 
potential for the individual to opt out (or be lured out) of the economic system 
altogether; to refuse to contribute to the labour force and compromise the broader 
productivity of the capitalist system. Radicalisation does indeed pose a direct threat to 
the liberal (economic) system and counter-radicalisation becomes more pertinent once 
liberal state's realise that they have a problem with an 'internal enemy' 96 . The 
possibility of unproductive subjects outside the West is troubling, but the idea of 
internal forces who seek to reject the validity of the current domestic order in 
economic terms requires decisive action. This is a point noted explicitly in Australian 
strategy but implicated throughout the approach in the UK and US. Security is again 
confirmed as the supreme concept of the bourgeois system.
The battle of 'ideas'
The official response then seeks to return the radical to mainstream (liberal) politics 
by undermining extremist ideas and essentially by enforcing a convergence on liberal 
shared values. This process of cferadicalisation is facilitated by 'mainstream' or 
'moderate' voices that support the state in the central 'battle for ideas' that defines 
counter-radicalisation. These voices are selected on the basis that they essentially do 
not question - or are willing and able to extenuate - the culturalization of terrorism 
and extremism. In the UK the role of these voices and organisations is integral to 
counter-terrorism and explicit in current strategy. Such 'voices' include state funded 
organisations like The Quilliam Foundation (QF) whose mission is to 'challenge
96 The focus on counter-radicalisation and counter-extremism work has increased greatly in more 
recent years following an acknowledgement by governments that the threat is now internal as well as 
external. The London bombings (7/7/05) have been cited as evidence of this internal threat and the 
prospect of'locally generated attacks' by both UK and Australian governments: The UK government 
intensified their commitment to the Prevent section of their counter-terrorism strategy and its counter- 
radicalisation component in the updated version of UK counter-terrorism strategy in 2009; The 
Australian Counter-Terrorism White Paper 2010 noted that the threat had evolved since the last count- 
terrorism white paper in 2004 effected by the 'increase in the terrorist threat from people born or raised 
in Australia'. Australian Government. Counter-Terrorism White Paper, ii; Vidino has noted that 'the 
recent surge in American Muslims involved in terrorism has led U.S. authorities to question the long 
held assumption that American Muslims are immune to radicalisation, and to follow the example of 
other Western democracies in devising a comprehensive counter radicalisation strategy'. Vidino, 
Countering Radicalisation in America, 1
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extremism' and 'promote pluralism' 97 reinforcing from the outset the idea that the 
'war on terror' is defined through a series of oppositions of which the opposition 
between fundamentalism and pluralism is crucial98 . Counter-radicalisation in this 
guise serves only to enforce the dominant, official understanding of the causes and 
necessary responses to terrorism. The causes remain confined to the Muslim 
community (domestically and internationally) and QF advocates that the response to 
extremism should at its core involve 'a more self-critical approach (to) be adopted by 
Muslims' in which 'Westophobic ideological influences and social insularity needs to
OQbe challenged within Muslim communities by Muslims themselves' . These 
'moderate' voices justify the state's suggestion that 'some of our counter-terrorism 
powers will be disproportionately experienced by the Muslim community 100 and in 
the case of QF, their framing of the issue converges more so with Martin Amis' 
famous assertion that in the interest of security 'the Muslim community will have to 
suffer until it gets its house in order' 101 ; an idea that arguably sits behind the liberal 
state's position.
In addition to QF, the UK government have heavily funded 'roadshows of 
'mainstream Islamic scholarship' to tour Britain to 'counter extremist propaganda'
1 0*7
and 'denounce it as unlslamic" . These roadshows, clearly integral to the battle for 
ideas have been run by an organisation called 'The Radical Middle Way'. The 
dissolution of the term radical through its juxtaposition with the concept of a middle 
way is clearly intentional. The idea that radicals and extremists can be 'turned' by 
converging on a 'middle way' illustrates the depoliticising function of this 
organisation and its integral role in counter-terrorism strategy as well as pointing 
toward the convergence between official strategy and the liberal intellectual. There
97Quilliam Foundation. 2011. "About Us." Accessed May 15.http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/
98 The commitment to pluralism is itself another mode of depoliticisation given that the notion of a 
harmonious accommodation of different opinions and interests in pluralism serves to mask the 
innumerable power struggles that exist in any given society.
"Quilliam Foundation, "About Us.".
100 Hazel Blears (the then Home Office minister) quoted in Vikram Dodd and Alan Travis. 2005. 
"Muslims face increased stop and search", The Guardian, March 2. Accessed May 11, 2011 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/mar/02/terrorism.immigrationpolicyl
101 Martin Amis quoted in Terry Eagleton, "Rebuking obnoxious views is not just a personality kink", 




should be little surprise that the UK government is leading the way in counter- 
radicalisation strategy and sought after as a model to follow by the US and 
Australia103 .
The response to extremism remains best served by the state as these 'voices' 
fail (or arguably refuse on the basis of state funding) to question the state's monopoly 
over counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation. The broader solution to the problem 
of Islamic extremism advocated by these moderate voices is epitomised by the co- 
director of QF who has suggested a need for the creation of 'an apolitical western 
Islam' 104 . This chimes so clearly with the state's culturalized, depoliticised framing of 
international terrorism that the extensive funding channelled to QF, The Radical 
Middle Way and similar organisations is highly unsurprising. These organisations are 
the 'credible voices' that the UK government seeks to recruit as a key element of 
counter-terrorism to assist in the communication of policy. These 'communications' 
are directly opposed to and involved in the refutation of the propaganda of Al Qa'ida. 
Opposing communications to propaganda illustrates both strands of depoliticisation; 
the depoliticisation of terrorism and of counter-terrorism. The argument suggests that 
because of its reliance on a misrepresented and selective analysis of politics and 
history, and because ultimately it has no legitimate political claims, terrorism has to 
resort to propaganda. Yet the response to terrorism need not be dragged into a 
political battle, it instead posits a technical, bureaucratic response that involves simply 
effective communication of information (not ideology).
The idea that counter-terrorism can now be defined by a battle for ideas is not 
new. The development of a counter-radicalisation strategy along the lines set out 
above has become a major point of convergence for contemporary counter-terrorism 
strategy through which the UK, Australian and US government have been involved in 
a mutually beneficial, multi-directional exchange of policy ideas. The 'revised' 
approach to counter-terrorism with its predominant focus on counter-extremism 
measures is not however new to the 'war on terror'. The integral role of the 'war of 
ideas' was set out in US counter-terrorism strategy in 2003 and whilst the concept of 
counter-radicalisation was not used here, the emphasis on promoting 'values' as a
103 The extension of this model of counter-radicalisation at EU level is also well underway. See, COT 
et al. The EU Counterra dicalization Strategy. Evaluating EU policies concerning causes of 
radicalization. (The Hague: COT, 2008).
104Kundnani, Spooked, 36
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means to counter extreme ideas is clear 105 . The discourse now contains discussion of a 
'struggle over narratives' 106 between the west and the terrorists that maintains the 
opposition between 'their' ideology and 'our' values. A battle between narratives is 
but the most recent framing of an opposition that is essentially depoliticised and the 
central construction of the Islamic terrorist through the idea of the fanatic 
demonstrates its continued application as a 'remarkably resilient and adaptable 
weapon in a wide array of political and philosophical confrontations' 1 7 .
The conjunction of a battle of arms and a battle of ideas has been set out to 
define the 'war on terror' as 'different kind of war' 108 . This definition, in which 
terrorism will be fought on the (undefined) battlefield as well as being fought through 
the promotion of values, is accepted by the UK, Australia and US (and across each of 
the different administrations in these countries in the post 9/11 era) and serves 
fundamentally to frame counter-terrorism strategy. The mystification of war that is 
involved in the presentation of the 'war on terror' as in some way unique and novel 
compounds the processes of depoliticisation that at their core serve to obscure the fact 
that this is a war of extreme violence much as any other military project. The infusion 
of a battle of ideas serves essentially to delegitimise the terrorist 'narrative' and 
reinforce the legitimacy of this 'war' in its external and internal components as well 
as the legitimacy of the politics of security.
Security discourse needs to be understood as being underpinned by a popular 
racism that is mobilised by the state to divide those who are to be subjected to the new 
security and policing techniques introduced in the name of national security. The 
intensification of an already well established state-sanctioned Islamophobia after 9/11 
serves to reinforce the exclusion that is crucial to liberal security politics. Liberalism 
was founded on a logic of exclusion and the contemporary mobilisation of appeals to 
race and nation in the name of security is illustrative only of the liberal character of 
the current regime. Successive liberal governments of both right and left persuasions 
have seen, and realised, the potential in the recruitment of a popular racism to
105 President Obama has reiterated more recently that 'a campaign against extremism will not succeed 
with bullets and bombs alone' confirming the continuing need for a battle of ideas as well as reiterating 
the need for continuing military endeavours. See, Benjamin, US Government's Efforts To Counter 
Violent Extremism, 1
106 Benjamin, US Government's Efforts To Counter Violent Extremism, 2
107Toscano, Fanaticism, 249
108 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2006, 1
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reinforce the project of exclusion that defines security politics 109 . The focus on a 
specific 'suspect' population to justify increasingly repressive policing measures has 
always defined the police project and, as Losurdo demonstrates clearly, the history of 
liberalism is a history of racism with the liberal state playing a central role 110.Clearly 
then, the emphasis on Muslim populations at home and abroad does not signal a new 
approach for the liberal state but stands only as the clearest example of what A. 
Sivanandan has defined as a 'new state racism that promises to safeguard the patriot 
nation from the shadow enemy within' Ul . This is only the most recent form of the 
liberal state's conscious process to mark out a suspect population against which an 
appeal to the nation can be mounted and a loyalty to the state secured 112 .
The inauguration of a counter-radicalisation strategy complete with legal 
sanctions enhances the process of marginalising radical ideas and the 'suspect' 
populations who harbour them and initiates a formal process of criminalising the 
internal enemy. From the more recent 'realisation' of an internal threat (ostensibly 
from 2005 onwards) this process of criminalising the internal populations has been 
incorporated into the central project underway in the 'war on terror' which involves 
identifying and isolating an 'enemy'. The 'moderate voices' play a central role in the 
approach to radicalisation reinforcing, and clearly legitimising the official narrative 
and the subsequent state monopoly over the response. In this sense they serve a vital 
function in sustaining the main thrust of counter-radicalisation which is to criminalise 
dissent. The strategies of deradicalisation provide a convenient gloss to what is in 
reality a clear project of the state utilising its force to silence dissent.
The status of the enemy is further reinforced when one returns to the concept 
of balance and considers its dual function in security strategy. It is employed as 
detailed above to conflate liberty and security and provide for the prioritisation of 
security under the fagade of a commitment to liberty. However, the concept of
109This is clearly not new to the post 2001 era although in its focus on the Muslim community has 
intensified since 9/11. Poynting and Mason have made clear that in relation to the Muslim community 
this began in the post 1989 period not after September 2001. This reinforces the idea that the origins of 
the current approach to security need to be situated at the end of the short twentieth century as opposed 
to the beginning of the twenty-first. See, Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason, "The resistible rise of 
Islamophobia: Anti-Muslim racism in the UK and Australia before 11 September 2001," Journal of 
Sociology*!, 1(2007).
110Losurdo, Liberalism
111 A. Sivanandan in Graham Murray, "France: the riots and the Republic" Race& Class 47(2006) 36
112 "Deployed in the name of security, loyalty and identity help organise the political imagination 
around the state." Neocleous, Critique of Security, 141
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balance is employed in fact in this vein only to (at least formally) protect 'our' liberty; 
when it comes to the liberty of those designated as the enemy (externally and more 
specifically internally) the true nature of the balance metaphor is revealed. The 
confusing formulation of liberty and security in which they are both opposing 
concerns and interchangeable aims remains in part because of the hegemonic status of 
balance within liberalism - the liberal state like the liberal intellectual is seemingly 
unwilling or unable to conceive of any other approach - but also because the 
relationship between liberty and security does not imply an equal status for all those 
subject to security strategy. 'Our' liberty and security are indeed one and the same but 
the liberty of the enemy has to be balanced with the security of the nation. The agency 
implied in the use of the balance metaphor that Dworkin cited as his reason for 
abandoning the liberty-security balance is, in NSS, acknowledged and accepted.
This selective application of balance is, we are told, 'inherent in the business 
of intelligence and security' 113 within which the rights of those who pose a threat to 
security must be balanced against the 'rights of society as a whole to security and 
freedom' 114 . Clearly here the conflation of security and freedom - as well as the 
protection of freedoms as this is now conditional on the securitisation of rights - is a 
selective project not extended to those suspect populations identified in counter- 
terrorism strategy. The use of the balance metaphor allows for the restriction of the 
fundamental liberties of a select population and this process is of even greater 
importance in regard to the internal enemy. The notion of balance is used to justify the 
deportation of terrorism suspects to countries in which they face the risk of torture as 
the safety of the community is balanced against the risk to the individual 115 . The 
increased restrictions on movement through borders in the name of security is also 
justified on the basis that they are targeted at a 'minority' who pose a threat with the 
intention of allowing the free movement of 'the vast majority' 116 . Freedoms in these 
cases are not interconnected with security; indeed in these cases they are 
fundamentally opposed, presented as inversely proportional in the true sense of the 
idea of balance. At the same time as constructing freedom and security as 
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freedoms of select (suspect) individuals or populations and to reduce their 
commitment to 'core values' on the international stage when required by security 
strategy 117 . Balance stands as a key liberal tool as one would expect but it has a dual 
function: to reinforce the distinction between "us" and the enemy; and to legitimise 
the liberal state's response.
The deployment of balance is in part predicated on the dissolution of the 
domestic/international distinction in security. This distinction is however maintained 
through the construction of external and internal enemies. It is clear that the 
populations identified are linked in both spheres but the maintenance of what is 
actually a false binary policing and war has allowed for the legitimisation of two 
processes of defining an enemy and responding to it in the required fashion given its 
location inside or outside of the nation. The response to this enemy is the same in 
terms of the state's free use of violence but this violence is framed in differing ways. 
As Neocleous has noted, 'the violence monopolised by the state is expressed as war
1 1 fi
when directed against foreign powers and as law when exercised internally' . Thus 
we have policies of foreign intervention and counter-radicalisation that fit into the 
same project of ensuring the maintenance of the current political and economic status 
quo, a project held in place ultimately by the state's recourse to the use of violence.
The idea that domestic and international spheres have been merged does not 
stop the reliance on a key liberal myth that there are distinct arms to the 'war on 
terror' between 'war' or military means and the internal policing of illegal 
populations. Given that the 'war on terror' definitively refuses the notion of equal 
enemies facing each other on a clearly defined field of battle, the notion that this 'war' 
(or its military components) can be distinguished from policing is false. The project of 
imposing a given international order relies at different times and in different places on 
a variety of means that fall under the traditional notions of war and police but 
essentially this distinction is, in this context, a fa9ade that the liberal state maintains to 
secure its own legitimacy. If one understands, as security strategy across the liberal
117 'Protecting our security requires us to work with countries who do not share our values and 
standards of criminal justice. In working with them to protect our country from terrorist attacks and 
other threats we do not compromise on our values. We speak out against abuses and use our own 
conduct as an example. But we have to strike a balance between public condemnation of any deviation 
from our values and the need to protect our security through international cooperation'. National 
Security Strategy of the United Kingdom 2010, 23.
H8Neocleous "War as Peace, Peace as Pacification"
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states in question reveals, that 'the 'war on terror' is thus the violent fabrication of 
world order in exactly the way that the original police power involved the violent 
fabrication of social order, 119 then this war/police distinction falls flat. Given the 
policing of those suspect populations deemed to constitute a radicalised or extremist 
threat, the police power at work in the 'war on terror' continues to impose a social 
order in the domestic context and plays a clear role in the fabrication and maintenance 
of the given world order in political and economic terms.
Securitisation as depoliticisation: widening the security agenda
The construction of the enemy, which is vital to the perceived legitimacy of the 'war 
on terror', takes place within an overarching project of depoliticisation. The 
dehumanisation of external suspect populations and the criminalisation of the internal 
'threat' are both essentially about maintaining the fa9ade of an apolitical 'war', a 
formulation that is required to maintain the all encompassing idea of a post-political 
age. The essential task of sustaining the presentation of an age in which politics has 
been overcome is a continuous one and security strategy is universally employed to 
depoliticise both the threats to security and the required responses. Post-1989 
'national security' has become simply the banner under which the state continues its 
essential task of self-preservation and the preservation of the current order. The 
formulation of national security as a radically new concept for the 'new' era 
(understood both post-1989 and again reemphasised post-9/11) has been a central 
component in the perseverance of the notion of an age of post-politics. Here the 
notion of an expanded security environment incorporating a range of formally distinct 
issues under the security banner is crucial. This process of securitisation is at its core a 
central tool in the depoliticisation of security and the maintenance of this fa9ade. This 
process involves the incorporation of disparate issues into the security arena of which 
several are already substantively depoliticised in the dominant understanding. This 
serves to reinforce the need for purely technical solutions to these newly securitised 
issues as well as to the wider problem of insecurity fundamentally withdrawing any 
consideration of the role that the current political and economic frameworks play in
119 Mark Neocleous, "The Police as Civilisation: The War on Terror as Civilising Offensive", 
International Political Sociology 5, 2 (2011)
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creating and sustaining these problems. Furthermore, through this restriction of 
possibilities the state assumes a monopoly over the response to all issues labelled as 
security threats further reinforcing the legitimacy of the state's response and 
broadening the reach of strategies imposed to close the possibility for any alternative 
politics. In this sense the remit of security politics is extended greatly allowing the 
insidious nature of logic of security to reach out beyond its former parameters.
The liberal state in the current era presents itself - and its strategy - as a 
reactive force in a changing security environment. The proliferation of national 
security strategies in the UK, Australia (and the US) is based ostensibly on the state's 
response to a fundamentally changed and continually evolving set of threats to 
national security. The liberal state's relationship to security is thus constructed in 
terms of a necessary and proportional response, playing no direct active role in the 
prioritisation (and fetishization) of security. However, the presentation of the 
contemporary security environment in these strategy documents reveals much about 
the state's role in defining security as well as the effects of such a (re)definition.
The post-9/11 security environment we are again told is better understood in 
the post-1989 context. The defining feature of the Cold War era - a clear security 
threat posed by a single state - has been replaced by a 'diverse but interconnected set 
of threats and risks' 120 . Understanding the 'diversity' of the new threats illustrates that 
the need for new strategy is premised on a major reconceptualisation of what 
constitutes (a threat to) national security. The novelty of the current era lies in the fact 
that the state now has to confront both 'traditional' and 'non-traditional' security 
threats 121 that combine to create an increasingly 'complex and unpredictable' security
I ^^ _landscape . The distinction between these two strands of the threat lies in the fact 
that traditional threats are those that threaten the 'interests and integrity of the 
sovereign state' while non-traditional threats instead target 'citizens and respective 
ways of life' 123 . Terrorism is defined as a traditional threat whilst the non-traditional
120The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom 2008, 3. The US were quicker to utilise the 
NSS format and in the US National Security strategy 2002, the post-Cold War era is defined by the 
unrivalled status of the triumphant liberal free market model and thus the threats to security are from 
the outset threats to this political and economic model. See George Bush. 2002. Foreword to The 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, iv.
121 Rudd, The First National Security Statement To The Australian Parliament
122 HM Government, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare, 10
123Gordon Brown and Kevin Rudd. 2009. "Joint Statement by Gordon Brown and Kevin Rudd", March 
31 Accessed May 15, 2011. http://www.publicpolitics.net/news/archive/145423
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strand encompasses diverse phenomena such as threats to the environment, global 
poverty, trans-national crime, energy security, pandemics and natural disasters 124 . The 
contemporary threat is distinguished by its dual stranded composition but the
10^
seemingly diverse threats are presented as linked, enabling a 'coherent' and 
overarching strategy. This formulation, presenting the threat as both diverse and 
interconnected, forms the basis of joint agreements between UK and Australian 
governments and provides the backdrop to more recent US NSS. The connections 
between the diverse threats legitimate the continued revision and expansion of 
security strategy into 'uncharted territory' necessitating new measures previously 
uncalled for.
Beyond justifying the continual development of security policy and the 
increasing prominence afforded to security in official discourse the implications of 
this broadened conception are more insidious. Fusing counter-terrorism with the fight 
against climate change for example allows the state to co-opt popular support for state 
action and thus bolsters support for the wider 'security' agenda. Arguably, this is done 
by building on the depoliticized approach to climate change that defines state strategy 
in both the UK and Australia126 . Climate change is understood in official discourse to 
be an unintended consequence of human action definitively disconnected from the 
capitalist mode of production. The response to it does not require a questioning of the 
current order let alone its transformation; instead it stands to open up new
1 ^fj _
opportunities for investment and entrepreneurialism . The capitalist mode of
124 Brown and Rudd, "Joint Statement", 2
125 Rudd, The First National Security Statement To The Australian Parliament, 3
126 The UK government has attempted to construct climate change as an issue for the UN Security 
Council a move that constructs climate change as predominantly, if not exclusively, a security issue. 
The issue of climate change in this approach becomes one of climate security and the response is 
monopolised by the most powerful Western governments. Referring climate change to the Security 
Council as opposed to the Economic and Social Council of the UN is a clear indication of the 
securitisation of the issue as well as its withdrawal from any discussion of the political and economic 
framework in which it has emerged as an international problem. See, Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree 
About Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009).
127 David Cameron has summed up the current governmental approach to climate change presenting the 
issue not as problem but as a new 'opportunity' for the reinvigoration of free-market capitalism: "I 
passionately believe that by recasting the argument for action on climate change away from the 
language of threats and punishments and into positive, profit-making terms, we can have a much wider 
impact. That's why this government has set up the Capital Markets Climate Initiative - to help trigger a 
new wave of green investment in emerging economies and make the City of London the global capital 
of the fast-growing green investment sector". David Cameron, "Use the profit motive to fight climate 
change", The Observer, November 28, 2010,accessed April 11, 
2011 ,http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/nov/28/david-cameron-climate-change-cancun
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production is not at the root cause of the crisis of the environmental and conversely, in 
the same sense as for the response to global poverty, it is presented as its only 
possible saviour. This approach arguably defines the liberal response to climate 
change more generally 128 to the extent that is has been argued that the hegemonic 
approach to climate change is not simply a symptom of depoliticisation but that this 
approach 'ultimately reinforces processes of depoliticisation and the socio-political 
status quo' 129 .
The liberal state's response to climate change is defined by an ideology of 
market environmentalism within which a 'carbon capitalism' seeks to 'extend 
property rights to the atmosphere' 130 - through the commodification (and subsequent 
fetishization) of CC>2 131 - and solve the problem by trading these rights regulated only 
by an 'invisible green hand'. By securitising climate change this inherently 
conservative approach is rendered closed to critique. Securitization results clearly in 
depoliticisation and in turn serves to reinforce the current order by confining these 
'security' issues within the current post-political condition. In relation to campaigns 
around climate change that are aligned with alternative politics, securitisation of the 
issue undermines the possibility of a proper political act and enforces subservience to 
the state.
The securitisation of climate change is however not the only mode of its 
depoliticisation. It certainly contributes in a decisive fashion to the process by which 
climate change is rendered conclusively non-political but the desire that the 
hegemonic approach to climate change reflect and infuse the post-political condition 
is fulfilled by various means. These must be understood to consider how the process 
of securitising climate change involves a two way process of depoliticisation effecting 
both ecology and security; reinforcing in the latter case the fact that security threats 
(and security itself) are essentially apolitical. Comprehending this mutually beneficial 
process (for those with a vested interest in the status quo) is vital to understanding the 
prominence of depoliticisation in security strategy.
128Anabela Carvalho, "Ideological cultures and media discourses on scientific knowledge: re-reading 
news on climate change" Public Understanding of Science 16, (2007)
129 Eric Swyngedouw, "Apocalypse Forever?: Post-political Populism and the Spectre of Climate 
Change" in Theory Culture Society 27 (2010) 214.
130 Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change, 300-303 
13 'Swyngedouw, "Apocalypse Forever?"
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The characterisation of climate concerns with a range of populist manoeuvres 
that typically infuse the post-political post-democratic condition is integral to their 
depoliticisation132 . The current hegemonic approach to climate change expresses some 
of the classic tenets of populism that reveals much about the utility (and ease) of the 
fusion of climate change and traditional security threats for a conservative project. In 
the first instance climate change is constructed as a humanitarian issue 1 positing no 
political subject but instead baring down on the 'people' as universal victims of a 
global threat. Here the incorporation of climate change into a security agenda within 
which human rights have central stage is a 'logical' development. As a result of the 
securitisation of climate change security strategy becomes even more so a 
humanitarian effort seeking to defend (human) rights. The approach to security is here 
located definitively in the age of human rights.
Furthermore, the presentation of climate change as a humanitarian issue is at 
the core of the rise of ecology understood through 'the rights of Nature' that has been 
condemned as 'a giant operation in the depoliticisation of subjects' rendering ecology 
the 'contemporary form of the opium of the people' 134 . In addition, the detachment of 
the current political and economic order from the problem of climate change is 
secured by externalising ecological problems and their solutions 135 . The 
problem/enemy is reduced to 'levels of CCVand the form and operation of the current 
system are not implicated in production of the 'threat'. As a result the solution is (as 
mentioned above) incontrovertibly to be found within the system.
It is here that the role of the liberal intellectual in constructing the issue as one 
detached from the liberal political and economic framework is becoming more clearly 
decisive 136 . The role of the liberal intellectual in the securitization of climate
132Swyngedouw, "Apocalypse Forever?" 
133 Swyngedouw, "Apocalypse Forever?"
134 Alain Badiou, "Live Badiou: Interview with Alain Badiou, Paris, December 2007" in Alain Badiou: 
Live Theory, ed. Oliver Feltham, (London: Continuum, 2008) 139.
135 Swyngedouw, "Apocalypse Forever?", 222
136 See Anthony Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change: National Responses to the challenges of 
global warming, (London: Policy Network, 2008). The role of the intellectual in constructing climate 
change as an apolitical issue is exemplified in Giddens' intervention. Giddens illustrates how the 
climate change issue is presented without a politics - denying decades of political activism - and in 
need of a political consensus to achieve the necessary solutions. The understanding of politics is here 
exclusively parliamentarist. The market must be tamed in its excesses and regulation will steer 
economic forces in a sustainable direction but ultimately the political and economic status quo need 
not, or more accurately must not, be transformed. The liberal enthusiasm for action on climate change 
is premised on this understanding and it is thus easily accommodated into a security agenda that seeks
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change 137 - through the fusion of climate change and energy security or indeed the 
reduction of climate change to the issue of energy or climate security - is a decisive 
intervention that (based on current NSS in the UK, Australia and the US) illustrates a 
further example of the role of the liberal intellectual in the service of the liberal state. 
As a clear example, Giddens' apparent attempt to instigate a politics of climate 
change is instead a process of securitization. It is definitively a process of 
depoliticisation and seeks ultimately to confine the political activism in this field 
within a post-political vision of security that mystifies the true nature of security and 
its importance to the liberal state. Giddens aims explicitly to summon a political 
consensus from which climate change can be addressed. The idea that solutions will 
come through consensus is classically liberal and this idea underpins the hegemonic 
approach to climate change. Indeed, ecology in the 'West' is 'practically
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consensual' and this undoubtedly closes the possibility for human emancipation 
that must come through alternative politics to those that define the current status quo.
Consensus, fostered by intellectual intervention and reinforced through 
securitisation, serves to annul dissent closing the possibility for true politics. 
Governance is enacted through a stakeholder-based arrangement within which the 
state operates together with 'responsible' or 'moderate' partners who are included on 
the basis that they accept the inevitability of the current order politically, 
economically and ecologically. NGOs find their place in this consensus allowing them 
the space to discuss and critique the current state strategy as long as the fundamental 
features of the status quo are not disturbed; equating to a willingness to maintain the 
notion of a non-political age. Given what we have uncovered about the NGO response 
to the liberty-security relationship above, it is unsurprising that their contributions are 
expressly invited by governments; they sit firmly within the consensus on security and
essentially to reinforce the unquestionable status of liberal free-market capitalism. It is also indicative 
of the compatibility of liberal approaches to climate change and security that securitisation is 
reinforced not only in security discourse but in the climate change literature. The issue of energy 
security is the driving force behind 'action' on the issue.
137 It is widely acknowledged that the construction of social and environmental issues as matters of 
national security has been a conscious aim in intellectual circles for many years as an attempt to 
enhance their importance. See, Joshua W Busby, "Who Cares about the Weather? Climate Change and 
U.S. National Security" Security Studies 17, 3 (2005)
138Badiou, "Live Badiou", 139
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their inclusion in debates on climate change is indicative of their failure (or 
unwillingness) to substantively contest the features of the status quo 139 .
The incorporation of climate change into the security arena involves the 
incorporation of the 'post-political environmental consensus' 140 that posits as its 
central idea that the problem/threat can be dealt with through a reproduction - and 
ultimately a reinvigoration - of the current liberal-capitalist order. Accordingly, there 
is no viable alternative to the current system and given the construction of the 
problem and its solutions we shouldn't be looking for one. The 'securitization' of 
climate change (as well as other 'non-traditional' issues) serves predominantly to 
bring the already well established depoliticised approach to these issues firmly into 
security strategy. Notably the UK, Australian and U.S. governments all attempt to 
deny their active role in this process of securitisation through their continual assertion 
that the current security environment has simply and autonomously evolved in the 
post-1989 period. The expansion of the security threat and by extension the 
understanding of what constitutes a threat to national security is something that the 
states have to respond to as opposed to leading through the production of the current 
NSS.
If we understand that through security 'authority inscribes itself deeply into 
human experience, neutralizing political action and encouraging us to surrender 
ourselves to the state and the institutional violence which underpins it' 141 then the 
securitization of these issues has major implications. It serves to neutralize all 
political action that in the case of climate change has for decades sought to confront 
these issues outside of state structures (the transformation of the engagement of NGOs 
from contestation to negotiation is a major indicator of this). It serves to bring these 
issues into the state, place them under state control and as a result those with a desire 
for action must surrender themselves to the state. The state assumes an overarching 
position through which it alone can define the problem and orchestrate and/or 
sanction the solutions.
139 The past few decades have seen the transformation of many NGOs engaged in green politics from a 
previous engagement in a politics of contestation to an incorporation into stakeholder-based negotiation 
agreements. See, Swyngedouw, "Apocalypse Forever?".
140Swyngedouw, "Apocalypse Forever?", 228
141 Mark Neocleous, "Inhuman security", Critical Perspectives on Human Security: Rethinking 
emancipation and power in international relations, eds. David Chandler, and Nik Hynek, (Abingdon: 
Routledge,2011)
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The state is able to dictate which individuals and organisations are 
'responsible' enough to be included in the debate and which, by virtue of their 
(political) understanding and subsequent strategic approach to the problem must be 
excluded. Ultimately, all substantive critique of the current order that seeks to name 
and implicate the capitalist mode of production - and indeed the capitalist state - in 
the creation and sustenance of these problems is marginalised 142 . Securitization serves 
to exclude in the first instance all but the state from the process of defining the 
problem and its solution. Those who wish to contribute must conform to the state's 
position and ultimately must tailor their understanding of climate change or global 
poverty (and the liberty-security relationship as we have seen above) to fit with the 
current logic of security.
Those who seek to politicise issues are in the current era marginalised, 
labelled as extremists and in many cases criminalised. In this context, the concept of 
'domestic extremism' has been constructed within which those involved in 'single- 
issue' protests, such as animal rights, environmentalism, anti-globalisation or anti-GM 
crops' 143 outside of the acceptable forms of political expression are constructed as 
extremists. Reinforcing the foreignness of the Muslim Other this formulation also 
allows for an expansion of the strategy of criminalising dissent to include what are 
defined as 'individuals or groups whose activities go outside the normal democratic 
process and engage in crime and disorder' 144 . The causal relationship presented here 
between abandoning the democratic process and engaging in criminal activity 
obscures the real process by which the narrow parameters set to the 'democratic 
process' allow all truly political activism to be criminalised. The politicisation of all 
issues cannot be tolerated and once issues become incorporated into the security 
agenda they are comprehensively closed off from any kind of alternative, critical 
analysis; in this sense politics is extreme. Those who seek to question the status quo 
and by definition politicise these issues through a rejection of the impotent channels
142 It is from this understanding of climate change for example that Giddens is able to suggest we have 
had, and will continue to have, no politics of climate change until the state assumes leadership. It is 
also this understanding of effective and legitimate intervention that allows Giddens to depict those who 
politicise the climate as 'radicals'.
l43National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit. 2010. "What is domestic extremism!", accessed 
June 6, 2011.http://www.netcu.org.uk/de/default.jsp. The National Extremism Tactical Coordination 
Unit is a national policing unit set up by Association of Chief Police Officers to respond to the threat of 
domestic extremism in England and Wales.
144 National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit, "What is domestic extremism!"
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of liberal political expression available will be met by the full force of the state's 
violence. The caveat attached to extremism strategy that 'legitimate peaceful protest is 
to be respected' is itself restricted to those actions that take place in a 'peaceful and 
safe manner and does not cause unnecessary disruption to a community' . Policing 
protest is a, if not the, central function of policing and the development of counter- 
extremism strategies in this vein formalise further the police's role in the fabrication 
of a social and political order. The applicability of counter-terrorism powers to 
contexts seemingly beyond their remit is not simply a fortuitous coincidence; as 
Toscano has noted, 'antiterrorism has become a full-fledged method of government, a 
wilfully vague expedient in the arsenal of the modern state' 146 . The legal regulation of 
extremist ideas and behaviour only reveals further that the primary role to which law 
has been devoted in bourgeois society is order147 . The criminalisation of alternative 
politics is at the core of security strategy and as a result the liberal monopoly over the 
definition of the political, which is in the current epoch a definition devoid of true 
politics, is secured through the approach to security.
Securing the hegemonic status of the liberal world view
This analysis has demonstrated a shared understanding of the current situation 
between the three liberal states in question. There appears not to be any specifically 
Anglo-Saxon character to the regime as the US has undoubtedly provided a 
significant degree of influence over the development of both UK and Australian 
security strategy. The presentation of the current era of 'insecurity' shared between 
these states was set out by the US government in the first instance and the 
convergence illustrated above between all three states suggests this is an essentially 
liberal presentation of a liberal regime as opposed to the product of a specific 
political culture. This is not to say that the influence over the formulation of security 
strategy (and security policy) has been a one-way process. There is clear evidence of a 
process of policy transfer running in multiple directions between the UK, US and 
Australia.
145 National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit, "What is domestic extremism!"
146 Alberto Toscano, "Criminalising Dissent", The Guardian, January 28, 2009, accessed May 25, 
2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/jan/28/human-rights-tarnac-nine.
147Neocleous, The Fabrication of Social Order, 110.
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What is crucial to this shared understanding is the need to rid the notion of 
security of any political dynamic. The overarching formulation of the current situation 
- at the local and global levels - as one in which politics has been overcome is 
absolutely fundamental to the legitimacy of the subsequent security regime. 
Intertwining human rights and security is both part of the process of depoliticisation 
and, as a result, pivotal to the legitimation of the 'national security' project. Returning 
to Schmitt and the notion of a void between the presentation of the liberal state and its 
actual operation, we can see that these security strategies have a vital role in 
maintaining the approved vision of the state and the context in which it operates. In 
presenting the liberal state as a post-political entity struggling to combat the forces of 
barbarism that remain wedded to an age of politics that is (thankfully) over, these 
documents have a crucial ideological function maintaining the perceived validity of 
the dominant understanding of contemporary liberalism and the state's loyalty to it. 
These strategies are effectively marketing documents tasked with the role of selling 
domestic and foreign policy initiatives that are located within, or can be brought into, 
the security agenda.
The state as site, generator and product of strategies is arguably brought to the 
fore here. Without inferring that security strategies as considered here in the formal 
sense are directly equivalent to Jessop's notion of state strategy, there is a sense that 
the liberal state's pursuit of security can be understood as the defining state project in 
the contemporary era. The approach to security in its various facets provides us with 
clear view of the state as institutional ensemble understandable as producer of 
political strategy, ultimately here aimed at the maintenance and consolidation of 
global capitalism; but also the state as currently constituted is produced through its 
past and current strategies. The policing (in the broadest sense) that defines security 
politics involves the (re)configuration of a multitude of institutions within the state 
(and beyond). If, as Jessop states, 'the structure and modus operandi of the state 
system can be understood in terms of their production in and through past political 
strategies and struggles' 148 then we can suggest that while the state's structure is the 
product of its past political strategies, the current form is being reconfigured through 
its approach to security. If security is the supreme concept of bourgeois ideology then 
we should not be surprised that the capitalist state reveals itself to be increasingly
148 Jessop, State Theory, 261
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enamoured with the concept but we should be concerned with the ways in which the 
pursuit of security affects how the state is structured. A critical analysis of security 
politics, and by extension a critique of security, demands a focus on the state and we 
must be continually mindful of both the ways in which the state leads (although not in 
isolation) the formulation of security politics and in turn, the way in which the 
approach to security affects, if not determines, the structure of the state.
We have arrived at a point in which the convergence between the liberal state 
and the liberal intellectual is clear. There exists a shared understanding of the current 
situation and a universal acceptance of the threat presented by international terrorism. 
The impact of security politics on domestic populations (not least in terms of the 
restriction of fundamental freedoms), whilst experienced in varying degrees 
depending on social location, requires the organisation of widespread (although not 
universal) consent for the consolidation of this security regime. The liberal state 
clearly understands the importance of this project and the production of these security 
strategy documents with such frequency and at such length needs to be understood in 
this sense. However, these documents alone are not sufficient for a task of this 
magnitude and it is here that the liberal intellectual becomes of great importance. The 
organisation of consent in the internal 'realm' is crucial to the state and it is in this 
context that the individuals and organisations working at the various levels of 
intellectual activity are so useful to the state in legitimising the state politics of 
security.
The convergence between the state and the liberal intellectual is however not a 
result of a simple one way process of influence. The shared understanding of the 
current situation and the agreement on the presentation of security politics is the result 
of an exchange of ideas that points toward in the first instance, the utility of the liberal 
intellectual's work to the state's project of self-legitimisation; and secondly toward 
the subservience of the liberal intellectual to the state. The convergence is ultimately 
the result of a shared commitment to the liberal tradition but there is a need to 




The role of the liberal intellectual in the service of the liberal state
In response to the clear convergence between state and intellectual in the liberal 
framing of the liberty-security regime, this chapter seeks to consider the direct role of 
the liberal intellectual in the service of the liberal state in the era of the 'war on 
terror'. The analysis considers two documents that may be best understood as 
manifestos produced in the post 9/11 era by groups of intellectuals who sought 
directly to intervene in political debates around the legitimacy of the 'war on terror'. 
The consideration of these documents is located at this point in light of both the 
analysis of the liberal intellectual in the current epoch and the subsequent 
consideration of state security strategy in the previous chapter. Based on a much 
clearer understanding of the liberal state's role in the development of the politics of 
security this analysis seeks to examine the liberal intellectual's direct intervention in 
political debates and consider the motivation for interventions in this form and effects 
they had in relation to state strategy. These manifestos, ' What We 're Fighting For: a 
Letter from America' published in 2002 and The Euston Manifesto published in 2006 
provided direct political interventions at specific points in the chronology of the 'war 
on terror' and were produced, albeit in different times and places, to have a direct 
impact on public and political opinion in relation to the 'war on terror' and by 
extension, the wider politics of security. The purpose of this analysis is to consider the 
content of these documents and to more specifically assess the service they provided 
to the liberal state.
The contribution of this section to the wider analysis is in developing an 
understanding of the relationship between the liberal intellectual and the liberal state. 
The analysis above has suggested that fundamental to this relationship is the role the 
liberal intellectual plays in legitimating the liberal state and in the current context the 
legitimation of the state's security strategy is primary importance. Central to the 
liberal intellectual's legitimating function is the engagement with critique and the 
process by which the assertion of the necessity and legitimacy of a liberal approach 
involves the curtailment, if not the outright denial, of the possibilities for alternatives. 
The analysis of the manifestos in this section focuses on this process and considers the 
extent to which the use of this form of political intervention is defined by a more
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direct engagement with critical accounts of the 'war on terror'. The analysis will thus 
consider if these manifestos need to be understood as examples of the direct 'policing' 
of critique that seemingly defines the liberal intellectual's work and considers the 
effect this has on alternative perspectives on the 'war on terror' and security politics 
more generally. This attempted narrowing or closure of alternative positions is clearly 
most important when one considers the response to the left in this context. A central 
concern of this analysis is to assess the role the liberal intellectual plays in attempting 
to marginalise if not exclude any truly leftist positions. Understanding the liberal 
state's reliance on the depoliticised framing of the current regime and the effect this 
framing has on narrowing the parameters for critical interventions - both reinforced 
by the wider work of the liberal intellectual - it is crucial that these manifestos are 
considered in depth at this point.
The function of the liberal intellectual
The analysis set out in chapters one to three has illustrated the convergence in position 
between liberal intellectuals in the era of the 'war on terror'. This analysis has made 
clear that the appearance of debate and even conflict within liberal intellectual circles 
obscures the fact that there exists a common position shared among intellectuals, 
scholars and human rights organisations in relation to the appropriate relationship 
between liberty and security. This shared intellectual position reinforces the state's 
prioritisation of security and fundamentally, despite claims to the contrary, the liberal 
intellectual intervention broadly conceived serves to legitimise the state's use of 
violence in the response to 'terrorism'. The dual concern of the liberal intellectual 
leads supposedly to a critical intervention facing in two directions - toward 
international terrorism and toward apparently illiberal counter-terrorism policies - has 
been shown to be a fa9ade. It has been illustrated through the interventions covered 
thus far that substantively the liberal intellectual and the liberal state speak with one 
voice in the condemnation of international terrorism and, despite much fanfare to the 
contrary, effectively stand together in defining and justifying the state response.
The intervention of the liberal intellectual - in the various forms this has taken 
- has been shown to be shaped by depoliticisation that is both premise and 
consequence of their work. The liberal intellectual has served to depoliticise the 
current security regime and crucially the concept of security itself. The eternal
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wrangling over the prioritisation of liberty over security - and/or their appropriate 
balance - has served to obscure the fact that the politics of security are liberal politics. 
Paradoxically, the attempt to disassociate liberalism from security politics and return 
the liberal state to a mythical liberal heaven in which terrorism can be legitimately 
tackled and security ensured without compromising liberty, has ultimately allowed the 
liberal state to reinforce its liberal credentials. As a result, the liberal 'critique' of the 
current regime directed at both the domestic and the externally focussed state 
response serves instead to reinforce the current legitimacy of such policies and 
effectively sanction their continued development and 'innovation'.
The output of the liberal intellectual across the three strata has been prolific 
and in varying degrees reached a wide audience both inside the nations leading the 
'war on terror' and beyond. The legitimating function that defines their role is a 
product of the continued output in their already existing forums. However, the 
publication of ' What We 're Fighting For: a Letter from America ' 7and The Euston 
Manifesto2 was indicative of the utilisation of a distinct format for intervention that 
had an immediacy, reach and direct impact unavailable to the standard forms of 
scholarly output. The necessity of this form of intervention is made clear when both 
documents are understood in general terms as responses to criticism of the 'war on 
terror' that sought to speak in a timely fashion to a much wider audience and have a 
direct impact on public and political opinion. It is this form and its potential impact in 
relation to the state politics of security that demands analysis here.
Liberals saving the 'war on terror' from itself
The purpose of both of these documents was to respond to criticism of the 'war on 
terror' and the form or medium chosen, the manifesto, is most suited when one 
understands the response to criticism in both documents as essentially a (re)statement 
of liberal political principles. At their different points of interjection and in their
1 Institute for American Values. 2002. "What We 're Fighting For: A Letter from America", Accessed 
January 1, 2012. http://www.americanvalues.org/html/wwff.html; Also available as: 60 U.S. 
Intellectuals, "What We're Fighting For: A Letter from America" in The Islam/West Debate: 
Documents from a Global Debate on Terrorism, U.S. Policy, and the Middle East, eds. David 
Blankenhorn et al. (Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield, 2005). References here will be for the most part 
from the version published in Blankenhorn et al.
2 Norman Geras et al. 2006. "The Euston Manifesto ". Accessed January 7, 
2012.http://eustonmanifesto.org/the-euston-manifesto/
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different geographic contexts both What We're Fighting For (WWFFj and The 
Euston Manifesto (EM) were attempts to dispel criticism of the response to terrorism 
by (re)framing the 'war on terror' as a liberal project. This is not a new pursuit for the 
liberal intellectual but there appeared to be at both points of publication a perception 
of the need to combat anti-war criticism that had failed to remain confined to 
academic or scholarly circles; essentially as the critique of the 'war on terror' had 
'become' political as opposed to theoretical or philosophical, these groups of 
intellectuals seemingly felt the need to break free of their confinement in traditional3 
intellectual circles. Moreover, they are responses to criticism that had emphasised the 
incompatibility of the 'war on terror' project with liberal values or in the case of EM, 
with values held by those on the left.
The role of WWFF in responding to criticism is made clear through its 
targeted publication and subsequent impact. WWFF made little impact in the U.S. due 
to its confinement to the website of its publishers/commissioners The Institute for 
American Values. In reality it was a document addressed to the Europeans published 
initially in Le Monde as 'Lettre d'Amerique, les raisons d'un combat^. The emphasis 
on publication in Europe was a response to political and public disquiet on the 'war 
on terror' that had been voiced from its inception. This is not to deny the popular 
protest movement in the U.S. before and during the 'war on terror' was formally 
launched in Afghanistan but the authors clearly felt the tide of public opinion was 
with them on that side of the Atlantic. In Europe dissenting voices were given space 
and appeared to be having a negative impact on political and intellectual support for 
the 'war on terror' and it was arguably in response to this that the document was 
drafted.
From a popular understanding of political positions WWFF is signed by 
intellectuals from a range of political backgrounds. It brings together individuals 
associated with neo-conservatism such as Samuel Huntingdon, Francis Fukuyama and 
Jean Bethke Elshtain with renowned left-liberals such as Robert Putnam and Michael 
Walzer. The idea of a fusion of neo-conservatives with more traditional 'liberal' (in 
the popular American sense) thinkers appears to illustrates a non-partisan and by
3 The use of this term does not imply the suggestion that traditionally liberal intellectuals have 
refrained from legitimating the power of the liberal state; this has always been their role.
4 Institute for American Values. 2002. "Lettre d'Amerique, les raisons d'un combat" Le Monde, 
February, 15, Accessed January 12, 2012. http://www.americanvalues.org/le_monde_l.PDF
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extension non-political stance. However, it is clear that this document relies upon and 
espouses liberal principles and it is a commitment to these principles that unite the 
signatories behind the 'war on terror'. The liberal/(neo)conservative distinction that 
defines US political discourse mystifies the liberal nature of US politics and the 
security politics that define the 'war on terror'. The allegiance of Walzer with the 
likes of Huntingdon, Fukuyama and Elshtain is not surprising as they share a 
commitment to the liberal understanding and subsequent prioritisation of security. 
The analysis above has sought to illustrate that while there are clearly important 
reasons for both sides of the liberal/conservative distinction to maintain a charade of 
opposition and conflict (both for themselves and for the continued presentation of the 
political pluralism of liberal democracy) in the context of security politics at the very 
least this distinction is revealed to be a false one.
The fa9ade of non-partisanship is of course itself a liberal trait and it is 
reinforced by a continual emphasis throughout WWFF with 'universal values' that 
are, as in state strategy, presented as defining the American nation, the political 
system and the response to terrorism (once understood as compatible with Just War 
theory). These values are moreover the cause of terrorism. The attackers who struck 
on 9/11 'despised not just our government, but our overall society, our entire way of 
living' 5 indeed 'their grievance concerns not only what our leaders do, but also who 
we are' 6 . The depoliticisation of the intellectual intervention is coupled with, or more 
accurately bound up in and reliant upon, the depoliticisation of terrorism beginning, 
crucially at this point in the chronology of the 'war on terror', with the events of 9/11. 
The attack was on American society; the authors note that those who died on 
September 11 were known (to their attackers) only as Americans7 . The symbolism of 
the site(s) is again here obscured entirely and the emphasis on values (as the cause of 
the attack as well as the reason for, and defining feature of, the response) is 
maintained. Ultimately, the document serves to reinforce the notion that they hate 'us' 
for our 'values' not our politics.
A subscription to the 'universal values' of freedom, democracy, tolerance and 
moderation set out in the WWFF document aligns the forces of good against an evil
5 60 U.S. Intellectuals, "What We're Fighting For", 22
6 60 U.S. Intellectuals, "What We're Fighting For", 22
7 60 U.S. Intellectuals, "What We're Fighting For", 27
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oenemy. The 'war on terror' is framed as a response to an 'unmitigated global evil' , an 
'implacable enemy' 9 who refuses to conform to these universal and essential values. 
The rejection of these values and centrally the rejection of human rights - which are 
posited as the 'basis of any civilisation oriented to human flourishing, justice and 
peace' - is a sign of barbarism that, as noted above, renders the terrorist outside 
humanity and the wrong side of the good/evil binary that defines the 'war on terror'. 
The moralising approach that defines the position of these intellectuals is unsurprising 
as it reflects the general theme of the liberal intellectual's intervention but it is crucial 
in its reaffirmation of the state's depoliticised framing of the response to terrorism.
The support for the 'war on terror' in WWFF is explicit and the authors (and 
by extension the signatories) make clear that they see themselves and the American 
public as aligned with the state in waging the war11 . The authors position themselves 
from the outset as working in the service of the state but it is the means by which this 
service is carried out that are important. It is not simply a valorisation of the 'war on 
terror' although this is certainly part of its job; the general purpose is to present the 
'war on terror' as a project in line with liberal principles continuing the state's own 
work to this end that, as noted above, defines the multitude of security strategy 
documents. This is made clear by the summary of WWFF provided by the Institute 
for American Values: in their terms WWFF 'sought to redefine the struggle against 
terrorism in terms of universal human values' 12 . This is an attempt to rescue the 'war 
on terror' from the rhetoric of the Bush administration that was, for some liberals, in 
the early months and years of the 'war', all too cavalier in their framing of the 
response to terrorism for it to be clearly compatible with the operation of a liberal 
state (here we are aware this concern is in reality with maintaining the formal 
presentation of the liberal state). There is no attempt here to suggest the 
Bush/Rumsfeld/Cheney orchestration of the 'war on terror' made a departure from
8 60 U.S. Intellectuals, "What We're Fighting For", 29
9 Alex Roberts, "Introducing the Debate" in The Islam/West Debate: Documents from a Global Debate 
on Terrorism , U.S. Policy, and the Middle East, eds. David Blankenhorn, (Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2005)
10 60 U.S. Intellectuals "What We're Fighting For", 28
11 The opening paragraph makes clear that the document is responding to the need that 'those who 
would wage the war state clearly the moral reasoning behind their actions'. 60 U.S. Intellectuals "What 
We're Fighting For", 21.
12 Roberts, "Introducing the Debate", 15
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what should be expected from a liberal state but one could suggest that they failed at 
times to maintain the fa9ade of restraint that defines the liberal presentation of state 
violence. It is at this point that the liberal intellectual's essential role in reconstructing 
the fa9ade of restraint becomes crucial. While this has been exhibited throughout the 
work of a range of liberal intellectuals - and rescuing the 'war on terror' from neo- 
conservative rhetoric has occupied many - the publication of this document should be 
understood as a direct, immediate and far reaching example of the fulfilment of this 
essential role and a clear example of the subservience of the liberal intellectual to the 
state.
There are 'alternatives'
The central framework through which the 'war on terror' is defined as compatible 
with universal values is Just War theory. For this reason it is unsurprising that Walzer 
is a key signatory and indeed a vital influence over the original authors of which 
Elshtain (known for her application of just war theory in the post 9/11 context) is 
understood to be the leading figure 13 . The application of just war theory to the 'war on 
terror' serves to legitimate the U.S. state as a legitimate authority that is able to 
orchestrate a just war and a response to terrorism that conforms - again through its 
commitment to 'values' - to the restraint of a war fought in this tradition. It does this 
to of course legitimate what was at this point the well established military intervention 
in Afghanistan and to pave the way for future action that was by 2002 already being 
discussed in relation to Iraq.
The effect of this framing is not simply a 'redefinition' of the struggle against 
terrorism (and by this it is understood to allow a retrospective legitimation of past and 
already existing military endeavours as well as future ones) but it is a crucial part of 
curtailing the possible positions available for inclusion in the debate around the 'war 
on terror'. The original document included a long endnote dividing the possible 
intellectual positions on war into four categories: realism, holy war, pacifism, and just 
war 14 . This serves to fundamentally narrow the possibilities for opposition to the 'war 
on terror' and conflates any support for vaguely defined notions of justice and
13 See, Edward Said. 2002. "Thoughts about America" in Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 28 Feb. - 6 March, 
No. 575. Accessed July 25, 2012.http://www.Iacan.com/said2.htm.
14 Institute for American Values, "What We 're Fighting For: A Letter from America"
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freedom with support for the 'war on terror'. The attempt is made to undermine all 
critique and exclude any possibility of dissent. True political alternatives that refuse to 
subscribe to any of the four available options are rendered to the extremes and denied 
all legitimacy; through this framing of the debate all effective critique is denounced. 
The liberal intellectual illustrates again here the decisive function unavailable to the 
straight supporter of both the 'war' and security politics more generally 15 . That 
Walzer is at the core of this process confirms the fallacy of his commitment to the left 
and dissolves the (neo-)conservative/liberal/left-liberal distinction that defines U.S. 
politics if not all liberal democratic politics.
The debate that resulted from the publication of WWFF much championed by 
its authors illustrates the result of this framing of possible positions. Those who join 
the debate from one of these four sanctioned positions are included and engaged with 
(including for example a strident critique supposedly from Osama bin Ladin or al- 
Qa'ida's representatives 16) but a critique that rejects them finds no response and is 
effectively excluded. al-Qa'ida can be included because they subscribe (in the 
caricature of the Islamic terrorist that they are aligned with and reinforce through their 
own rhetoric) to an apparently apolitical position. They can be included in the debate 
because they ultimately, on the basis on their adoption of or allocation to one of the 
possible 'alternatives', have nothing (political) to contribute in opposition to the 
liberal framing of the security regime.
The response to a critical intervention provided by a group of leftist US 
intellectuals 17 to this debate illustrates the charade of 'inclusivity' to this much 
vaunted debate. Unlike the responses by Muslim scholars and al-Qa'ida that elicited 
lengthy counter-responses from the original authors of WWFF, the intervention by 
scholars on the left provoked only silence 18 . An intervention that makes clear the
15 "As well as acting as conduits for the distribution of policy justifications, the liberal pro-war 
intellectuals help frame arguments for policy-makers in terms more palatable to potentially hostile 
audiences". Richard Seymour, The Liberal Defence of Murder, (London: Verso, 2008) 2.
16 "Osama bin Ladin", "Letter to the American People", 2002. in The Islam/West Debate: Documents 
from a Global Debate on Terrorism , U.S. Policy, and the Middle East, eds. David Blankenhorn, et al. 
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005)
17 140 U.S. Intellectuals, "Letter from United States Citizens to Friends in Europe". 2002. in The 
Islam/West Debate: Documents from a Global Debate on Terrorism , U.S. Policy, and the Middle East, 
eds. David Blankenhorn, et al. (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005)
18 It has been included on the archive pages of the Institute for American Values website and was 
included in Blankenhorn et al's compilation but this is seemingly to maintain the charade of an open
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ideological context in which the 'war on terror' is fought and in which WWFF was 
drafted does not warrant inclusion on the basis of its departure from the narrow range 
of alternative positions available. That the authors of this leftist intervention sought to 
directly politicise the sites of the 9/11 attacks by noting that 'the World Trade Center 
clearly symbolised U.S. global economic power, while the Pentagon represented U.S 
military power' 19 and thus sought to directly undermine the pivotal idea that the U.S. 
was attacked because of its 'values'. This meant that it need not, indeed could not, be 
accommodated into the debate.
Furthermore, the leftist intellectuals go as far as to implicate the authors and 
signatories of WWFF in the reinforcement of the fa9ade of the U.S state as the 
defender of universal values. By making explicit reference to the function of the 
intellectual in the context of the 'war on terror' they transcend the parameters of the 
debate fixed by the liberal intellectual and reinforced happily by the liberal state. The 
leftist intellectuals offer a choice available to intellectuals as to whether or not they 
join 'the chorus of those who celebrate brute force by rhetorically attaching it to
*?n
"spiritual values'" which is clearly where they locate the authors and signatories of 
WWFF designated as 'pro-war celebrants'. Those leftist intellectuals understand there 
to be an alternative beyond those laid out in WWFF; this involves 'taking up the more 
difficult and essential task of exposing the arrogant folly of power and working with 
the whole of humanity to create means of reasonable dialogue, fair economic relations
01
and equal justice' . The fact that this alternative falls outside the four options 
available in the WWFF framing of possible perspectives on the 'war on terror' means 
they do not warrant a response.
However, the fact that they understand the alternative in reference to the 
category of humanity and speak in terms that fail to name the system that ensures 
unfair economic relations means their intervention is worthy of a place at the end of 
Blankenhorn's collection and a spot on the Institute for American Values website 
which is indicative of inclusion in some basic form if ultimately regarded with 
indifference. One could suggest that if they had made their opposition without these
debate. In reality the lack of a response illustrated the unwillingness of the liberal intellectual to engage 
with anything approaching a substantive political critique.
19 140 U.S. Intellectuals, "Letter from United States Citizens to Friends in Europe", 255
20 140 U.S. Intellectuals, "Letter from United States Citizens to Friends in Europe", 256
21 140 U.S. Intellectuals, "Letter from United States Citizens to Friends in Europe", 256
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caveats they could not have been included in the debate as defined by the intellectuals 
tied to the Institute for American Values. The indifference with which this critique 
was treated is seemingly a consequence of its failure to push its critique as far as 
required. Holding back from the required naming of the both the politics of security 
and the capitalist system it sustains allowed for inclusion on liberal terms; but in this 
context it can be suggested that 'exclusion' would be a sign of a level of critique 
possible in this situation and clearly required from the left.
In light of the reference to humanity, this leftist intervention was understood 
only to make a basic point that 'the U.S. is an arrogant and militaristic enemy of
fyy
humanity' . This is because the basic ideological opposition (though clearly not 
pushed as far as it is able) could not be acknowledged without the apolitical 
presentation of the 'war on terror' becoming unravelled. The relevance of ideology in 
the WWFF framing is reserved only for 'Islamism' that is itself subsequently 
dismissed as essentially apolitical as it refuses to conform to liberal standards. In a 
clear echo of state strategy, politics is here ultimately denied; the current security 
regime is re-positioned at the 'end of history'. The leftist intellectuals do attempt a 
politicisation of security and make clear an ideological opposition to the liberal 
framing of the 'war on terror' and for this reason they transcend the narrow 
boundaries set to the debate by the liberal intellectual. However, their failure to push 
this political opposition to the point of an explicit anti-capitalism, exposing at the 
same time the bourgeois foundation of the concept of security, prevents them 
effectively disturbing the hegemonic status of the current framing. The question here 
is whether there can be an effective critique from the left that remains committed to 
principles shared with liberalism: can the left be truly critical if it is unwilling or 
unable to fully transcend the principles that define the current regime?
The redefinition of the left and the policing of dissent
Edward Said noted at the time of the publication of WWFF that the letter 'augurs a 
new and degraded era in the production of intellectual discourse' 23 that has seen 
intellectuals form the most powerful country in the world 'align themselves so
22 Roberts, "Introducing the Debate", 19
23 Said, "Thoughts about America"
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flagrantly with that power, pressing that power's case' 24 . This is of course not a new 
phenomenon and the level of support lent by intellectuals (including liberal 
intellectuals) to the state in this context is arguably not unprecedented but in light of 
this Said suggests we have returned to the 'bad old days of the intellectual war against 
communism' in which all too many intellectuals chose the path currently followed by 
the authors of WWFF. The idea of an intellectual war on terrorism appears to have 
more in common with the intellectual war on communism than a subservience of 
intellectuals to state strategy. The allegiance of liberal intellectuals and the liberal 
state in denouncing and fundamentally delegitimising all substantive political 
alternatives continues to define the twenty first century in the U.S. and beyond much 
as it did in the days of anti-communist witch-hunts25 . The intellectual war against 
terrorism needs to be understood as a war against alternatives and most specifically 
against the left. It is a war against political alternatives that reinforces the 'war on 
terror' because it follows the same binary opposition and separation into two races: 
good and evil. The good is the forces of civilisation, freedom, tolerance, democracy 
etc (read liberalism) and the evil is any opposition. The liberal intellectual needs to be 
understood as engaged in this intellectual war and these manifestos bring this out 
most explicitly. The liberal intellectual's service to the state in the contemporary 
period continues to arise from the intellectual weight they bring to the 
delegitimisation of any possible opposition to the liberal state and capitalism.
The denial of political alternatives has always been central to the role of the 
liberal intellectual in the service of security. The appeal to notions of nation and 
demand for loyalty to those 'values' that define the nation (and are used to construct a 
national identity) are mobilised for security now as much as they were in the 'bad old 
days' of the twentieth century. If we understand that 'deployed in the name of 
security, loyalty and identity help organise the political imagination around the 
state' 26 then the central theme of WWFF is in line with the liberal intellectual's wider 
role in the service of security. The role of the liberal intellectual in the security regime
24 Said, "Thoughts about America"
25 The continuity between the Cold War and the 'war on terror' in this sense lies in the perception of a 
threat posed to liberal capitalism by the so-called 'forces of evil'. For many the continuity of this threat 
is understood through a conflation of communism and Islam warranted on the basis of their shared 
commitment to a revolutionary egalitarianism: '.. .for many veteran or belated Cold Warriors, the 
menace posed to liberal capitalism by the Islam of the twentieth century (communism) has been 
relayed by the communism of the twenty-first (Islam)'. Toscano, Fanaticism, 239.
26 Neocleous, Critique of Security, 141
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is brought out most explicitly in this document but it makes no fundamental departure 
in nature from the substantive feature of the work considered in previous sections.
The intellectual war on communism can be understood as a crucial episode in 
the continual intellectual war on political alternatives that has always employed the 
liberal intellectual and remains at the core of their vital function in legitimising the 
liberal security regime. We see in WWFF and in the wider contribution of the liberal 
intellectual only a continuation of this in the post 9/11 period. As has been noted 
above it is the pretence of distance - in ideological standpoint or more precisely in the 
rejection of ideology - between the 'critical' liberal intellectual and the 'war on 
terror' that provides it with an unrivalled legitimating function. The 'war' on political 
alternatives is far more successful if it is fought on liberal terrain.
The emphasis on Walzer's signature in WWFF - raised here and reiterated by
"77
Said - arises from the pretence of distance between his ostensibly leftist (or 
socialist) politics and the politics of the 'war on terror'. It was noted in chapter one 
that Walzer's professed commitment to the left or his version of the 'decent' left 
allowed for a legitimating function that is borne out of the pretence of critique and the 
incorporation of political alternatives into a debate on security politics. The notion 
that the debate around the 'war on terror' can sustain substantive critique - and 
demands this on the basis of its liberal commitment to debate and the quest for 
consensus - affords Walzer's 'leftist' position an important voice in the debate much 
as it reinforces the importance of Rorty's intervention as discussed above. The 
legitimating function of the liberal intellectual that arises from their apparent political 
distance is arguably further compounded when these intellectuals locate themselves 
on the left. Their attempt to dissolve any leftist/liberal distinction has clearly been 
internalised in relation to their own politics and enables a pretence of leftist politics to 
be sustained while Walzer signs up to a document like WWFF. It arguably provides 
the document with a heightened legitimating function on the basis that it is apparently 
the result of a consensus among diversely situated intellectuals. This is of course a 
nonsense; the signatories are united through their commitment to a liberal politics that 
is, on the basis of its flexibility in popular political discourse at times given (or 
adopted) labels ranging across a liberal political spectrum from neo-conservative to 
liberal-left. While the involvement of the likes of Huntingdon and Elshtain is
27 Said, "Thoughts about America"
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important in terms of the provision of intellectual support for the 'war on terror' the 
WWFF document provides a greater legitimating function on the basis of the apparent 
diversity of the political backgrounds of the signatories.
The role of the 'decent' left in the era of the 'war on terror' is evident in the 
work of Walzer and Rorty but runs much deeper into the intellectual support for the 
current security regime. The 'decent' left has a pivotal and arguably unrivalled role to 
play in policing 'legitimate' alternatives that is fundamental in reinforcing what 
constitutes an acceptable 'critical' intervention. It is from this 'decent left' perspective 
that Walzer has been able to restore the ability of the The U.S. Army/Marine Corps to
/•) O ___
'think clearly about war - including its legitimacy and its demands' . The decent left 
is not a political alternative and Walzer is not a critic in any true sense; he and his 
vision of the left provide a pivotal source of legitimacy to the liberal state that has 
been of great importance to the marketing of the 'war on terror' to a liberal audience. 
However, the inclusion of the 'decent' left as an apparently distinct political 
perspective from both the neo-conservative and liberal interventions allows for the 
maintenance of the pretence of inclusivity and the ability of the security regime to 
accommodate substantive critique. The Euston Manifesto needs to be situated in this 
tradition.
The concept of a 'decent left' is acknowledged as being borrowed from 
Walzer's understanding of the need for a reformed left in the post 2001 era and in its 
current formulation, set out following the invasion of Iraq, it has been defined by 
those outside the movement as the pro-war left29 . This specific position initially 
merits focus because of its proclaimed willingness to 'propose a fresh political 
alignment' 30 in the context of the response to the current liberty-security regime. The 
influence of Walzer's (and the other public intellectuals') position on the response to 
terrorism running through the various levels of intellectual activity31 is seemingly
28 See, Sewall, "Introduction to the University of Chicago Press edition. A Radical Field Manual" xxii
29 See, Johann Hari. 2007. "Johann Hari: The pro-war left's disastrous misjudgment", The Independent, 
July 23, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/johann-hari/johann-hari-the-prowar- 
lefts-disastrous-misjudgment-458361 .html.
30 The Euston Manifesto, A. Preamble
31 The fact that this position has been seemingly adopted not only by academics but also bloggers and 
scholars suggests a notably diffusion of the position of the public liberal intellectual (Walzer at the very 
least) even beyond the readership of their own work. This grouping of intellectuals has the potential to 
popularise the liberal intellectuals' political approach to the current liberty-security regime. Given the 
legitimating function this approach has been shown to have the subsequent diffusion of these ideas is a 
key concern here.
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confirmed in this document and the idea that this has given rise to 'a fresh political 
alignment' warrants further scrutiny.
The development of Walzer's concept of a 'decent left' reveals much about 
this 'fresh political alignment' and its approach to the relationship between liberty and 
security. In essence, the concept of a 'decent left' has been employed to legitimate 
support for the military intervention central to the 'war on terror' from a supposedly 
left wing perspective. Much as Walzer (and Rorty) consider the left to be incapable of 
'keeping up' with the demands of the new age of international terrorism, the 
articulation of this position has been incited by the apparent failure of the anti-war 
movement (aimed predominantly at the intervention in Iraq) to remain both realistic 
and true to the values of the left32 . The supposedly new political alignment revolves 
around Walzer and Rorty's notion of abandoning the leftist/liberal distinction and 
'reaching out beyond the socialist Left toward egalitarian liberals and other of 
unambiguous democratic commitment' 33 . It is an approach defined by a liberal 
understanding of democracy that shares Walzer and Rorty's frustration with the 
failure of the left to modernise. Modernisation of the left is understood to mean an 
abandonment of Marxism but moreover dissolution of the left/liberal distinction and 
an abandonment of any true opposition to the status quo. This 'modernisation' of the 
left involves an abandonment of its core principles; it is a demand for 'suicidal' 
reform that in light of Walzer and Rorty's articulation of the demands may be better 
understood as a conscious process of attempting to kill off any true leftist politics. 
From this conservative foundation it is unsurprising that the 'decent left' is a 
perspective committed to human rights principles and the legitimacy of the use of 
military intervention to fight terrorism. The novelty or 'freshness' of this alignment 
lies in defining what it is to be on, or of, the left and not in defining a response to the 
current security regime.
The emphasis lies once again with a project of revisiting what a left-liberal 
position on the 'war on terror' should look like. Fundamentally, the project for these
32 The preface to Alan Johnson's 'Global Politics After 9/11' was written by Walzer and he used this 
space to reiterate his notion of a decent left as considered in chapter 1 above. The introduction by 
Johnson seeks to set out how through the pages of both the Euston Manifesto and the Democratiya 
journal this concept has been developed ultimately to reveal its relevance (and necessity) for the post 
9/11 era. See, Alan Johnson, Global Politics After 9/11: The Democratiya Interviews, (London: The 
Foreign Policy Centre and Democratiya, 2008)
33 The Euston Manifesto, A. Preamble
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'leftists' is the same one that has united many of these scholars returning to the 
foundations of the liberal (and in this case the leftist) tradition to set out a true 
response to terrorism. These scholars, journalists, bloggers etc locate themselves on 
the left and from here seek to rethink the liberal relationship between liberty and 
security. That they take Walzer's purportedly leftist (and ultimately liberal) 
perspective as their starting point is unsurprising but it is further illustration of the 
broad influence of the public intellectual strata. The political alignment proposed here 
is instead again distinctly liberal, and develops out of the work of the liberal 
intellectuals with the influence of WWFF implicit in both its content and form. This is 
illustrated not least by the fact that the response to global inequality is restricted to 
'radical reform' of the major institutions of global economic governance34 . The 
fallacy of this perspective purporting to offer an alternative politics to that that defines 
the current regime is clear: this is not a project of the left, defined by an alternative 
politics to the current liberal regime, but a rearticulation of the liberal framework 
formally positioned on the left as an attempted grasp for legitimacy both for the 
current regime and for those supposedly on the left who support it.
In true liberal fashion, following the dominant approach set out in the 
literature considered above, the liberal response is positioned between two opposing 
forces. In this case the threat is not from terrorism and neo-conservatism but from 
terrorism and another illiberal threat - that of the 'old left'. The left that refuses to 
accept the politics of the current regime is lumped together under the banner of 
'excusers of terrorism and tyranny'. Mirroring the 'with us or against us' rhetoric that 
defined the 'war on terror' from the outset, a leftist opposition to war in Iraq is 
equated with excusing terrorism; arriving at the same conclusion that renders the 
leftist intellectual response to WWFF mentioned above to fall on deaf ears (despite in 
that case its own failings to develop its critique and state the seemingly 'unstatable'). 
The EM develops the conflation of leftist opposition to military intervention and 
terrorism through the definition of the 'far left' as nihilists35 echoing Ignatieff s 
definition (reinforced by both the consensus of liberal intellectual opinion and of 
course in liberal state security discourse) of international terrorists as 'apocalyptic 
nihilists'.
34 The Euston Manifesto - B. Statement of Principles
35 Nick Cohen, What's Left: How Liberals Lost Their Way, (London: Fourth Estate, 2007) 14.
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The apparent leftist sympathy with authoritarian or terrorist regimes has been 
discussed by one of the original authors of EM (and leading figures of the 'decent 
left') as being underpinned by a 'new authoritarian Marxism' that, under the
v 1Aleadership of Badiou and Zizek, is articulating a "terrorist" theory of the state . This 
simplistic, superficial 'analysis' of the contemporary left is based initially on a 
reductionist vision that unites all leftist anti-war (or anti 'war on terror') sentiment 
together to be readily dismissed. But more pressingly, the labelling of a 'terrorist 
theory of the state' exhibits the liberal attempt to delegitimise any truly alternative 
politics and utilises the most effective label available in the current epoch to dismiss 
the legitimacy of any position: terrorist. Given that the construction of the terrorist in 
the current epoch is inseparable from the idea of the fanatic, we see in this dismissal 
of the left - for Johnson exemplified in the work of Badiou and Zizek - a re- 
emergence of the critique of Marx and Marxism on the grounds of its own
"^7
fanaticism . This critique is intended to be particularly potent given Johnson's (and 
the 'decent' left's) role in the construction of the Islamic terrorist as a fanatic in the 
context of the 'war on terror'.
The fear of any truly alternate leftist politics, that is in reality a fear of 
transformation, confirms that this 'fresh political alignment' is clearly a reiteration of 
the liberal framework maintaining the legitimacy of the current status quo. The
v •} o
position of Zizek and Badiou is dismissed as the 'reactionary Left-cum-Right' as 
part of the attempt to cleanse the left of any true opposition to liberalism. Liberalism 
is understood as compatible with the left as the left in this vision is understood as the 
inheritors of the bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth century. A rejection of this 
tradition and any attempt at its transcendence is from this position a betrayal of the 
principles of the left and must be aligned with or transplanted to the right. The 
simplistic and very selective, if not wholly disingenuous, reading of history allows for 
a redefinition of what the left is and what it means to be on the left. Crucially, here the 
leftism of Zizek and Badiou is aligned with the terrorist on the basis of their rejection 
of human rights. Both can be understood as outside legitimate politics by virtue of this 
rejection. If the left is understood in this way as the direct inheritors of the bourgeois
36 Alan Johnson, 2010. "The New Authoritarian Marxism: A Terrorist Theory of the State", Dissent 
Magazine Blog, May 17. Accessed January 24, 2012.http://www.dissentmagazine.org/atw.php7io> 122.
37Toscano, Fanaticism, 173
38 Alan Johnson. "The Reckless Mind of Slavoj Zizek" in Dissent 56, Fall (2009)
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revolutions it has to be committed to human rights; any attempt at a leftism that does 
not define its critique in the language of human rights has seemingly abandoned the 
left and this is precisely what the EM, and the decent left, assert. As a result it would 
seem that the possibilities for effective critique and dissent in the current epoch are 
denied. In terms of the 'engagement' with the contemporary left the 'decent left' 
serves only to give further legitimacy to a regime that has been condemned most 
vociferously (on the page and the street) by those on the left39 . The rewriting of the 
recent history of left wing protest and dissent at least in response to the 'war on terror' 
is a shared feature of both WWFF40 and EM as they both remain at their core 
defenders of the state in the face of dissent41 .
We have in the form of the EM the fulfilment of Walzer and Rorty's demand 
(by no means unique to them) for the dissolution of the left/liberal distinction. The 
equation of the left with the liberal is not simply the result of the confusion of the 
terms in popular US political discourse; to be on the 'decent' left is to be liberal and 
in the current context this means to be wholesale supporters of the liberal security 
regime. Supporting the regime is of course only a sign that the liberal-left like the 
liberal more generally is firmly committed to (the politics of) security; it could not be 
in any way in opposition by virtue of its alignment with the status quo. It is this vision 
of the left that allows one of its leading lights and disciples of Walzer42, Alan Johnson 
to see fit to work for the UK government in a consultative role in the development of 
its counter radicalisation and counter-extremism strategies43 . Johnson's work in
39 There is no attempt here to make the same reduction of the left to one essential position and nor is 
there the attempt to defend or legitimate all leftist positions and subsequent alliances made in the anti- 
war movement. The point made is that the 'decent left' is not of the left if one understands the left to be 
defined in opposition to the current status quo. It is instead liberal and suffers from the classic fear of 
any alternative politics that are willing to challenge the current status quo in terms of its political and 
economic arrangement.
40 WWFF supports 'not only our government's but society's decision to use force of arms against them 
(the terrorists)' ignoring - and thus dismissing - the waves of protest in the US against the invasion of 
Afghanistan. See, 60 U.S. Intellectuals, "What We're Fighting For", 29.
41 "The Euston group provides a counter-pressure against shifts to the Left that the antiwar movement 
has produced". Seymour, The Liberal Defence of Murder, 230
42 Johnson was the founder of the journal Democratiya in 2005. The journal has since been 
incorporated into Dissent magazine where the link with Walzer was made formal through Johnson's 
admission to the editorial board of Dissent. Democratiya was defined as 'a free quarterly online journal 
of social-democratic and anti-totalitarian politics and culture' that reveals much about its underlying 
politics as well as its link to, or influence on, the central themes of EM. Dissent. 2009. "Democratiya". 
Accessed February 2, 2012. http://dissentmagazine.org/democratiya.php [Accessed 3/2/12]
43 'Alan recently completed a consultancy project for the UK government, studying journeys taken by 
young British Muslims 'in and out of extremism' and helping to develop strategies and
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developing the EM and the wider work of the 'decent' left must be understood as 
playing an integral informal role in the development of this counter- 
extremism/radicalisation strategy that complements Johnson's formal role. The 
'decent' left plays a fundamental part in defining both what constitutes extreme or 
radical (and in Johnson's view 'terrorist') politics and thus play a vital role in policing 
political alternatives and reinforcing the legitimacy of the status quo (a role that is 
arguably even unavailable to the explicitly liberal intellectual).
The decent left's willingness, if not compulsion, to legitimise the state's 
security regime is brought out only most explicitly by Nick Cohen, one of the lead 
authors of the EM, in reference to Iraq. In a rebuke of Robin Cook's resignation in 
protest at the invasion of Iraq, Cohen developed the line of the EM equating 
opposition to war with support for (and in Cook's case responsibility for) the deaths 
of Iraqis under the former regime. Cohen's absolute support for the British 
involvement in the invasion led him to define the British Army in that context as 'the 
armed wing of Amnesty International' 44 . The legitimising effect of this framing of 
British military involvement is arguably without parallel; it is a framing that the state 
so desired in its own documentation of the time but the state could never be as brazen 
as to conflate 'humanitarian (military) intervention' with the work of the HR 
organisation despite its insinuation of this link in its justification of the war. It is here 
that the role of the apparently independent intellectual (an independence reinforced by 
Cohen's status on the left) becomes crucial in not simply reinforcing the state's 
position but being able to frame the state's role in terms unacceptable in official 
discourse. Notwithstanding Amnesty's own work legitimising the state, the equation 
of military intervention with human rights advocacy in Cohen's work45 seeks to 
position the state alongside Amnesty and others and usurp their position in the 
popular consciousness as the guardians of human rights. In this framing, protest 
against the war in Iraq is equated with an opposition to human rights and by extension 
an opposition to the emancipation of those Iraqis who were the victims of the violence 
of Saddam Hussain's regime. In a further reduction of WWFF's narrow choice of
communications aimed at countering radicalisation and extremism.' World Affairs Journal. 2011. 
"Alan Johnson". Accessed February 2, 2012. http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/users/alan-johnson.
44 Nick Cohen, "A question of guilt", The Observer, July 13, 2003, accessed April 15, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/jul/13/iraq.iraql
45Notably in his role as a columnist for The Observer, the natural 'home' for Britain's left-liberal anti- 
war middle classes.
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positions in relation to the 'war on terror', there are for Cohen and the EM only two 
choices: support for the war and human rights (read here freedom) or an opposition to 
both. Phrased another way, this choice is framed as one of support for the US and 
British state or support for the Iraqi state under Saddam Hussain. The attempt to 
'simplify' the options available is of course an attempt to quash resistance to the 
state's military and political project.
The decent left and liberalism's exclusionary logic
The mobilisation of a popular anti-Islam, anti-immigration, xenophobic racism that 
characterises security discourse is a crucial component in the process of establishing 
support for the current security regime. In light of this, we should not be surprised that 
the state is reliant on the support and assistance of an intellectual class to develop and 
legitimate this racism46 but we must however, be aware of the specific role within this 
of the liberal intellectual who has the capacity (and the willingness) to reinforce this 
construction of the Other and to do so in such a way that it can be presented as in line 
with liberal democratic values. Recent history alone attests to the fact that the liberal 
state is willing to impose a regime of racist violence directed at the most marginalised 
sectors of the population47, but the legitimating function of the liberal intellectuals 
support for the construction of the Muslim Other (the Muslim 
extremist/fundamentalist) is vital. The role of the decent left in this is significant. A 
critique of contemporary security politics, and the racism that they entail, cannot 
restrict its focus to the political right and instead must be mindful of what Badiou has 
referred to as 'the crushing responsibility of those, very often - they say - "of the 
left,'" 48 . While in this sense we must refer to both governments and intellectuals 
(nominally) of the left, we must clarify that in these cases those governments of the 
right and the left who have depended on these exclusionary measures are 
differentiated by name only. The labels of right and left must in reality be dismissed;
46Alain Badiou, "The Racism of the Intellectuals" ["Le racisme des intellectuels"], Le Monde, May 5, 
2012, trans. Edward P. Kazarian, accessed August 14, 2012. 
http://darkprecursor.net/2012/05/07/badious-the-racism-of-the-intellectuals/
47 See A. Sivanandan (1981) "From resistance to rebellion: Asian and Afro-Caribbean struggles in 
Britain," Race & Class XXIII, 2/3 (1981)
48Badiou, "The Racism of the Intellectuals"
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these regimes, located either side of what is a false divide, are in substance liberal and 
it is in this sense that the political position of the decent left is to be understood.
The role of the liberal intellectual in the service of the liberal state is here 
crystallised. What is professed in these manifestos only reinforces the wider work of 
the liberal intellectual including here the work of the human rights organisation. If 
social engagement is the marker of true intellectual activity49 then the liberal 
intellectual as conceived here is indeed worthy of this title. More crucially, it fails in 
any way to depart from the position of the liberal state and what we have here is but 
another forum through which the liberal intellectual can legitimise the state politics of 
security. The form taken here is significant in that it demonstrates the commitment of 
contemporary intellectuals to rally to the support of the state as well as their 
willingness to adapt the medium to fit the message. The veil of independence and 
autonomy is of course crucial to both the legitimacy of the intellectuals and to what is 
basically a statement of support. Not discounting a genuine sense of impartial critique 
on the part of many liberal intellectuals, we are reminded through this analysis that 
the regime we are considering is truly liberal and that its current form is the result of a 
series of interventions. The state is pivotal in the development of this regime but its 
form, and its endurance, is a result in part of the support it receives from apparently 
independent non-state actors of which the intellectual, and most specifically the 
'critical' intellectual, are of utmost importance. The claims to be on the left is an 
attempt to extend this 'critical' independence and the legitimating function provided 
through the intervention from the liberal-left while not new50 is fundamental.
It is clear that the 'decent left' is incapable of, but also unwilling to provide, 
critique. The narrowing of possibilities for dissent so crucial to its role in the current 
era raises questions about its framing of the left in the post 2001, if not post 1989, 
period. We have in the shape of WWFF and EM the qualification of the charge that 
the liberal intellectual's labour can be defined by the quest to disqualify any political 
reasoning that is not their own. This attempted decimation of the possibility for truly
49
Review
Radhika Desai, "Second-Hand Dealers in Ideas: Think-Tanks and Thatcherite Hegemony", New Left 
i  1,203 (1994) 37
50 "Imperialism is not a distant relic, but a living reality, and the moralization of the means of violence 
has been the task of the liberal and progressive intellectuals since the first competed with clerics for 
moral authority. The liberal facade is important for the empire, because those claiming to draw on 
leftist traditions are not, like their militaristic friends on the right, sullied by having espoused principles 
of inequality for decades". Seymour, The Liberal Defence of Murder, 218.
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alternative perspectives founded on an alternative political reasoning is a decisive 
political manoeuvre that confirms the importance of the liberal intellectual and their 
role in the maintenance of liberal hegemony. This process makes clear that liberalism 
enacts a form of political rationality that is defined by the prioritisation of security51 
and the liberal intellectual is employed in defending this rationality as the only 
legitimate possibility for contemporary politics. From this stance any true opposition 
to security in its current form(s) is symptomatic of alternative politics that must be 
delegitimised and in reality excluded.
In the provision of this support the signatories of WWFF and EM highlight 
once again the role of human rights as an integral component of the politics of 
security. The framing of the current political context by the authors of WWFF and 
EM highlights the apparent centrality of human rights principles to their political 
reasoning and as a result their importance in marking the illegitimacy of alternative 
politics that refuse to conform to liberal principles. The pervasiveness of this framing 
is reinforced through the idea that not only is a commitment to human rights a marker 
of legitimacy in the debate about the response to terrorism but it is also an essential 
marker of a true leftism and this raises a central question about the use of human 
rights on the left. The decent left has illustrated that its own commitment to human 
rights is not to strengthen its capacity for criticism but precisely the opposite; it is to 
reinforce the legitimation of the current regime and to reinforce the politics of 
security. The question here seems instead to be whether it is possible to remain 
committed to the principles of human rights whilst still opposing the current status 
quo from a truly alternative politics. The response to WWFF provided by the 140 
leftist intellectuals appears to suggest that a commitment to these principle at the very 
least dilutes a critique, and while it does not infer the complicity of the 'decent left' in 
their intervention, it fails to establish a position that can name and truly challenge the 
politics of security. There is a need to consider further whether a commitment to 
human rights is a fundamental hindrance to the leftist critique that the current regime 
and the politics of security in general require. The suggestion is not automatically that 
a human rights perspective on the left is by definition impossible but that it is, based 
on this analysis thus far, difficult to see how the maintenance of a commitment to
51 Neocleous "Security, Liberty and the Myth of Balance"
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what appears to be an essentially liberal principle - certainly one that defines the 
liberal position - can be compatible with a politics that refuses a liberal political 
reasoning, rejects security and is truly in opposition to the status quo.
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Chapter 6 
Human rights in Left Politics / Emancipatory Politics in Human Rights?
While the previous sections have highlighted an apparently inherent relationship 
between human rights and liberal politics, this chapter seeks to respond to the more 
complex issue of the attempt to employ human rights principles as part of, and even as 
central to, a critical left wing perspective. Focussing on the work of Noam Chomsky, 
Judith Butler and Jurgen Habermas this analysis seeks to consider how intellectuals 
who locate themselves on the left (and in this case intellectuals who are lauded as 
three of the most prominent leftist intellectuals) understand an emancipatory potential 
for human rights. Given what has been revealed about the depoliticising function of 
human rights activism and the conservative function human rights have as an integral 
component of liberal politics, the analysis considers how human rights can be 
employed on the left in the face of current (and past) critiques. Fundamentally, the 
analysis considers the extent to which leftist intellectuals who see human activism as 
central to their work seek to mark a definitive distinction between their position and 
the liberal understanding of human rights.
The analysis begins by setting out the conception of human rights on the left 
as defined by these thinkers. While considering the work of Chomsky, Butler and 
Habermas to be by no means homogenous, the analysis seeks in the first instance to 
outline how human rights are understood as compatible with a leftist politics as well 
as the similarities and divergences in position offered by these three. Secondly, the 
analysis seeks to consider in what ways, and to what extent, this leftist position 
departs from the liberal understanding. The central question here lies with the 
possibility for human rights to be detached from liberal politics, relieved of their 
legitimising function in relation to the current status quo (in both its political and 
economic formation) and put to service in the context of alternative, emancipatory 
politics. The analysis begins by determining if a leftist understanding of human rights 
in itself constitutes a challenge to the current structures that define the status quo.
The second major strand of this analysis turns to the specific application of 
human rights as part and even central to critiques of the current security regime. The 
primary concern here lies with the departure these critiques make from the critique 
offered by liberal intellectuals and scholars considered above. The analysis will
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consider the extent to which these critiques offered from the left question the 
substantive features of the status quo as opposed to being restricted to highlighting 
abuses of human rights. In this sense, the analysis poses a central question about the 
efficacy of a critique of liberal politics based on human rights. Furthermore, the 
analysis asks how a defence of human rights is separated from the right to security 
and ultimately, the security of property and the securitisation of society; in other 
words, are human rights decoupled from the notion of security in the current context?
The concern remains throughout with the seemingly paradoxical application of 
human rights as part of, if not at the core of, a left politics. In the context of the 'war 
on terror' this paradox appears to be compounded by the role human rights play in 
legitimating the politics of security and the analysis here will therefore attend to both 
the pre and post-9/11 interventions made by these authors to decipher if a leftism that 
relies on human rights can constitute a truly alternative political formulation. The 
analysis asks if human rights are inherently tied to liberal principles, or do they 
embody principles of their own which can provide the basis for, or otherwise be put to 
use in the context of emancipatory politics.
Contesting the foundation of human rights
The relationship between language and politics is a central concern for Chomsky, 
Butler and Habermas (albeit in different ways) but it is arguably in Chomsky's work 
that his concern with language and subsequent linguistic theory is most integral to his 
understanding of human rights. Despite Chomsky's continual refutation of the idea of 
any substantive link between his linguistic work and his political writings, his 
understanding of human rights is grounded by the central theme that emerges from his 
linguistic theory, namely, that of human nature. Chomsky's theory of Universal 
Grammar 1 posits an innate human capacity to learn grammatical rules and develop 
language. In his formulation of a Cartesian linguistics2 Chomsky maintains that the 
general features of grammatical structure are common to all languages and reflect 
certain fundamental properties of mind. He identifies himself as a Cartesian rationalist 
grounding his linguistic theory on the idea that there are certain intrinsic properties of
1 Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965)
2 Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought, (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1966)
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human nature3 and it is this central idea that, despite his claims to the contrary, marks 
a fundamental connection between his linguistic and political work.
On the basis of an acceptance of human nature, ethics as well as language find 
their foundation in innate, fundamental human qualities. Chomsky sees himself 
joining a long tradition of thinkers who develop the notion of innate rights as part of 
the natural world understood through rational enquiry4and as a result he positions 
himself as a politically neutral scientist who is employed in revealing fundamental 
human qualities that can be applied to the political realm. Ethics is grounded in 
human nature, residing 'in fundamental human qualities, in terms of which a "real" 
notion of justice is grounded' 5 .
While a commitment to human rights presupposes an association of rights and 
the notion of humanity, Butler starts from a confrontation with the meaning of 
'humanity' in questioning whether 'human rights take the human as their ground' 6 . 
This starting point illustrates the conceptual distance between Chomsky and Butler 
and Butler's further question as to the possibility that 'human rights do not so much 
presuppose the human as conjecture (but) posit its future possibility' 7 marks clearly 
her rejection of the tradition of innate rights within which Chomsky locates himself.
Butler asserts a need to 'distinguish between humanity understood as the 
quality of being human and the human as subject position secured through juridical
o
power and from this point we begin to unravel the centrality of this apparent 
reinterpretation of human rights to her politics. Butler suggests that the status of being 
human is not in the current mainstream political culture a universal. Humanness, as 
currently constituted, is an exclusionary concept and Butler's work involves a critical 
analysis of the definition of the human and a subsequent attempt at a reconstitution of
3 See, Alison Edgley, "Chomsky's Political Critique: Essentialism and Political Theory", 
Contemporary Political Theory 4 (2005).
4 Noam Chomksy, Chomsky on Anarchism, (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2005) 173.
5 Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault, The Chomsky-Foucault Debate: On Human Nature, (New 
York: New York Press, 2009) 55.
6 Judith Butler, "Afterword - The Humanities in Human Rights: Critique, Language, Politics" in PMLA 
121,5(2006).
7 Butler, "Afterword", 1659
8 Butler, "Afterword", 1659
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this category. Butler is aware that 'certain humans are recognised as less than human' 9 
but the required response involves a contestation with what counts as a human life.
The notion of human rights grounded in human nature is also emphatically 
rejected by Habermas leaving the Chomskian position, at least in this group but 
arguably more generally, isolated on the left. Human rights are for Habermas 
constructions as opposed to being pre-given moral truths10 that need to be understood 
as being 'Janus-faced, looking simultaneously toward morality and law' 11 . This 
dualist conception of human rights is set out in Habermas' attempted refutation of 
Schmitt's critique of the moral foundation and moralising effects of human rights. For 
Habermas contra Schmitt, human rights 'do not have their origin in morality but 
rather bear the imprint of the modern concept of individual rights hence of a 
specifically juridical concept' 12 . The charge that human rights have a moral 
foundation is for Habermas based in an overemphasis on the fact that moral 
arguments are sufficient for the justification of basic rights and a resulting disregard 
of their existing juridical character. The moral justification for rights provides them 
with a universal validity claim but does not turn them into moral norms 13 .
Fundamentally, human rights 'owe their character to their structure, not their 
content' 14 and their structure is determined by 'the structure and form of modern 
law' 15 . Yet the relationship between law and morality remains central to Habermas' 
conceptualization of human rights:
Human rights circumscribe precisely that part (and only that part) of morality 
that can be translated into the medium of coercive law and become political 
reality in the robust shape of effective political rights 16 .
9 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender, (New York: Routledge, 2004) 2.
10Jurgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 
2001)122
11 Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, 118.
12Jurgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1996) 191.
13Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other, 191 
14Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other, 191
15 Jeffery Flynn, "Habermas on Human Rights: Law, Morality, and Intercultural Dialogue", Social 
Theory and Practice 29, 3 (2003) 434.
16Jurgen Habermas, "The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights", 
Metaphilosophy 41, 4, (2010)470.
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Habermas positively celebrates the coercive capacity of law for its ability to fill the 
void left by a depleted common morality in modern complex societies. The 
connection between morality and law is further conceptualized through the idea of 
human dignity that 'forms the "portal" through which the egalitarian and 
universalistic substance of morality is incorporated into law' 17 . A conception of 
existing equality is grounded in human rights through the legal recognition of the 
equal dignity of human beings and for Habermas this 'interplay' between law and 
morality could (and seemingly in his terms, should) give rise to a political order 
founded on human rights 18 .
Whilst human dignity is the moral 'source' from which 'basic rights derive 
their meaning' 19 it is only social and political struggle that make violations of human 
dignity possible20 . Habermas' conceptualization is for Flynn indicative of the active 
component of human dignity through which it is made central to the 'moral and
01political constructivism of the content of human rights' . In this sense Habermas 
promotes an understanding of human rights that avoids visualizing violations of 
human dignity in overly passive terms. There exists an apparent distinction between 
the logics of humanitarianism and human rights as they are grounded respectively in a 
passive and active component of human dignity that have for Flynn given rise to 
different politics. Habermas' politics of human rights is based in the active component 
that understands others as the subject of rights as opposed to mere 'objects of concern
oo
or pity' . We have then in Habermas's conceptualization an active subject of human 
rights that is presented as distinct from the idea of the victim that is central to the 
logic of humanitarianism.
17Habermas, "The Concept of Human Dignity," 469 
18Habermas, "The Concept of Human Dignity," 469 
19Habermas, "The Concept of Human Dignity," 466
20 Jeffery Flynn, "Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and the Politics of Human Dignity" (paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting and Exhibition of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, 
WA, September 1-4, 2011), accessed May 11, 2012, http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1899837
21 Flynn, "Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and the Politics of Human Dignity," 14
22 Flynn, "Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and the Politics of Human Dignity," 19
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Rejecting the concept of innate rights: universality as an unfinished project
While the universality of humanity is a finished project for Chomsky, international
syj
lesbian and gay politics involves for Butler a process of 'reconstituting the human' 
taking universality as a 'site of contest' 24 to reimagine and redefine who counts as a 
person. This struggle is at the very core of human rights activism for Butler as 
pursuing rights and their ongoing universalization is a struggle to extend the 
recognition of who (which individuals or groups) count as persons recognised in their 
humanity. The struggle for rights is for Butler fundamental to the process of 
transformation. Reconstituting the human, opening up this category to include those 
otherwise excluded individuals (and groups) is presented as a radical, emancipatory 
process and underlies Butlers political project; universalisation is an ongoing process 
brought about by a critical human rights activism.
Understanding human rights as a strategy aimed at ever widening inclusion of 
particularities dissolves Butler's human rights project into a politics of recognition; an 
identity politics, the implications of which must be considered further. We must ask of 
this project (as of any human rights project) what kind of politicisation it desires; as 
Wendy Brown has suggested, we must ask 'what kind of political recognition can
f\ C
identity based claims seek' . We must also in the context of the current politics of 
security ask what possible critique can an identity politics - or a human rights politics 
based on the recognition of identity(s) - produce if it fails to acknowledge the 
relevance of class politics. If, as Brown suggests, identity politics is at least partly 
dependant on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and 
economic values, and as a result reinscribes bourgeois ideals leaving the status quo 
untouched, we must consider what potential a human rights project based on these 
premises has for the left? How can the politics of security be contested by a political 
project that avoids a confrontation with capitalism? A project that reinscribes 
bourgeois ideals is incapable of confronting the current regime with a view to
23 Butler, Undoing Gender, 30
24 Judith Butler, "Restaging the Universal", in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, eds. Judith 
Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek, (London: Verso, 2000) 38
25 Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995)55.
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transform it and here we must be mindful of the possibility that this formulation of a 
human rights politics may serve to reinforce the impenetrability of security.
Human rights are thus intrinsically tied to Butler's understanding of an 
transformative politics; the exclusion that characterises the current understanding of 
humanness is not an inherent feature of human rights, it is only a feature of an 
'imperialist' conception of international human rights. The category of the inhuman or 
the subhuman is not a creation of human rights as per Badiou's critique but is instead 
viewed as the result of the curtailment of the recognition of universal humanity 
grounded in a particular (and clearly dominant) conception of human rights. 
Fundamentally, the challenge to this narrow interpretation of personhood can come 
through human rights activism as 'international human rights is always in the process
0 f\
of subjecting the human to definition and renegotiation' . This process leaves open 
the possibility for an 'anti-imperialist or, minimally, non-imperialist conception of
*77
international human rights' that 'calls into question what is meant by the human' . 
This involves challenging the human as subject position secured through juridical 
power and instead basing a recognition of humanity on the quality of being human.
For Habermas human rights are understood to carry a universal range of 
application despite their obvious unequal application. Here then as for Butler, 
universalisation is an incomplete process that must be extended and ultimately 
concluded, but unlike Butler, in Habermas' conceptualization this process is a legal 
one that is to be achieved through exhausting the human rights content of basic law28 . 
The distinction between Habermas' and Butler's understanding of the process 
universalisation comes through Habermas' denial of a specifically political process 
and its substitution with a legal one. This is fundamental to Habermas' understanding 
of human rights and the subsequent promotion of a vision of societies wholly 
governed by law but there also remain questions as to the specific character of the 
politicisation that Butler demands that we will return to.
26Butler, Undoing Gender, 33 
27Butler, Undoing Gender, 37 
28Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other
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Human rights in alternative politics?
From an understanding of ethics as an 'a priori structure of consciousness'29 
Chomsky's political writings, indeed his politics in general, can be characterised as 
the pursuit of justice understood to be defined by the defence of these innate human 
rights. Popular struggles are therefore reduced to upholding human rights; 
emancipatory struggle in Chomskian terms is the struggle to uphold the natural rights 
that exist by virtue of one's humanity. Chomsky's conception of human rights is 
central to his own political framework that he defines as anarchist with 'origins in the 
Enlightenment and classical liberalism' 30 . It is this 'classical' liberalism that grounds 
the notion of innate rights and there is a need to decipher how this tradition is 
accommodated into what is positioned as (and widely championed as) a 
transformative, emancipatory politics.
There exists for Chomsky a classical, pre-capitalist liberalism that has at its 
core a notion of the common good. This concept of a liberalism defined by equality 
and in turn central to the notion of democracy is an integral component of Chomsky's 
leftist, anarchist politics31 . Equality is understood to be grounded in human nature and 
framed by the equal rights we hold on the basis of our humanity. The contents of 
human nature that give rise to this equality are thus the only possible basis for a 
legitimate social order. The classical liberalism of Adam Smith and James Madison is 
by virtue of a rehabilitation of their work afforded a central influence in the 
development of an alternative politics. He sees not only a pre-capitalist but even an 
anti-capitalist theme in the works of Smith and Madison that obscures (or attempts to 
rehabilitate) the fundamental contribution made by these thinkers to the foundation of 
a bourgeois ideology. In particular Chomsky's reformation of Madison to an 'anti- 
capitalist' position (or at least to one having anti-capitalist themes) involves the 
suggestion that Madison's defence of the right to unequal property and his assertion 
that the defence of this right should be the first object of government (to ultimately 
protect the differential acquisitive capacities of men) are not reflective of the 'spirit'
29 Christopher Wise, Chomsky and Deconstruction: The Politics of Unconscious Knowledge, (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2011) 74.
30Chomksy, Chomsky on Anarchism, 191
31 Noam Chomsky, "The Common Good" (speech delivered at The Progressive Challenge, Capitol 
Hill, Washington D.C. January 9, 1997) accessed May 12, 2012, 
http://www.cooperativeindividualism.org/chomsky_commongood.html
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of his work and his politics. For Chomsky classical liberalism can be understood as a 
set of ideas that were superseded, or moreover swept away, by the 'rising tides of 
state capitalist autocracy' 32 . The suggestion that Madison's ideas were 'swept away' 
by the development of state capitalism as opposed to being at its very core involves a 
startling denial.
On the basis of such obfuscation Chomsky suggests that this classical 
liberalism and its defining concept of innate rights have a transformative, in the sense 
of emancipatory, potential. Indeed, the notion of innate rights grounds the only 
possibility for radical change; a rejection of human nature is ultimately conservative 
'as it legitimates existing hierarchies' 33 . As a result a politics based on human rights is 
presented as essentially transformative given that it seeks by definition to challenge 
existing structural inequality.
The overlap between classical liberalism and anarchism is not unique in 
Chomsky's work and has its most pronounced link in terms of the relationship to law 
and the faith in its capacity to restrain the expansion of state power34 . Chomsky's 
indebtedness to the classical liberal tradition lies not only in his understanding of 
innate rights but in the faith he puts in their ability to restrain the state and moreover 
to uphold individual rights against the privileged35 . Human rights are understood to 
have a levelling effect in the pursuit of an egalitarian social order and a regulatory 
effect in relation to the state. Chomsky's anarchism aligns itself with a liberalism 
apparently uncontaminated by the oppressive conception of rights (rights allocated 
other than by virtue of one's humanity) that resulted from the 'growth of the industrial 
economy, and the rise of corporate forms of economic enterprise' 36 . The radical 
change in the concept of human rights that brought about the inclusion of any 
'individual, branch, partnership, associated group, association, estate, trust, 
corporation or other organization (whether or not organized under the laws of any 
State), or any government entity' 37 symbolises the shift from classical (pre or even
32 Chomsky, Chomsky on Anarchism, 191
33 Chomsky, Chomsky on Anarchism, 175
34 See, Robert F Barsky, The Chomsky Effect: A Radical Works Beyond the Ivory Tower, (Cambridge 
MA: The MIT Press, 2007) chapter 4.
35Barsky, The Chomsky Effect, 188
36 Noam Chomksy, "Market Democracy in a Neoliberal Order: Doctrines and Reality", Z Magazine, 
November 1997, accessed August 15, 2011, http://www.chomsky.info/articles/19971 l-.htm.
37Survey of Current Business, in Chomsky, "Market Democracy in a Neoliberal Order".
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anti-capitalist) liberalism to the contemporary form that allows the abuse of human 
rights and in turn gives rise to an oppressive force underpinning liberal governance 
and market principles that was supposedly absent in the days of Smith and Madison et 
al.
It is clear then that the notion of human rights as grounded in human nature is 
at the core of Chomsky's politics and central to his understanding of both existing 
equality and of the left's ability to mount a challenge to the current status quo. His 
even partial adherence to classical liberalism - a form supposedly detached from 
contemporary liberalism and its intrinsic relationship with capitalism - provides for a 
confusing presentation of contemporary politics and the strategies for activism that 
ground his intellectual interventions. In his formulation of human rights progressive 
political struggle need not be theorised; we must instead focus on revealing the truth 
and making the facts of human rights abuses public. Given Chomsky's political 
starting-point - human rights as biologically given - theory and ideology become in 
this formulation superfluous, if not a hindrance, to a transformative politics.
•50
Chomsky's explicitly anti-theoretical approach to political writing and the tendency 
to suggest an even post-ideological basis39 to his interventions is a result of this 
innatist conceptualisation of human rights. The extent of his opposition to theory is 
illustrated in his rejection of Gramsci's assertion that 'a main obstacle to change is the 
reproduction by the dominated forces of elements of the hegemonic ideology' that is 
replaced by the maxim "just tell the truth"40 . Telling the truth is opposed to 'repeating 
ideological fanaticism' 41 , as though an alternate politics can be formulated outside of 
ideology. Chomsky here demonstrates the continued currency of fanaticism as a term 
of abuse and more alarmingly echoes Alan Johnson's dismissal of the radical left 
through the negative association of contemporary emancipatory politics and 
fanaticism. This simplistic understanding of the operation of ideology reduces 
strategy on the left to a process of disseminating the truth based on an understanding
38 See, Slavoj Zizek, "Introduction: Between the Two Revolutions" in Revolution at the Gates: A 
Selection of Writing from February to October 1917 by Vladimir I Lenin, ed. Slavoj Zizek (London: 
Verso, 2004) 4.
39 'Chomsky....steps outside of all groups and eschews all ideologies'. Chris Hedges, Foreword to 
Power and Terror: Power and Terror: Conflict, Hegemony, and the Rule of Force, by Noam Chomsky, 
(London: Pluto, 2011)
40 Noam Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions: Conversations with Noam Chomsky on the Post 9/11 World, 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 2005) 63.
41 Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions, 63
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that facts alone are enough42 . We potentially enter here a post-political formulation 
within which Chomsky's leftism is seemingly based not on an alternative politics but 
on an impossible attempt to step outside ideology and operate on a terrain defined 
ultimately by human rights.
Human rights beyond politics
Habermas' notion of a political order based on human rights stands at the heart of his 
project of articulating a worldview in which the democratic process is taken beyond 
the nation state. This postnational constellation is posited as a transformative 
response to neo-liberalism43 and in this idea of an ostensibly radical cosmopolitan 
democracy the demos is unbounded by nation states instead understanding the 
populace to be humanity at large44 . The notion of transcending national citizenship is 
grounded in Habermas' conceptualization of rights that refer to individuals on the 
basis of their humanity. The postnational framework needs to be understood as the 
fulfillment of Habermas's understanding of the potential of rights. The global 
expansion of human rights can come about through the transformation of states into 
constitutional democracies through which 'nationality' would become the result of a 
free choice as opposed to something imposed on the individual. As this is, as 
Habermas admits, some way off, an alternative route would emerge if each individual 
'attained the effective enjoyment of human rights immediately as a world citizen'45 . 
The concept of 'citizen' here loses its meaning; the concept of a bounded 'people' on 
which a notion of equality can be grounded is lost through its substitution with a 
universal humanity.
The centrality of human rights to Habermas's vision of world politics is 
further illustrated in his assertion of the co-originality of human rights and popular 
sovereignty. In line with his theory of communicative action, Habermas rejects the 
idea of a problematic, tension ridden relationship between human rights and popular
42 See, Slavqj Zizek, "An interview with Slavoj Zizek", Left Business Observer, April 17, 2003, 
accessed August 15, 2011, http://www.leftbusinessobserver.com/Zizek.html
43 Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, chapter 4 - "The Postnational Constellation and the 
Future of Democracy".
44 Andrew Fraser, "A Marx for the Managerial Revolution: Habermas on Law and Democracy", 
Journal of Law and Society 28, 3 (2001).
45 Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, 119
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sovereignty. The connection is based on the fact that 'human rights institutionalize the 
communicative conditions for a reasonable political will formation' 46 . The 
relationship between human rights and democracy is filtered through Habermas' 
understanding of deliberative democracy for which human rights are a formal 
condition47 . This formulation of a consensus based politics illustrates that Habermas' 
suffers from what Mouffe has termed 'the incapacity of democratic theorists and 
politicians to acknowledge the paradox of which liberal-democratic politics is the
^o
expression' . His deliberative politics based on human rights is fundamentally 
depoliticised - and depoliticising - as it seeks to deny the conflictual nature of politics 
and the ineradicability of antagonism49 . This is arguably unsurprising given the 
depoliticising effects of a conceptualization of rights based on the concept of a 
common humanity that is so central to Habermas' political framework.
If we accept from Zizek that 'a leftist position should insist on the 
unconditional primacy of the inherent antagonism as constitutive of the political' 50 
then Habermas' position on the left is brought into question. While for a right-wing 
lawyer such as Andrew Fraser, Habermas' communicative model of preceduralist law 
making is considered to be designed to promote the revolutionary transformation of 
Western civilisation51 , in reality his political vision, based as it is on a pivotal 
deconstruction of the democratic conception of equality, denies the possibility for any 
substantive alternative, emancipatory politics. Habermas's 'leftism' at best suffers 
from the delusion that the status quo can be contested through a repression of the 
political; at worst it converges with a liberal reformism that brings Habermas very 
close to so-called left liberalism of Rorty.
The fallacy of his claims to a truly transformative leftist politics is further 
exposed through his concern with the rejuvenation of Europe. When one considers 
that the transcendence of the nation state involves (although cannot be reduced to) an
46Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, 117
47Jurgen Habermas, "Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and Republican Versions", 
Ratio Juris!, 1(1992)
48 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, (London: Verso, 2000) 8
49Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, xi
50Slavoj Zizek, "Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics", in The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, ed.
. . . rv /T _ — J~«. \T*.~r,n 1 OOO\ OOChantal Mouffe, (London: Verso, 1999) 29
51 Fraser, "A Marx for the Managerial Revolution"
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apparent transformation of the international economic system52 this appears to signal 
Habermas' desire for a substantive reordering of the current political and economic 
frameworks. However, his apparent desire to transform the economic status quo is at 
odds with the basic premise of his manifesto for the renaissance of Europe53 in which 
he fundamentally fails to acknowledge - or seeks to obscure - that a crucial 
dimension to the European project is strengthening the competitiveness of European 
capitalism and in turn reinforcing neo-liberal capitalist hegemony54 . His project for 
transformation is instead shown (at least in the European context) to be something of 
a 'Third Way project for international politics' 55 and this points toward the 
conservative effect of his vision of human rights that appears in reality to undermine 
his professed desire for transformation. It becomes clearer at this point that human 
rights play a central role in a project of reform but substantive transformation based 
on a truly alternative and above all emancipatory politics is denied through his 
conceptualization of a politics based as it is on a rejection of a notion of substantive 
equality.
Transformation of/through human rights
Despite Chomsky's assertion of a distinction between classical and contemporary 
liberalism, in terms of political effects his understanding of human rights merges with 
the current liberal one based as it is on a fa9ade of political neutrality. Regardless of 
whether the liberal begins from the conception of human rights based in human nature 
or not, Chomsky's formulation of a politics based on human rights suffers from the 
same delusion that there exists a space outside of politics within which an 
'uncomplicated' human rights based critique can be offered. It has been shown in the 
preceding chapters that the liberal critique mounted on the pretence of an apolitical 
defense of human rights has a pervasive depoliticising effect withdrawing any 
substantive critical discussion of the broader structural features of the status quo.
52Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, 68
53Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, "February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for 
a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe", Constellations 10, 3 (2003)
54 See, Frank Deppe, "Habermas' Manifesto for a European Renaissance: A Critique", Socialist
Register 41 (2005)
55Deppe "Habermas' Manifesto for a European Renaissance," 17
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Chomsky's politics of human rights runs the same risk undermining his professed 
desire for transformation and this will be considered further in the latter part of this 
section.
For Habermas, understanding the basis of his ultimately conservative vision of 
human rights involves a return to the explicitly legalistic aspect his politics. Habermas 
accepts that a human rights fundamentalism is a possibility but that it is avoided not 
through a rejection of the politics of human rights but through 'a cosmopolitan 
transformation of the state of nature among states into a legal order' 56 . The danger of 
a moralization of politics is for Habermas avoided by a legal formalization of 
morality. Habermas succumbs to the ever present illusion that law 'must and will be 
increasingly the sole regulator of social life' 57 . He advocates the jmodification of 
politics as a response to real and potential oppressive effects of power politics and in 
this framing human rights, understood to be specifically juridical in nature, play a 
central role in regulating politics. This approach is underpinned by an absolute faith in 
the regulatory capacity of law and moreover, a faith in the neutral function of law in a 
liberal capitalist democracy.
Clearly Habermas is occupied in a defense of human rights both in terms of 
refuting 'selective readings, tendentious interpretations, and narrow-minded
c Q
applications' - a list of charges for which Schmitt is seen to be guilty of all - and 
exposing and rejecting 'the shameless instrumentalization of human rights that 
conceal particular interest behind a universalistic mask' 59 . Criticisms of human rights 
are therefore based on either unfounded attempts to delegitimise an innately 
legitimate framework or on confusion between the misuse of human rights and their 
inherent meaning. Yet Habermas fails to challenge the moralization of politics given 
that his response is reduced to the criminal prosecution of human rights violations. 
His confrontation with Schmitt and subsequent defense of human rights is based on a 
supposed 'subversive force' of human rights that knows no geographical bounds60 but 
when one considers the closure of political possibilities that Habermas enacts through 
his expressly legalistic perspective, the existence of a truly subversive force behind
56Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other, 201 
57Manent, A World Beyond Politics?, 171 
58Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, 129 
59Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, 129 
60Habermas, "T he Concept of Human Dignity," 478
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human rights and an affirmative political project that Flynn accredits to Habermas 
ultimately fall flat.
While Chomsky and Habermas fail to confront and thus fail to substantively 
transform the reality of liberal politics, Butler's re-imagining of the subject of human 
rights through a reconstitution of the category of the human is a process symptomatic 
of Butler's understanding of a transformative, performative politics61 . Within this 
'performative polities' repetition or reiteration of the universal can have 
transformative effects:
Conventional and exclusionary norms of universality can, through perverse 
reiterations, produce unconventional formulations of universality that expose 
the limited and exclusionary features of the former one at the same time that
(\}they mobilise a new set of demands .
This practice is at the core of Butler's vision of human rights claims that can and must 
involve a questioning of the hegemonic formulation of the universal. Human rights 
claims in this sense are political in that they contest the universal and demand through 
its reformulation a new set of claims as opposed to a simple assimilation of the rights 
claimant into an existing regime of explicit understandings of rights.
Butler is well aware that positing a transformative conception of human rights 
runs the risk of appearing to remain on the same (liberal) political terrain. A 
performative politics that is employed in 'challenging existing forms of legitimacy, 
breaking open the possibility of future forms' 63 appears antithetical to the formulation 
of human rights exposed in the critique of liberal intellectuals above. However, in 
Butlers understanding of transformative politics, 'rights-claiming may be best 
understood as performative' 64 . This understanding requires an acceptance that one 
must follow a 'double path' in the politics of rights-claiming. In this sense claiming 
rights is never simply a 'citation of liberal norms' 65 and while Butler accepts that we 
have to operate in terms of human rights she suggest that we must also 'subject our
61 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, (New York: Routledge, 1997)
62 Butler, "Restaging the Universal," 40
63 Butler, Excitable Speech, 147
64 Karen Zivi, "Rights and the politics of performativity," in Judith Butler's Precarious Politics: 
Critical encounters, eds. Terrell Carver and Samuel Chambers, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008) 165.
65Zivi, "Rights and the politics of performativity," 167
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very categories to critical scrutiny' 66 . The double movement of innovation and 
critique allows Butler to utilize human rights as a central component of an alternative 
politics through a transformation of liberal norms. Human rights therefore provide a 
site for transformation and open a space for 'remaking reality' by querying the human 
as a 'site of power differentials' 67 . This is reliant on the rejection of the Chomskian 
understanding of human rights as the notion of the human as ground for Butler 
renders any attempted transformation of current inequalities incapable of coherence 
and ultimately of success:
Only when the human is ungrounded, then, can we ask, how does the human 
come into being at the expense of the inhuman, and how do these qualities
f O
become allocated on the basis of power differentials?
Butler clearly attempts to posit a reformulated, anti-imperialist and 'just' 
human rights activism that appropriates the discourse of human rights from its liberal 
hegemonic foundation. This involves an opening up of the category of the human 
viewing universalisation as an uncompleted process that only a reimagined human 
rights activism can fulfil. Human rights are presented in this sense as rigorously 
critical, distinct from the liberal understanding with a transformative potential that 
cannot be dismissed by the left. The contestation of the construction of the inhuman 
that is so evident in the contemporary epoch requires for each of these intellectuals 
not a rejection of human rights but their maintenance. However, Butler is explicit that 
human rights activism must refuse to concede a critical relation to power in its drive 
to be effective; it cannot refuse to 'rock the boat' and be silent in the face of current 
power relations in its attempt to be taken seriously. This is not a complete defense of 
human rights activism as it exists now, as Butler is well aware that in the drive to be 
pragmatic human rights activists runs the risk of neglecting their capacity to be truly 
critical in relation to the current hierarchies of power but this is not understood to be a 
innate feature of human rights. They have in their current dominant form become (or 
have the potential to become) depoliticised and in turn legitimating but Butler remains
66Butler, Undoing Gender, 37 
67Butler, "Afterword," 1660 
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committed to a revised vision of human rights that is an invaluable tool to a leftist 
politics that seeks to contest and refashion the status quo.
An alternative critique of the liberty-security regime?
Given the apparent tendency of Chomsky and Habermas to fail to substantively 
engage with the relationship between liberal politics and human rights the nature of 
their critique of the current security regime requires critical analysis. The central 
question posed here in relation to all three authors is how these critiques differ from 
the liberal criticisms of the 'war on terror'. If the ostensibly alternative 
conceptualization of human rights fails to substantively depart from the liberal 
formulation it appears to constrain, if not negate, the possibility for a truly critical 
analysis of the politics of security; a critique that avoids the obfuscation of liberal 
politics that defines liberal critiques. At the core of this analysis the potential for a 
truly critical human rights based critique of liberal politics must be assessed.
Chomsky's critique of the current security regime is, in line with much of his 
political writings over the last forty years, essentially an empirical account of state 
violence. His writing on post-9/11 interventions as well as the development of (or 
intensification of) a domestic regime of policing under the rubric of counter-terrorism 
provides numerous vital insights and expositions of the basic facts of the content and 
effects of state policy. However, his critique rarely, if ever, moves beyond what is 
essentially a journalistic style of critical analysis. His aversion to theory and 
commitment to making facts public renders his wealth of contributions to leftist 
literature on the 'war on terror' devoid of any substantive political critique. He 
remains committed only to exposing the apparent hypocrisy or hidden intentions that 
lie behind official rhetoric. Fulfilling his understanding of the responsibility of the 
intellectual set out in his very early work69 he seeks to respond to power through the 
exposition of truth. Truth is understood as an uncomplicated notion and 'factual 
truths', understood as autonomous from the socio-political context in which they 
arise, are awaiting identification and exposition. For Chomsky this process forms a 
sufficient basis for a philosophical and political strategy. The responsible intellectual
69 Noam Chomsky, "The Responsibility of Intellectuals", The New York Review of Books, February 23, 
1967, accessed August 25, 2011, http://www.chomsky.info/articles/19670223.htm.
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must regardless of political persuasion insist on the truth and Chomsky remains 
committed to this ostensibly non-partisan, non-political framing of intellectual 
intervention.
The lack of theoretical content leaves his critique and subsequent defense of 
human rights without substance. The centrality of human rights to the rhetoric of the 
liberal states orchestrating the 'war on terror' is not subjected to a truly critical 
analysis. Human rights are understood to be uncontestable; they cannot in Chomsky's 
understanding have any kind of intrinsic legitimating function as they remain 
grounded in the fundamentals of human nature. As a result, the only possible 
explanation for the fusion of human rights and security in the current regime is that 
human rights are exploited and misappropriated in the service of Western 
imperialism. Human rights are understood to be antithetical to the use of force in 
international politics and in Chomsky's view the US must choose which path to 
follow, one governed by human rights or one of power politics70 . In this framing 
human rights are exonerated from any essential function in the 'war on terror' and 
Chomsky's role - and indeed the role of any 'responsible' intellectual - is reduced to 
exposing the hypocrisy behind the US government's commitment to human rights.
Chomsky relieves himself of the need to confront the relationship between law 
and violence in liberal politics that would require a substantive exposition of the 
distinctions between classical liberalism and its contemporary form. By rejecting the 
utility and necessity of political theory Chomsky avoids naming the current politics 
and through a comprehensive depoliticisation of human rights he denies any 
possibility for a politics of human rights to be bound up in the maintenance of the 
current status quo. Fundamentally, the central charge of an exploitation of human 
rights aligns Chomsky's critique with the essential liberal criticism of the 'war on 
terror'. In his critique he is arguably more willing to expose the violence of the liberal 
state than some of the more apologetic liberals but this is never developed into a 
substantive critique of liberal politics as that would necessitate a confrontation with 
both human rights and the concept of security in the liberal tradition (including in the 
'classical' tradition).
70 Noam Chomsky, "Distorted Morality: America's War on Terror?", (Speech delivered at Harvard 
University, Cambridge, MA. February 2002), accessed August 25, 
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Chomsky's assertion of a pre-capitalist liberalism fails to acknowledge (or 
chooses to obscure) the fact that the prioritization of security over liberty is not a 
feature confined to the period following his suggested break in formation of liberal 
ideology. Critical accounts of the prominence of security in the development of liberal 
ideology beginning with Marx make clear that security existed as the central liberal 
category in its founding thinkers including those directly cited by Chomsky as 
influences on his politics71 . Chomsky's failure to substantively expose and dissect the 
current politics of security is arguably a result of his professed intellectual debt to the 
likes of Smith, Madison and von Humboldt within whose work liberty is already 
subsumed under the idea of security. If security is the supreme concept of bourgeois 
ideology and indeed of liberal ideology, Chomsky's distinction between classical and 
contemporary liberalism falls flat. His avoidance of theory prevents what would be a 
most uncomfortable reconfiguration of his own politics brought about by a 
consideration of the concept of security. His predominant recourse to legal regulation 
through human rights as opposed to a coherent political critique of liberal ideology is 
a result of this problematic intellectual lineage in his work and he thus spares himself 
the need to think critically about the role of human rights in the current security 
regime.
The convergence of left and liberal: further legitimation of the status quo in the 
guise of critique
While Chomsky portrays a continuation in the US state's reliance on the use of 
violence between the pre and post-9/11 periods, Habermas suggests that the 'war on 
terror' marks a significant turning point in the US state's regard for the law. For 
Habermas the response to 9/11 marks an 'unprecedented rupture with a legal tradition 
that no previous American government had ever explicitly questioned' 72 . Presenting 
the current security regime as novel converges with the current and historical liberal 
presentation of a supposed exceptional rejection of legal regulation on behalf of the 
liberal state. Habermas' political theory illustrates his clear commitment to the 
fundamentally liberal idea of an intrinsic relationship between legality and legitimacy
71 See, Neocleous, Critique of Security; George Rigakos, et al, A General Police System: Political 
Economy & Security in the Age of Enlightenment, (Ottawa: Red Quill Books, 2009).
72Jurgen Habermas, The Divided West, (Cambridge: Polity, 2006) 182.
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and the resulting understanding of the 'war on terror' is of an exceptional 
circumstance in which the liberal state has conceded legitimacy by rejecting the 
regulatory role of law.
The central charge in Habermas' critique of the current security regime - that 
it is characterised by a novel rejection of the law - is grounded in an acceptance of the 
essential legitimacy of the liberal democratic tradition and its conformity to the rule of 
law. The legitimacy of liberal democracy is based primarily in its relation to, and 
respect for, the regulatory function of the law but also on the inherent capacity to 
develop and sustain channels for communication that are the precondition for an 
effective and legitimate politics. These two points are however two sides of the same 
coin when one understands that for Habermas' 'legitimate lawmaking is always
T"2
simultaneously a process of generating communicative power' . A legitimate politics 
is conditional on the legal formalization of relations between individuals that allows 
for communicative processes through which a consensus can be reached. Liberal 
democracy prevents the speaker and listener from becoming estranged avoiding a 
situation in which communication would be distorted or denied. While this starting 
point reveals a delusional (and characteristically liberal) belief that a politics of 
consensus arrived at through the rejection of conflict is both effective and desirable, it 
grounds the critique of the current security regime and the position of human rights 
therein.
In this formulation legitimate politics is that which is tamed or more 
accurately repressed by the power of the law. Habermas' appreciation of the liberal 
democratic form is underpinned by the misunderstanding that in a true liberal 
democracy politics are subordinate to law and legal regulation is absolute. The fa9ade 
of the liberal state's commitment to legal regulation is here maintained and from this 
point the 'war on terror' can be condemned as an abrogation of liberal principles 
orchestrated by 'neoconservatives' who have definitively broken with the UN human 
rights policy74 . Habermas occupies the same vantage point as Tom Farer and other 
liberals above who view the 'war on terror' as an illiberal project that the liberal can 
and must critique from an independent external position.
William E Forbath, "Short-Circuit: A Critique of Habermas's Understanding of Law, Politics and 
;onomic Life", Cardozo Law Review 17, 4-5, (1996).
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Relying on such a decisive obfuscation of the liberal state's relationship to law 
and the role of law in bourgeois society, Habermas is able to present terrorism as the 
antithesis of liberal democracy. Understanding terrorism as the most extreme version 
of the distortion of communication75 it is presented as the negation of the political that 
requires in response not a withdrawal to illiberal power politics unrestrained by the 
law but instead a truly liberal democratic project though which the channels of 
communication can be rebuilt. Liberal democracy is again presented as under threat 
from two sides: from terrorism and from the neoconservative response that both 
threaten the liberal drive to pacify conflict. Terrorism must instead be opposed by a 
return to the principles of liberal democracy defined ultimately by legal regulation.
On this basis Habermas opposes the 'war on terror' for its reliance on the 
exercise of political power in the 'dimensions of the military, the intelligence services 
and the police' that 'endangers the mission of improving the world in accordance with 
liberal ideas' 76 . The apparent subscription to a distinctly liberal vision of reform 
accords with the analysis above in which transformation of the political and economic 
status quo is denied in Habermas' politics and this frames his critique of the current 
security regime. His critique of the exercise of political power through the police does 
not however preclude him from legitimating the policing of domestic and global 
contexts in the name of security. His understanding of the relationship between law 
and politics allows for, if not necessitates, a support for the policing of terrorism but 
he presents this as a distinct project from the one in place in the 'war on terror' as it 
must be underpinned by a commitment to the law. The desired 'transformation' 
advanced by Habermas is of 'international and selective punitive wars into police 
actions authorized by international law' 77 that would conform to his vision of a 
cosmopolitan international order in which justice between nations can only be secured 
through the jmodification of international relations. Policing is seen to be a legitimate 
part of a liberal response to terrorism as it serves to respond to the adversary in a 
manner compatible with criminal justice procedures. The vision of policing 
underpinned by the rule of law seeks to reinforce a distinction between the exercise of 
political power through the police and the processing of criminals through the
75Habermas, The Divided West, 64 
76Habermas, The Divided West, 34 
77Habermas, The Divided West, 100
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criminal justice system. Again, politics can and should be effaced through a 
commitment to the law.
Habermas attempts the impossible task of cleansing the concept of policing of 
all its political connotations suggesting that a form of policing authorized and 
regulated by law (in both the domestic and international context) is uncontentious. In 
maintenance of the liberal fa9ade of legal regulation, liberalism is here presented as 
opposed to the exercise of political power through military and policing means. The 
conformity to the liberal notion of the political neutrality of the law (and by extension, 
the police) is all too clear in Habermas' 'alternative' and it is ultimately his 
conceptualization of the political that allows him to posit an ostensibly non-political 
vision of policing. His marginalization of the political to a distinctly liberal theory of 
consensus building enables him to depoliticize the police and detach the function of 
the police from its inherent relationship to the state. Policing becomes solely about 
defending liberty in a critique built on a startling mystification of the nature of 
security and denial of its supreme position in liberal ideology. Habermas sustains a 
false opposition between war and policing whilst at the same time obscuring their 
symbiotic relationship in service of the liberal system. If we accept that the 
war/policing opposition is false, Habermas' defense of the 'war on terror' in its 
policing guise has potentially a similar legitimating effect as that provided by the "just 
war" left.
As for Chomsky, human rights are positioned as detached from and 
antithetical to the current security agenda only implicated because they have been 
instrumentalized by the state in service of the 'war on terror'. As a result of this 
position a defense of human rights can only come through a 'return' to an inherently 
legitimate rule of law. Fundamentally, the leftist critique of the current security 
regime articulated by Habermas and Chomsky relies on the same notion of the 
illiberal activities of the liberal state that forms a fundamental theme in the liberal 
public intellectual and scholarly critique. While Habermas' position is more explicitly 
implicated in the legitimation of the liberal system, the failure of this leftist position is 
for both authors brought back to a failure to engage critically with the concept of 
security and its central position in liberal ideology. There is an unwillingness to name 
the current politics of security and engage in a comprehensive critical analysis of the 
liberal affiliation with security both in its contemporary form and its classical 
tradition. Both authors leave themselves no option but to withdraw to fundamentally
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liberal terrain on which on ground their critique; legal regulation through the 
promotion of human rights has the potential to return the liberal state to its liberal 
foundations (regardless of how far back one has to go to identify these foundations). 
Liberty, formalized in terms of human rights, is in this vision of liberal ideology 
presented as the central liberal principle that has been neglected by an abrogation of 
the liberal tradition that took place either at the point in which classical liberalism was 
distorted by the development of industrial capitalism or in the response to the events 
of 9/11. Both accounts involve a pivotal distortion of liberal ideology on the basis of 
which a leftist critique is rendered impotent.
Whilst this is ultimately true for both Chomsky and Habermas' interventions, 
the explicit positioning of law as a counterweight to politics in Habermas' work leads 
his critique to elicit more clearly the same depoliticising effects as those born out in 
the interventions made by Dworkin and Rorty et al. Chomsky at least remains 
committed to exposing the levels of violence that the liberal state employs in the 
pursuit of security even if he fails to develop this form of critique. Habermas on the
78
other hand acknowledges approvingly the critiques posited by Dworkin and Rorty 
and the convergence in critique illustrates a more obvious convergence in political 
position in which Habermas' leftism merges with the liberalism articulated by the 
'critical' liberal intellectuals. In fact Habermas' understanding of the left and left 
politics is made clearer in his portraits of Rorty and Dworkin within which the 
patriotism of both thinkers is applauded. In these accounts Rorty's position on the left 
is celebrated for its promotion of a tolerant society that 'keeps people together in 
solidarity despite growing diversity and recognizes no authority as binding that cannot 
be derived from deliberation and revisable agreements of air 19 .
That Habermas sees a place on the left for Rorty's own deliberative politics is 
ultimately a sign of the liberal reformism that defines his own political project80 . 
Furthermore, it confirms his subscription to a politics of consensus that he applauds as 
the basis for Dworkin's confrontation with the 'frightening political polarization' 
blighting the contemporary US. While Chomsky's critique falls short of the required 
political critique and fails in turn to provide a political alternative, Habermas is bound
78 See, Jttrgen Habermas, Europe: The Faltering Project, (London: Polity, 2009); Habermas, The 
Divided West, chapter 7.
79Habermas, Europe, 15 original emphasis. 
80 See, Hallward, "The Politics of Prescription"
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up in the depoliticisation of politics and the subsequent legitimation of the liberal 
system that serves in turn to reinforce the apparently unquestionable status of the 
current politics of security. He falls into the category of liberal reformism in the 
broadest sense and his critique of the security regime is, in line with Rorty et al, an 
attempt to rescue the liberal state from a perceived crisis of legitimation. The location 
of Habermas on the left understood in opposition to the current status quo is a blatant 
error that serves only to cloud the left-liberal distinction that must be asserted to 
expose and confront the liberal character of the current security regime.
Human rights beyond liberalism?
The leftist critique based on human rights appears therefore to be either incapable or 
unwilling to escape the narrow parameters placed on the possibilities for political 
critique by the hegemonic liberal framing of the liberty-security relationship. 
However, Butler begins from an acceptance that the left is in the current epoch in 
need of reorientation to take it 'beyond the liberal antinomies on which it currently
o i
founders' . There is therefore an apparent acceptance by Butler that much of the left 
has failed in the post-9/11 period to transcend the liberal terrain and thus been unable 
to offer a critique that exposes the liberal character of the current regime seeking 
seriously to offer a political alternative. Given the failure of Chomsky and Habermas 
to offer a leftist defense of human rights that truly transcends liberal ideology, 
Butler's vision of a reoriented left that remains wedded to human rights as a central 
concept and tool for critique requires careful scrutiny.
The analysis of Chomksy and Habermas above illustrates Butler's broader 
point that the left continues to founder on liberal antinomies and is as a result 
incapable of adequately grasping the current politics of security. Butler subjects the 
"just war" liberal-left to critique for its reinforcement of the liberal state's 
construction of a 'with us or with the terrorists' binary and here Walzer is rightly 
implicated as a central figure in this so-called leftist response. The role played by the 
liberal-left in policing dissent in the 'war on terror' is a crucial observation and a 
rejection of the narrow parameters reinforced by Walzer - and one would now argue 
certainly by Habermas and to a lesser degree by Chomsky - serves to at least
81 Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?, (London: Verso, 2009) 27.
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rhetorically to mark Butler's departure from the liberal-left. However, Butler's 
understanding of the current situation in which the left needs to be reformulated is 
brought into question when she suggests that the left is found wanting in light of 'new 
forms of state violence' that include those that 'seek to suspend legal constraints in 
the name of sovereignty, or which fabricate quasi-legal systems in the name of
o*^ __
national security . The problem exists not in her verdict on the left's failings but on 
the suggestion that the current situation in which unregulated state violence is 
employed in the name of national security is novel. The security regime understood in 
the terms set out by Butler is in reality not exceptional as it did not mark a departure 
from the security apparatus that had been in the making for decades and as the targets 
of this ostensibly new 'war' were themselves not new. The question therefore arises 
as to whether this misconception of the current regime is the result of a leftist 
intellectual who in reality remains within the liberal framing of the current situation 
and who as a result, is unable (despite intentions to the contrary) to truly 
conceptualize the politics of security and the subsequent political and intellectual 
response required of a reoriented non-liberal left.
It makes sense then to consider further Butler's vision of a reoriented left to 
ascertain the extent to which her reformulated leftist critique of the current regime 
transcends the liberal parameters that constrain Chomsky and Habermas. Butler is 
clear that her work (at least in the post-9/11 context) seeks to reorient politics on the 
left 'toward a consideration of precarity as an existing and promising site for
oo
coalitional exchange' . Precarity is for Butler a 'politically induced condition in 
which certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of 
support and become differentially exposed to injury, violence, and death' 84 and her 
recent work has involved an emphasis on this concept as a way of understanding the 
construction of less 'grievable' populations in the context of the 'war on terror' and 
beyond. It appears therefore to be bound up in Butler's understanding of the 
possibilities for a politics of human rights that contests the current exclusionary 
construction of the human.
82 Butler, Frames of War, 28
83 Butler, Frames of War, 28
84 Judith Butler, "Performativity, Precarity and Sexual Politics", AIBR : Revista de 
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The critique of the current security regime articulated through the concept of 
precarity recognizes the dehumanization that is a central feature of the construction of 
the specific suspect or criminal populations in the 'war on terror'. Butler refers to the 
'derealization' of populations that results from and is the premise of their 
dehumanization and serves as a crucial method of managing populations. She appears 
through this line of critique to begin to get the heart of the politics of security but the 
development of this critique draws her into a confrontation with, and emphasis on, the 
supposed novelty of the current regime. Determining exactly how the security regime 
is novel in Butler's conceptualization brings us closer to understanding how human 
rights are perceived to have a place in an alternative politics.
Butler's critique of the 'war on terror' focuses in on what she refers to as the
Of
'new war prison' within which the current form of state power is reconfigured 
through the contemporary interrelation of governmentality and the exercise of 
sovereignty. It is seemingly this fusion of modes of state power that gives rise to the 
novelty of the political project underway in the 'war on terror'. The practice of 
indefinite detention manifested in Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and elsewhere is for 
Butler illustrative of a 'resurgent sovereignty' revealed through the exercise of 
prerogative power that belies the notion of history as chronology' 86 . The myth that 
sovereignty exercised through the suspension of the law has been superseded is for 
Butler exposed in the context of the war prison. But it is not simply unrestrained 
power at work in Guantanamo Bay etc but bureaucratic systems in which managerial 
officials decide who will be detained and this illustrates that 'a parallel exercise of 
illegitimate detention is exercised within the field of governmentality' 87 . Sovereign 
power operates within the field of governmentality and in this resurrected form it is 
for Butler a 'lawless and prerogatory power, a "rogue" power par excellence'** within 
which human rights are withdrawn from certain populations.
Fundamentally, in this understanding human rights are withdrawn when, and 
because, the law is suspended. The denial of due process that defines the detention of 
suspects in the 'war on terror' is an unnecessary measure to ensure security and the
85 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, (London: Verso, 2004) 
chapter 3.
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condemnation of this Butler acknowledges emerges from a human rights perspective. 
However, she suggests that distinct from this position a critique of power must also 
'object, politically, to the indefinite extension of lawless power that such detentions 
portend' 89 . The separation of a human rights point of view from that of a critique of 
power (or at least the acknowledgement that a critique of power demands more than a 
human rights perspective) illustrates that Butler does not have the same level of 
confidence in human rights as Chomsky and Habermas who conflate the two.
So if Butler refutes the idea that human rights are the sole principles on which 
to base a substantive critique we must return to her understanding of universalization 
as a political project to account for how the two remain inter-related. In her more 
recent work the recognition of precariousness is positioned as a central precursor to 
the pursuit of universality in which all lives become recognized as human and all 
populations are realised. The recognition of a shared precariousness 'introduces 
strong normative commitments of equality and invites a more robust universalizing of 
rights' 90 and thus the 'politics of precarity' and by extension leftist politics, is to be 
realised through a demand for rights. In her critique of the 'war on terror' as well as 
her work on sexual politics, the subject of human rights as currently constituted is 
exposed as fixed in an exclusionary form. Butler's politics of human rights involves a 
reconstitution of the subject facilitated by the continual political process of 
universalization that is brought about by the demand for groups to be recognized in 
their humanity. Fundamentally, equality is something proclaimed through political 
struggle marking a clear distinction between the Butler's understanding of human 
rights and that offered by Chomsky and Habermas.
In the context of the 'war on terror' the category of the human is limited by a 
cultural understanding in which 'we' are human and 'they' are not. Dehumanization 
has become 'the condition for the production of the human' through which cultural 
lines are drawn between the civilized and the inhuman91 . The rejection of this cultural 
framing does not for Butler involve a rejection of the term "human" as a political 
category but it necessitates a questioning of what it forecloses and the possibilities it 
leaves open. Butler's maintenance of a potential within human rights born out of the
89 Butler, Precarious Life, 63
90 Butler, Frames of War, 28-9
91 Butler, Precarious Life, 91
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possibility of redefining the subject aligns her position to some degree with that of 
Ranciere. More specifically, the possibility for universalization achieved through 
political struggle arguably illustrates Butler's unacknowledged debt to Ranciere's 
assertion that the subject of human rights can be (re)created in scenes of dissensus92 . 
For Butler the process of denying or 'derealizing' the humanity of an individual or 
whole population is one that can and must be contested through a political struggle. 
Crucially, the distinction between Butler and Habermas' conception of human rights 
can be understood in terms of the distinction between projects aimed at dissensus and 
consensus. By denoting the process of universalisation as a political instead of legal 
strategy Butler understands the subject of human rights as a political subject who can 
construct a dissensus against their exclusion as opposed to being rendered politically 
impotent in the pursuit of consensus. In terms of a leftist conception of human rights 
Butler appears to be distinct from Chomsky and Habermas by virtue of the inherent 
antagonism that she retains as the central feature of the defense and extension of 
human rights.
However, this distinction is apparently clouded by Butler's retention of the 
law's ability to regulate the exercise of sovereignty through the demand for rights. 
Butler develops her critique of the current configuration of state power to understand 
what place law has in the response to the current resurgent sovereignty. Rights in this 
sense continue to have a role in the limiting and conditioning of claims of state 
sovereignty. Butler concedes that her analysis of the process by which populations are 
managed through the derealisation of their humanity and subsequent 
'desubjectivation', points toward her wish that 'the state were bound to law in a way 
that does not treat the law merely as instrumental or dispensable93 . Yet she rejects the 
idea that this can be reduced to a narrow commitment to the rule of law; instead the 
place of law in the articulation of an international conception of rights that has the 
capacity to regulate the exercise of sovereign power is a central concern. The question 
arises here as to the extent to which the retention of the supposed regulatory power of 
the law reduces the distance between Butler and Habermas.
92Jacques Ranciere, "Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?", South Atlantic Quarterly 103, 2/3 
(2004)
93 Butler, Precarious Life, 98
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Recognising humanity?: Identity politics and the left
In considering the distinction between Butler's position and that of Habermas and 
Chomsky the underlying concern remains with the location of these thinkers on the 
left. Arguably a central component in this assessment is the extent of Butler's 
commitment to an identity politics and by extension the extent to which this defines 
her approach to human rights. If, as Brown suggest, identity politics is at least partly 
dependant on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and 
economic values then Eric Hobsbawm's conclusion that 'the Left cannot base itself 
on identity politics (because it has) a wider agenda' continues to ring true94 . 
Fundamentally, given the understanding of the politics of security set out above we 
must investigate the centrality or at least the visibility capitalism in Butler's work and 
specifically here, in her post 9/11 interventions. Understanding at this point that 
Butler's critique of the current security regime is built on a politics of human rights 
we must ask how this politics distinguishes itself from, and seeks to transform, the 
politics that define the status quo.
For Hobsbawm the Left must be against identity politics, not to deny the 
relevance of oppression experienced on the basis of gender, race, sexuality etc, but 
because a politics of identity fails to mobilize more than a minority and in doing so 
isolates these minorities. In this isolated and isolating approach the central, bourgeois 
features of the status quo are understood to be no longer relevant and such politics as 
a result plays a vital role in further obscuring the central features of the current 
regime. Indeed from the standpoint of identity politics class politics are seen as an 
increasing irrelevance to the point that they are now understood to be 'just one species 
of identity politics' 95 . From this perspective class, class struggle and capitalism are 
'largely fetishes disposed of any precise meaning' 96 and this version of left politics 
becomes paradoxically refocused away from the substantive features of the current 
regime. The politics of security are invisible from this vantage point confusing, if not 
obscuring the truly fetishized concept of the current era. A critique based on a politics 
of identity cannot but leave the current regime untouched. We must turn then briefly
94 Eric Hobsbawm, "Identity Politics and the Left", New Left Review I, 217 (1996) 44 original emphasis
95 Ernesto Laclau, "Structure, History and the Political", in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, eds. 
Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek, (London: Verso, 2000) 203.
96Laclau, "Structure, History and the Political," 201
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to Butler's positioning of her identity politics, or politics of recognition, to understand 
the extent to which her work and more specifically her vision of human rights falls 
into this category.
Butler has directly engaged in the debate around the role of identity politics on 
the Left. Her intervention(s) have sought to respond to an orthodox, economistic Left 
that decries any politics of recognition as 'merely cultural' 97 . Her defence of a post- 
structuralist influence on the left (and indeed on Marxism) has led her into an attempt 
to reconfigure the relationship between cultural studies and political economy that has 
itself been the target of criticism98 . Butler understands the evolution of new social 
movements (and by new we mean fixed to a specific identity) as a reaction to a 
hegemonic left as much a response to a 'complicitous liberal centre and a truly 
threatening right wing' 99 . The exclusion of questions of race and sexuality has lead to 
the evolution of what Butler has termed a neo-conservative Marxism that now defines 
this hegemonic left.
The notion of a neo-conservative Marxism, whilst reminding us again of
V
Johnson's depiction of the 'totalitarian Marxism' of Zizek and Badiou, leads Butler to 
attempt to reformulate the understanding of the cultural sphere and its relationship to 
the economic. Butler's attempt is not to dismiss the relevance of the economy (and 
she is compelled to make this clear by the critiques of cultural studies and identity 
politics that preceded her) but to explain that the cultural and the economic cannot be 
analytically separated. For Butler the cultural operates as the 'constitutive outside' of 
the economic or more specifically, 'the cultural is the condition of possibility for the 
economic' 100 . As opposed to this necessarily inferring the reduction of class into 
identity politics as per Laclau, Anna Marie Smith has suggested that Butler here drifts 
into structuralist Marxist and specifically Althusserian territory. In place of 
Althusser's ideological underpinning of the reproduction of the economic, Butler 
suggest that the economic necessarily depends on the cultural.
97 Judith Butler, "Merely Cultural", New Left Review I, 227, (1998)
98 See, Nancy Fraser, "Heterosexism, Misrecognition, and Capitalism: A Response to Judith Butler", 
Social Text 0,52/53 (1997)
99 Butler, "Merely Cultural", 36
100 Anna Marie Smith, "Missing poststructuralism, missing Foucualt: Butler and Fraser on capitalism 
and the regulation of sexuality" in Judith Butler's Precarious Politics: Critical encounters, eds. Terrell 
Carver and Samuel Chambers, (London: Routledge, 2008)
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The underlying premise of this apparent reconfiguration of the Left (one that 
accepts the relevance of cultural or identity politics but remains aware of the central 
but not primary importance of the economic) is that a transformative politics is one 
that 'properly combines redistributive and recognition struggles' 101 . Butler's position, 
initiated as a response to the 'merely cultural' critique found on the left, was to insist 
that an emphasis on new social (cultural) movements was not to the detriment of an 
emphasis on political economy. Rather than ascribing to Eraser's distinction between 
a politics of distribution and the politics of recognition102 (a distinction that stands 
only in the abstract ultimately intertwined in concrete historical conditions and 
combined in actual movements) Butler insists that capitalism is necessarily 
intertwined with cultural identity issues, most specifically, with the perpetuation of 
compulsory patriarchal heterosexuality that forms a core focus of Butler's critical 
work.
Capitalism then is ostensibly retained as a central concern of Butler's vision of 
identity politics. However, she remains committed to a politics of recognition that 
maintains an importance to cultural differences that for many pose an obstacle to a 
united left. A left that retains cultural or civil distinctions and marginalises the 
importance of class and moreover, in Rousseau's terms, the importance of the 
thinking subject103 is ultimately incapable of a transformative response. Stating the 
insignificance of 'cultural' difference is not the same as disputing their existence. 
Badiou's reference to 'the immortal' to be understood in his terms through 'our 
capacity for truth - our capacity to be that 'same' that a truth convokes to its own 
'sameness " 104 illustrates the possibility for a leftist perspective that can move beyond 
the cultural and particular to the universal.
For Butler we have the postulation of a universal but instead of a political 
category we have humanity. Butler's human rights approach is indeed connected to 
her vision of an identity politics and her vision of the left. We move beyond the 
particular (and negate the critique of the orthodox, if not 'neo-con', left) by positing a
101 Smith, "Missing poststructuralism, missing Foucualt." 87
102 Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the 'Postsocialist' Condition, (New York: 
Routledge, 1997)
103 See, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: Or, on Education. 1762. trans. Allan. Bloom, (New York: Basic 
Books, 1979) book I, 3 rd Maxim, 225.
104Badiou, Ethics, 27-28 original emphasis
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reconfigured, expanded vision of (who constitutes) the human. Questioning the 
hegemonic formulation of the universal through a 'performative reconfiguration' is 
for Butler the central task of the left that can widen the universal to enable the 
inclusion of infinite particularisms in the future. As a result equality is not a current 
condition, a starting point, but something to be realised in the future once the struggle 
to expand the concept of humanity to its all-inclusive conclusion has been realised. 
This vision of the left, regardless of the apparent recognition of capitalism, is 
incapable of a truly transformative politics.
While capitalism is retained as an issue of importance the actual effects of 
Butler's commitment to politics of recognition (even if it is widened to the 
recognition of a shared humanity) are borne out in her interventions that focus on the 
current security regime and its contemporary effects. Capitalism and bourgeois 
cultural and economic values do not feature as predominant concerns in Butler's 
analysis of the politics of security. As a result of this absence (and its underlying 
premises) human rights can be retained as the basis for a critique and the foundation 
of a political struggle. We have to return at this point to Butler's notion that a 
performative reconfiguration, as is pivotal to her reconfiguration of the human, can in 
itself form the basis for a truly transformative politics. This understanding has been 
brought into question in terms of the extent to which it actually allows for a 
contestation with the entire regime:
One should maintain the crucial distinction between a mere 'performative 
reconfiguration', a subversive displacement which remains -within the 
hegemonic field and, as it were, conducts an internal guerrilla war of turning 
the terms of the hegemonic field against itself, and the much more radical act 
of a thorough reconfiguration of the entire field which redefines the very 
conditions of socially sustained performativity. 105
Butler's reconfiguration of the human at the core of her human rights approach 
arguably stands as an 'internal guerrilla war' concerned with the terms of the 
hegemonic field. It remains within the current regime and is unable and unwilling to 
reconfigure the entire field. With Butler we have at least this internal guerrilla war 
conducted through a political struggle that aims at the construction of a dissensus, a 
struggle that is almost non-existent in Chomsky and Habermas' approach, but
105Zizek, The Ticklish Subject, 264.
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ultimately the critique available from her position is insufficient. On the basis of what 
is in reality a demand for only a partial politicisation she fails to grasp and thus 
redefine the current conditions.
Furthermore, despite the distinction between Butler's and Habermas's (and 
Chomsky's) human rights approach, for Butler human rights remain ends in 
themselves. The realisation of a universal humanity and the receipt of rights by those 
who have been historically denied them are seen as the end points of a transformative 
politics. This politics of recognition does not encompass a politics of redistribution 
but instead marginalises it and we end up with a critique of the current security 
regime that denies the inherent legitimating function of human rights and one that 
fails to reveal the intrinsic relationship between security and the capitalist system it is 
rooted in and serves only to defend.
Human rights in this sense are the ideal bedfellows of identity politics and, 
despite Butler's defence of identity politics and its apparent reformulation or 
reorientation, human rights and a politics of recognition have similar depoliticising 
effects that are magnified in their seemingly inevitable fusion. Butler's critique makes 
a number of important critical observations about the effects of the current political of 
security, and gets closer than Habermas and Chomsky by a long way to drawing out 
the significant problems of the current liberty-security regime but her political 
framework ultimately constrains her critique. Fundamentally, her departure from the 
liberal position - as exemplified by the liberal intellectuals considered above and 
essentially in this context by Habermas and Chomsky - is seemingly constrained by 
her commitment to human rights. By maintaining a central place for human rights in 
her understanding of an alternative politics her critical intervention retains a 
legitimating function. The idea of a critique that seeks truly to contest the status quo 
being built on (or retaining a space for) human rights appears, on the basis of this 
analysis, to be unworkable. The question remains whether human rights are inherently 
tied to the liberal system or whether they can be 'disconnected' to enable a 
substantive critique of the status quo; ultimately, we must ask whether they can be 




The function of human rights in the context of the 'war on terror'
The (im)possibility of critique
This analysis set out to determine the role human rights fulfil in the era of the so- 
called 'war on terror'. In doing so it sought to unravel what needs to be understood as 
a liberty-security regime, a regime within which concerns for liberty and security are 
intertwined. The analysis began from an understanding that the politics of liberty and 
security cannot be separated, except analytically, and only in a provisional way. An 
understanding of the formulation of either concept in the current epoch requires a 
concomitant analysis of the other and a concern with the ways in which they are 
entangled. In liberal politics liberty and security have always been interchangeable 
and conflicting only in appearance and this relationship continues in the twenty-first 
century. However, it is important to note that an alternative, if not antithetical, 
presentation of this relationship is fundamental to the perceived legitimacy of such 
politics. This chapter aims to bring together the preceding analyses and set out how 
the current liberty-security regime is to be understood and in doing so the intention is 
to determine the function of human rights in this regime. We must ask whether the 
current liberty-security regime demonstrates qualities inherent to human rights that 
ultimately render them a hindrance to an alternative politics, or whether alternatively, 
human rights can be drawn out of this context detached from the politics of security 
and (re)claimed for the left. The possibility in the current situation of an emancipatory 
politics that relies upon human rights must be considered in light of a critical analysis 
of the role of human rights in the current regime.
The analysis began from the idea that an unravelling of this liberty-security 
regime was only truly possible on the basis of a critical understanding of the liberal 
politics that underpin it. Liberalism needs to be understood as a specific politics and 
there was an understanding of the necessity of a substantive critical analysis of the 
current regime unhindered by the misleading definitions of liberalism that abound in 
contemporary political discourse. Therefore, the introductory analysis provided an 
exposition of what liberalism is, established in the first instance through a critical 
analysis of the classical liberal tradition. We have as a result an image of a liberal 
tradition defined by security and not liberty in the sense that it is traditionally
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presented. The liberty-security relationship has been defined through a long tradition 
of classical thinkers who have, despite their own claims and those of liberal scholars 
who champion their work, developed a politics of security that defines liberty in terms 
of a narrow, exclusionary defence of private property. The liberal tradition, heralded 
as the foundation of a commitment to liberty, is instead defined by an exclusionary 
logic that serves to maintain, if not exacerbate, the inequalities that define a capitalist 
society.
In this connection, it is fundamental to observe that there exists a void between 
the presentation of liberal politics and the reality of politics in a liberal democracy. 
The maintenance of a dominant presentation of liberalism defined by liberty has a 
crucial ideological function in the current epoch that is reinforced by a selective and 
misleading reading of the classical tradition. A major role of liberal discourse is 
precisely to deny the void between the presentation of the liberal state and the reality 
of its operation and to obscure totally the fact that the liberal state is unafraid of the 
use of violence as a fundamental tool for the maintenance of the status quo. In 
response to this, establishing a counter-hegemonic image of contemporary liberalism 
- still very much indebted to its foundation in seventeenth century liberal thought - is 
crucial as a starting point for a critical analysis of the current liberty-security regime. 
A critical analysis of contemporary liberal politics must begin from an understanding 
of the ideological function served by the maintenance of the dominant image of 
liberalism.
The role of the intellectual and the hegemonic politics of security
The liberty-security regime and its formal presentation need to be understood as 
installed and maintained not simply at the level of state or government action but as 
involving a number of influential actors who work, consciously or not, alongside the 
state to formulate the current approach to liberty and security. The role of the liberal 
intellectual is fundamental to this regime and the legitimacy of the regime relies upon 
the support of not only the straight defenders of security policy, but also a mass of 
intellectuals who are understood to be, or appear as, independent and, in many cases, 
even in opposition to current state politics. Despite the claims of critique, or more 
accurately because of it, the liberal intellectual provides a legitimating function to the 
current regime that is not available to its straight defenders. Liberal intellectual
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activity takes place at various levels but there exists a common position in which the 
major premises of the state's understanding of the current situation are not contested. 
This position has been influenced heavily by the interventions of a series of high 
profile public intellectuals who serve as a reference point in a long, drawn out 
'debate' about the liberal relationship between liberty and security.
This intellectual activity extends beyond traditional academic and scholarly 
circles and it is possible and indeed fundamental, to understand human rights 
organisations to fulfil a major intellectual function in this context. The intervention of 
leading human rights organisations in the debate about the liberty-security 
relationship demonstrates their conformity to the liberal framework and their response 
provides a legitimating function to the current regime that surpasses that provided 
through the other levels of intellectual activity. The legitimating function of the 
human rights organisation reinforces the belief that there is an independent critique 
emanating from an alternative position - consolidated in this context by their 'non- 
go vernmental' status and the popular perception, reinforced by the institutions 
themselves, of them as 'thorns in the side of the state' in relation to human rights 
issues - a belief that is pivotal to the legitimation of liberal politics.
The ability to accommodate critique, to reflect upon it, and arrive at an 
agreement through compromise is quintessentially liberal and reinforces the state's 
continually reiterated assertion that the current regime remains true to the liberal 
tradition at all times. The legitimacy of liberalism depends upon the idea that 
alternative perspectives can be accommodated and the end result of a process of 
debate is a compromise that takes all perspectives into account. This is crucial both to 
the current regime and to the existence of some kind of debate around the liberty- 
security relationship that suggests that the regime is able and willing to take 
alternative, critical perspectives into account and arrive at 'the truth' through such a 
process. That liberal intellectuals are presented as, and in many cases believe 
themselves to be, critical observers of this regime consolidates the vision of a regime 
produced through a process of reflection on the criticism it receives. In reality, the 
critique provided by the liberal intellectual is not only insubstantial but reinforces the 
vision of the state whilst purporting to hold the state to account.
Therefore, the idea of loyalty to the liberal tradition is true in two senses: in 
the first instance the liberal state (in its formal self-presentation) and the liberal 
intellectual broadly conceived are unwilling or incapable of transcending the defining
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characteristics of a liberal politics. Their shared response is defined by the application 
of the notion of balance as the only reasonable way to mediate between opposing 
concerns. In addition, they are both unable to confront the concept of exception and to 
concede in a formal sense that the liberal state is willing and able to transcend the 
regime of legal regulation that is central to liberalism. The premise and consequence 
of the shared position is a startling depoliticisation that is crucial to the legitimisation 
of the current regime and, central to this, the veiling of the reality of the liberal state's 
politics. Secondly, however the liberal character of the current regime is reinforced 
certainly not by the state's actual conformity to these principles of balance, 
negotiation and subservience to the law but by a kind of unconscious loyalty to, and 
an apparent incapacity to conceive a political reality other than, the reality of liberal 
politics. The current politics of security do not reveal a liberal state unwilling and 
incapable of making a decision but a state that is willing and able to use both legal 
and extra-legal violence to maintain the current order in conformity with the history 
of the liberal state.
The regime that exists underneath the presentation provided by official actors 
and the legions of liberal intellectuals engaged in the debate are focussed upon the 
maintenance of the current political and economic status quo. Security is confirmed as 
the supreme concept of bourgeois society and security policy is unsurprisingly 
ultimately aimed at policing opposition to liberal democratic capitalism. The current 
logic of security is all pervasive and the extension of the reach of security policy is a 
conscious process to reinforce the state's control over the current order; securitisation 
always involves a process of depoliticisation through which issues are bracketed off 
and handed to the state. The expansion of the remit of security strategy is a clear 
attempt to expand the state's ability to ensure that the current order, defined in the 
post 1989 as opposed to post 2001 context, is secured. This is not to dispute the fact 
that there is always a certain fragility to the state's ability to maintain order as we see 
at regular intervals. The process of securitisation is without end and the dominance of 
the liberal state's world view is not a testament to its omnipotence. The crisis 
situations that punctuate the continued march of the neoliberal order serve to 
undermine, if only temporarily, the stability of the status quo and security politics 
play a decisive role in attempting to consolidate the current order. The criminalisation 
of dissent is central to security politics and we see in times of crisis an intensification 
of the continuing curtailment of the right to protest justified in the name of security.
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The policing of protest is most explicit in relation to groups who seek openly to 
question the legitimacy of the status quo and anti-capitalist movements have been 
increasingly policed using powers introduced and justified in the name of countering 
terrorism 1 . This cannot be explained away as a 'misuse' of these powers; powers 
introduced in the name of security are aimed at policing dissent in all true forms. We 
must be mindful of the ways in which the self-presentation of the state and its direct 
or indirect backing from intellectuals serves not simply to mask the vulnerability of 
the current order but to consolidate its form by delegitimizing emancipatory 
alternatives.
The specific formulation and maintenance of the current regime through a 
necessary convergence of what tends to appear as a multiplicity of 'voices' around a 
common liberal position, demonstrates the importance of a form of hegemonic 
politics at the core of the politics of security. The role of the liberal intellectual as 
"persuader" - following Gramsci's terms but here in a conservative, counter- 
revolutionary sense - is arguably decisive in enabling the state to achieve sufficient 
support for security politics. Of course the state does not require unanimous support 
and the consent of all of those at the sharp end of security policies, those who must be 
policed, is not required. There is instead a need to persuade a sufficient number of the 
population that it is their security and their liberty that is being ensured and that this is 
being done in a manner compatible with the 'values' of a liberal democracy. Here the 
liberal intellectual offers a degree of reassurance that the state cannot provide. The 
curtailment of liberties has to be presented in such a way that it is clear that the trade 
of liberty for security is worth it and/or that the real loss of liberty will only be felt by 
a minority population who are identified as not simply 'suspect' but as a threat to the
nation.
In every facet of the current regime the role of the intellectual is crucial to the 
imposition and maintenance of policies that shore up the current status quo. The 
willingness of many of the authors, scholars, academics, etc. considered above to 
engage directly in public debates on the 'war on terror' is indicative of their function 
as intellectuals in the Gramscian sense. This function, demonstrated in the context of 
the 'war on terror' - and intensified through the pretence of critique - is not new but a
Daily observation also illustrates how 'security forces' are increasingly employed with ever greater 
freedom to suppress anti-austerity protests throughout Europe and beyond. The police have a 
fundamental role in defending the current order and this has to be intensified when this order appears to 
be in crisis.
218
critical analysis of the politics of security must make clear the influence of this 
intellectual class and the ways in which its intervention is crucial to the legitimacy of 
the liberal state.
The importance of the liberal intellectual to the hegemonic status of liberal 
security politics is unsurprising if we understand that 'the questions of hegemony and 
that of the intellectuals are, in a strict sense, indissoluble' 2 . The intellectual defined by 
'active participation in practical life, as constructor, organiser, "permanent persuader" 
and not just simple orator' 3 is fundamental to the consolidation of a hegemonic 
project. The intellectual has always been crucial to the dominance of liberal politics 
and we see in the current context only the most recent manifestation of the 
relationship required in all political projects:
Every group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential 
function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, 
organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and 
an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the 
social and political fields4 .
However, as we have observed the development of a specific liberty-security regime 
that defines liberal politics in the twenty-first century, the elaboration of a new group 
of organic intellectuals has been of pivotal importance. The argument here is not that 
the current politics of security constitutes an entirely new class project, indeed the 
analysis above has illustrated that the liberal project has always been defined by 
security, but that its current form demands a specific group of intellectuals whose role 
it is 'to elaborate such organisation in both ideological and practical terms' 5 . In this 
context, the public liberal intellectual along with their disciples - and here one can 
point most clearly toward the authors and signatories of WWFF and the EM - has a 
decisive mediating function. We should also note here that this function is crystallised 
in the work of the human rights organisation whose status in the contemporary liberal 
regime affords them a power to mediate in this sense inaccessible to the other strata of 
liberal intellectuals.
2 Gianni Francioni in Peter Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, (Leiden, NL: Brill, 2009) 406.
3 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 10
4 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 5
5 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, 416
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It is possible to make the claim that there are academics and scholars who 
have been considered above that would seem to fit more appropriately the label of 
traditional intellectuals in Gramscian terms. For many there is a genuine sense of 
opposition to the 'war on terror' and a feeling that what is happening in the name of 
security is indicative of the liberal state's transcendence or abandonment of liberal 
principles. These individuals are marked by an essentially conservative function 
hidden under the guise of an intellectual independence that is symptomatic of the 
function of the traditional intellectual. Indeed many of these could be understood as 
Peter Thomas puts it, to be 'unwilling, at best, or, at worst, unable, to recognise their 
continuing political function' 6 as Gramsci made clear that the assumption of 
autonomy and independence is 'not without consequences of in the ideological and 
political field' 7 . Indeed, this analysis has focussed on uncovering the ideological 
consequences of the liberal intellectual's pretence of autonomy and independence.
In broad terms however, the liberal intellectual needs to be understood as the 
contemporary type of organic intellectual tied to, and crucial to the success of, the 
current hegemonic project of the liberal state8 . Thomas's summary of Gramsci's 
understanding of the function of the intellectual captures much of what is directly 
relevant to an understanding of the liberal intellectual in the current epoch:
They function not simply as constructors of the 'trenches' that characterise the 
complexity of a fully developed modern state-formation; with the seemingly 
'non-political' organisation they undertake in the realm of civil society, they 
function as points of prestige and attraction for a class's hegemonic project 
and embody those trenches themselves, as 'functionaries' of the 
superstructures, or 'agents' of the state in its integral sense as 'organised 
disequilibria'9 .
The apparently non-political status of the liberal intellectual and their role as 'points 
of prestige and attraction' demonstrates the importance of Gramsci's thesis to a
6 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, 417
7 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 1
8 It is possible to suggest that firstly, this exposition of the specificity of the liberty-security regime, 
whilst not making claims to its exhaustive character, makes a crucial contribution to periodizing the 
state and secondly, that an understanding of the process by which hegemony is sought is vital to this 
project. There is insufficient space here for this to be developed but it is worth noting that an 
understanding of the current regime is, as we noted above, vital to an understanding of the current state 
form and the implication this has for the development of emancipatory alternatives. On hegemony and 
periodization see, Jessop, State Theory, 214-5
9 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, 413
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critical understanding of the current state politics of security and the process by which 
we have seen emerge a specific liberty-security regime.
Human rights and political possibilities in the 'age of terror'
The role of the liberal intellectual brings out further the specificity of the current 
regime. It reinforces the fact that the politics of security as currently in place across 
Western liberal democracies cannot function as they do currently without the correlate 
of liberty that infuses both the discourse through which they are 'sold' and, at a 
deeper level, the basic principles on which they rest. Human rights are integral to the 
current regime; human rights understood as the rights to property are the cornerstone 
of security policy. Human rights are both the goal of security strategy and its guide. In 
both roles they provide a legitimating function to the regime that is unsurpassed in a 
contemporary liberal democracy. The depoliticising function of human rights is vital, 
rendering the regime closed to opposition and further reinforcing the unquestionable 
legitimacy of liberal security politics. The relationship between security discourse and 
human rights principles is mutually beneficial reinforcing their unrivalled status and 
in turn shoring up liberalism's monopoly of legitimacy. Fundamentally, the split 
subject of human rights (with its active and passive sides) ensures that the politics of 
security are not only compatible with the contemporary humanitarian ethics but that 
they need to be understood as inseparable.
Human rights have to be central to the framework adopted by the liberal 
intellectual and the liberal state and it is this condition that leads a critical analysis of 
the current regime that bases its opposition on human rights principles to not only fail 
to provide a substantive critique but instead gift the current regime a source of 
legitimacy. Ultimately, the fact that liberal critiques are formulated giving so central a 
place to the language of (human) rights serves to set the parameters for all subsequent 
critique. Failing to circumscribe one's critique in the language of rights leads to 
rejection from any debate around security - legitimacy is ultimately the reserve of the 
human rights advocate. A critique that seeks to contest the politics of security and the 
politics of human rights (as indeed they cannot be separated) is rendered literally to
the extremes.
We have then a paradox characteristic of liberalism by which to be taken 
seriously a critique must refrain from saying anything serious. In other words, to be
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accepted within the current debate an intervention must not be truly critical of the 
current regime; essentially, this comes down to the fact that political economy of 
contemporary liberalism must remain obscured. If a commitment to human rights is a 
precondition for incorporation into the debate we must ask, as we have done in this 
thesis, what effects the incorporation of human rights has upon a critical standpoint. 
In the context of the current regime, a human rights based critique is acceptable 
precisely because it remains within the boundaries of liberalism and therefore fails to 
expose the politics of security as they are currently constituted. Such a critique is by 
definition, incapable of exposing the key role human rights play in this regime. 
Attempting to extract human rights from this regime and detach them from security, 
positioning them instead as the basis for a critique of liberal politics, leads inevitably 
to the conclusion that the liberal state is violent precisely because it has neglected its 
human rights commitments.
A critique based on human rights is seemingly incapable of acknowledging the 
pivotal role human rights have as part of the current politics of security and therefore 
ultimately unable to understand the current regime. Its inability to grasp the 
fundamentals of the regime renders such a critique less 'dangerous', less threatening, 
and thus acceptable. But what is the critical weight of a critique that does not pose any 
threat? The depoliticising function of human rights, well documented above, begs the
y
question here, posed by Zizek, as to "what kind of politicization do those who 
intervene on behalf of human rights set in motion against the powers they oppose?" 10 . 
This question seems vital in the assessment of human rights as a tool for the left.
In the case of those thinkers on the left who maintain a place for human rights 
in their vision of an alternative politics, the politicisation they set in motion is, at best, 
limited. For the likes of Chomsky and Habermas, their intervention is in reality leftist 
by name only; they conform to the fundamental principles of a 'critical' liberal 
position and fail to envisage an alternative politics that can be realised through 
political struggle. Butler's intervention suggests that a leftist politics of human rights 
is not necessarily as depoliticised and conformist as for example, Habermas's work on 
the 'war on terror' would suggest, but the politicisation set in motion is still only 
partial. The confrontation with the status quo still fails to identify the structures that
10Zizek, "Against Human Rights", 126
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define contemporary liberal societies and the transformation demanded by a politics 
of human rights remains limited, incapable of pursuing a true alternative.
The impenetrability of the politics of human rights lies in their status as an 
antipolitics 11 in a situation which gives credit to this (political) position. This only 
reinforces the politics of security, which is in the same sense defined by the 
suppression of political action. It is ultimately impossible to mount a contestation of 
the current regime on the basis of a commitment to human rights. If we accept that 
human rights activism 'displaces, competes with, refuses, or rejects other political 
projects' there is seemingly a major contradiction in trying to oppose through human 
rights a political regime that relies upon their central position. There is a need to 
accept that the legitimating function human rights play in the context of the 'war on 
terror' is emblematic of the pivotal role they play in securing a monopoly of 
legitimacy for liberalism. If, as Brown has noted, an analysis of the type conducted 
here is initially confronted by 'the impossibility of saying anything generic about the 
political value of rights' 13 it is crucial that her subsequent conclusion be noted:
It makes little sense to argue for them (rights) or against them separately from 
an analysis of the historical conditions, social powers, and political discourses 
with which they converge or which they interdict 14 .
In the context of the politics of security - within which human rights undoubtedly 
converge with the dominant political discourse- it is possible, and indeed necessary, 
to articulate a scathing critique and an unequivocal rejection of human rights as tools
for critique.
If we return to Marx's reminder about liberal rights, as summarised by Brown, 
we can see that a human rights based critique is innately depoliticising and in fact an 
inherent hindrance to an alternative politics. The inevitable fusion of a cultural 
politics and human rights found in Butler's critique is not a sign of their compatibility 
in any transformative sense but a result of their shared capability to reify the social 
powers they ostensibly confront:
1 'Brown, "The Most We Can Hope For..." 453 
12Brown, "The Most We Can Hope For... ", 453.
13 Brown, States of Injury, 98
14 Brown, States of Injury, 98
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Rights in liberal capitalist orders, Marx reminds us, are bits of discursive 
power that quintessentially privatise and depoliticise, that mystify and reify 
social powers (property and wealth but also race, sexuality and gender) as the 
natural possessions of private persons, that analytically abstract individuals 
from social and political context, that are in fact effects of the social powers 
they obfuscate.
Moreover, we must understand that human rights are bound to a dominant politics 
which defines what legitimate politics are by virtue of their inherent and seemingly 
inescapable capacity to mystify property and wealth. A liberal politics, defined from 
its outset by a possessive individualism and a defence of the institution of private 
property continues to rely upon rights to obscure the social powers that maintain the 
status quo. The relationship between liberty and security is not one mediated by 
balance or indeed a relationship of opposing concerns, but a conveniently adaptable 
pair based on the idea of property. In this sense the emphasis can be changed 
depending on the situation. The idea of balance simply serves to veil the liberal 
staunch defence of the inherent inequality that capitalism demands and creates.
For a political project that tries to abandon the constraints of liberal reformism 
and seeks instead to confront the world as the world is with a view to transform it, 
human rights reveal themselves to be not only of little utility but arguably a 
detrimental accompaniment. If a drive for collective justice - or indeed for any true 
sense of justice which by definition must include a fundamental collective dimension 
- is to be at the core of emancipatory politics then human rights cannot, by way of 
their equation with liberal individualism, assist such a project. This revelation should 
provide real cause for concern for those on the left who seek to articulate critiques of 
the violence of liberal politics - including the current security politics - in the 
language of human rights.
15 Brown, States of Injury, 123 original emphasis
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